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Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
ducoterra	1e816da5a8	phase: 01_keyboard_kiosk_control Build and Push Containers / test (push) Successful in 35s Details Build and Push Containers / build-and-push-app (push) Successful in 10s Details Phase 01 final verification pass — complete, 100% green - Verified all 4 tasks done (files in `complete/`); implementation review: key router in `watch.js`, share-page router, CSS focus/selection affordances, `?` overlay, pointer-free E2E suite — all sound. - Gates: `ruff check` + `ruff format --check` ✅ · `pyright` 0 errors ✅ · `uv run pytest` → 223 passed, 2 skipped (realdisplay), 1 pre-existing FastAPI deprecation warning · `MIRROR_REALDISPLAY=1 pytest -m realdisplay` → 2 passed ✅ · `pytest -m e2e` → 51 passed (incl. `test_keyboard_wall.py`, which a meta-test keeps pointer-free) · `node --check` on all static JS ✅. - Completion criteria: all 6 ✅ (j/k+Enter, f/g/n/p/1–9/m/?/Esc keyboard-only E2E; no hover-only controls via CSS guard + focus-ring E2E; `#name` text-safe; e2e/realdisplay green; key map documented in README "Kiosk client" and `docs/kiosk-silverblue.md`). - README fixed: added missing env vars `MIRROR_MAX_BITRATE`, `MIRROR_PING_INTERVAL`, `DEBUGPY_WAIT` to the config table; added the one-time `rpm-ostree` layering note before the kiosk install snippet. - AGENTS.md fixed: removed stale "roadmap is intentionally empty" parenthetical (3 phases pending); coverage ~94% → ~95%. No content added. - Unresolved, needs your call: README/SECURITY.md say `mirror.reeseapps.com`; `docs/kiosk-silverblue.md` (reference-client naming table with real IPs) says `mirror.reeselink.com`. I couldn't verify which is the live deployment domain, so I changed neither — say the word and I'll unify. - Next pending phase: `02_sharp_capture`.	2026-11-01 20:53:28 -05:00
ducoterra	896cca2f23	docs: plan, agent operating rules, and an honest security model PLAN.md locks the architectural decisions (WebRTC mesh with the sharer as sole offerer, JSON-only signaling, in-memory roster with no database, no auth, no CDN, Linux as the reference platform) and records the roster rules, the verification ladder, and the constraints that are accepted rather than hidden: the secure-context requirement, mesh upload scaling with watcher count, and the Wayland portal's per-share prompt. Phases are deliberately not written yet -- the prototype and its tests came first, so .agents/phases/todo/ holds only a README pointing at the candidate phase list in PLAN.md section 7. SECURITY.md answers the question a no-auth tool has to answer: not "who is allowed in" but "where is this allowed to run". It separates what an unauthenticated LAN visitor can do from the guarantees that are enforced and named to a test, and tells users the two things they will actually hit -- that http://<lan-ip> hides getDisplayMedia, and that on Wayland the compositor asks every time and mirror must not work around it. LLM-Generated: true	2026-11-01 16:54:28 -05:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

ducoterra

1e816da5a8

phase: 01_keyboard_kiosk_control

Build and Push Containers / test (push) Successful in 35s

Details

Build and Push Containers / build-and-push-app (push) Successful in 10s

Details

**Phase 01 final verification pass — complete, 100% green**

- Verified all 4 tasks done (files in `complete/`); implementation review: key router in `watch.js`, share-page router, CSS focus/selection affordances, `?` overlay, pointer-free E2E suite — all sound.
- Gates: `ruff check` + `ruff format --check` ✅ · `pyright` 0 errors ✅ · `uv run pytest` → 223 passed, 2 skipped (realdisplay), 1 pre-existing FastAPI deprecation warning · `MIRROR_REALDISPLAY=1 pytest -m realdisplay` → 2 passed ✅ · `pytest -m e2e` → 51 passed (incl. `test_keyboard_wall.py`, which a meta-test keeps pointer-free) · `node --check` on all static JS ✅.
- Completion criteria: all 6 ✅ (j/k+Enter, f/g/n/p/1–9/m/?/Esc keyboard-only E2E; no hover-only controls via CSS guard + focus-ring E2E; `#name` text-safe; e2e/realdisplay green; key map documented in README "Kiosk client" and `docs/kiosk-silverblue.md`).
- README fixed: added missing env vars `MIRROR_MAX_BITRATE`, `MIRROR_PING_INTERVAL`, `DEBUGPY_WAIT` to the config table; added the one-time `rpm-ostree` layering note before the kiosk install snippet.
- AGENTS.md fixed: removed stale "roadmap is intentionally empty" parenthetical (3 phases pending); coverage ~94% → ~95%. No content added.
- **Unresolved, needs your call:** README/SECURITY.md say `mirror.reeseapps.com`; `docs/kiosk-silverblue.md` (reference-client naming table with real IPs) says `mirror.reeselink.com`. I couldn't verify which is the live deployment domain, so I changed neither — say the word and I'll unify.
- Next pending phase: `02_sharp_capture`.

2026-11-01 20:53:28 -05:00

ducoterra

896cca2f23

docs: plan, agent operating rules, and an honest security model

PLAN.md locks the architectural decisions (WebRTC mesh with the sharer as
sole offerer, JSON-only signaling, in-memory roster with no database, no
auth, no CDN, Linux as the reference platform) and records the roster rules,
the verification ladder, and the constraints that are accepted rather than
hidden: the secure-context requirement, mesh upload scaling with watcher
count, and the Wayland portal's per-share prompt.

Phases are deliberately not written yet -- the prototype and its tests came
first, so .agents/phases/todo/ holds only a README pointing at the candidate
phase list in PLAN.md section 7.

SECURITY.md answers the question a no-auth tool has to answer: not "who is
allowed in" but "where is this allowed to run". It separates what an
unauthenticated LAN visitor can do from the guarantees that are enforced and
named to a test, and tells users the two things they will actually hit --
that http://<lan-ip> hides getDisplayMedia, and that on Wayland the
compositor asks every time and mirror must not work around it.

LLM-Generated: true

2026-11-01 16:54:28 -05:00