main
6
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 ducoterra
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c43a088ce8 |
phase: 04_controller_page_responsive
**Final verification pass** (all three task reports PASS; tasks already in `complete/`). One real defect found and fixed.
**Commands / results.** `bash tests/run_tests.sh` → `RESULT: all suites passed`, **5 104** checks (page **220**). `SANITIZE=1 bash tests/run_tests.sh` → passed. `bash .agents/validate.sh` → `validation OK`; bridge/console/rollback `SUCCESS`; `page bytes: 59262`; `README/AGENTS claims: OK`; `repo hygiene: OK`. Real-browser leg (headless Chromium, served assembled bytes): no horizontal scroll at 360/390/768/1440, ARM first-in-`main` and sticky, log height-capped, all 5 folds openable, all 3 changed page statements execute.
**Fix.** The folded notes' `<summary>` — the only route to five pinned safety sentences — rendered **17 px** on coarse pointers, under the page's own 44 px thumb floor, while every byte-level assertion stayed green. `src/web_page.h`: `button.k,.pill,input,summary{min-height:44px}` + `summary{padding:13px 0}`; `tests/test_page.js` +1 check (219→220); mutation-tested (reverting the CSS fails host *and* browser legs, then restored byte-for-byte).
**Criteria.** 1 ✓ browser-measured (physical phone still unobserved). 2 ✓ 220 checks + prose untouched. 3 ✓ page 59 286→**59 262 B** (−24 vs phase start), README = gate figure. 4 ✓ one `test_page` row at 220, intro 5 104 = measured. 5 ✓ gate green; phases 01–03 assertions unchanged apart from the re-pinned byte constant.
**Docs.** Re-pinned 59 262 (README, `config.h`, `test_conn.cpp`), totals 5 103→5 104, README Tests row 220; re-measured footprint rows (flash 1 257 901 / 1 178 141 / 1 157 593, TLS +6 176/+100 308); fixed stale "48 KB"/"~50 KB" (×4 src comments, ×2 README) and the 51 626-byte page-delivery row; added **bug 14** with root cause and renamed *Thirteen*→*Fourteen bugs* in README + AGENTS.md's two stale references; added the Phase 04 browser+device row to `.agents/HW_VERIFICATION.md`.
**Deviations.** Device leg stays open: live board serves 51 626 B (pre-phase image); no reflash attempted, per the standing no-unattended-reflash rule — no byte-equality claim made. `ruff check tools tests`: 29 findings, identical at HEAD and `--isolated`, `E9,F` clean, no repo lint config or gate step → left untouched. `.agents/validate.sh` is **untracked and has never been committed** (`git log --all --` empty) though README/AGENTS/PLAN cite it 13× — harness needs `git add` it; I did not stage anything.
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ducoterra
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d629a0ff51 |
phase: 03_session_takeover
**Phase 03 `session_takeover` — final verification pass. All green.**
All four task files were already in `.agents/phases/complete/03_session_takeover/` with per-task reports, so this was the phase-level close, not new implementation.
**Completion criteria**
1. *2nd controller authenticates + takes the bridge; a 3rd is refused* — met host-side: `test_claim` 102 (whitelist matrix, `acceptsUpgrade` one-claim-at-a-time, both deadline clocks across `millis()` rollover, 64-byte cap through the real codec), `test_relayctl` 308 (`--take-over` = `T`,`X`,`H`; default refusal names the flag and sends no `X`), `test_page` 142 (claim→button→one click→`T` then `X` only). Refusal mechanism stated precisely: a second claim gets `503`/`E3`, a third *socket* gets the slot refusal (`slotrefused`).
2. *Handover releases then adopts, lands disarmed* — pinned: `closeLink("taken over")` before adoption (inverting it fails exactly 1 check, reverted); no `arm`/`setArmed`/`armed = true` in the `X` path (inserting one fails exactly 1 check, reverted); un-authenticated `X` admitted in `claim.h` fails `test_claim`+`test_relayctl` (reverted). Also verified by reading: `serveClaim` never writes `_lastInboundMs`/`_controllerSeen`, so a parked claim cannot hold the board armed past 8 s.
3. *Incumbent page says taken over, disarmed, no auto-reclaim* — `onE12()` + `test_page` (disarms, releases mouse, ends typing run, pill `taken over`, reconnect loop off).
4. *Three source pins fail on inversion* — re-demonstrated in this pass, all reverted (`src/claim.h`, `src/control_server.cpp` byte-identical to pre-inversion).
5. *Gate green + README/AGENTS say takeover cannot arm* — yes.
**Validation** — `bash .agents/validate.sh` → **exit 0**: 12 suites **5026 checks, 0 failures** (normal and `SANITIZE=1`), `bridge`/`console`/`rollback` all SUCCESS, page bytes 59 286, README/AGENTS claims OK, hygiene OK. Extra lint: `ruff --select F,E9` clean, `bash -n` clean, `py_compile` clean. Coverage on new/changed logic: `claim.h` 100 % (11 lines), `status.h` 100 % (29), `proto.h` 94.8 % (229), relayctl take-over lines 14/15 (the miss is a `def` continuation trace never records).
**Defects fixed (docs only — no code defect found)**: bug 6 claimed a 2nd `/ws` upgrade "is still refused"; Measured-behaviour samples lacked `taken=`/`busy`/`tkov`; footprint + TLS-cost rows quoted phase-02 numbers while claiming to be what the gate prints (now 99 744/1 257 933, 67 352/1 178 173, 93 568/1 157 609 → TLS = +6 176 B RAM/+100 324 B flash); page-delivery/handshake rows dated; `AGENTS.md` pure-module list was missing `claim.h`.
**Hardware**: no device run. The board still runs pre-phase-03 firmware, reflash/arming mutates a live device (the target is this machine), and both controllers need the operator's passphrase — guessing feeds the shared 5-fail lockout. The 3 blank rows (third-controller refusal, chord labels, nothing-outlives-the-link) are now recorded `skipped (no device run)` with the exact closing commands in `.agents/HW_VERIFICATION.md`.
**Tree left for the harness**: index untouched (0 staged), no history changes; `todo/03_session_takeover/00_phase.md` moved to `complete/` (matches the phase-02 rename pattern); untracked files the commit must include: `.agents/validate.sh`, `src/claim.h`, `tests/test_claim.cpp`, `.agents/phases/complete/03_session_takeover/`, `.agents/reports/03_session_takeover/`. Next phase: `todo/04_controller_page_responsive/`.
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ducoterra
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e0780f58e0 |
phase: 02_tls_control_channel
**Verified / implemented (phase 02 final pass)** - All 6 tasks already in `complete/` → verification pass. Device measurement **found a real defect (README bug 11)**: the cert carried its SAN *value* under the OID written from the ASCII text `"2.5.29.17"` instead of DER content bytes `55 1D 11` (`openssl x509 -text` showed `1.10.46.53…`, hex `30 2f 06 09 32 2e 35…`), i.e. **no SAN** → hostname validation impossible while every host check stayed green (they walked the value, never the label). - Fixed in the pure module: `kSanOidTlv`/`sanOidDer()`, `sanExtensionFullDer()` (pinned to the 43 bytes OpenSSL writes for these names), `derCarriesSan()` (OID *and* value); `tls.cpp` uses them + 3 `static_assert`s; `cert` now warns and names the remedy. 33 new checks in `test_tls_pem.cpp`, incl. the pre-fix extension byte-for-byte (`derContains` yes / `derCarriesSan` no). - Corrected a false finding: the earlier "fingerprint rotated once" was an **OpenSSL `-ext` artifact** (`C8:76…` vs the real `61:54:19:30…`, same DER). Re-measured: serial `cert` == live handshake DER hash; page 51 626 B, `sha256 dd16e195…f04e9` == locally assembled page. **Tests / lint (100 % green)** - `bash .agents/validate.sh` → **GATE_EXIT=0**: `RESULT: all suites passed` in the plain *and* `SANITIZE=1` run, **4826 checks / 0 failures** each; `bridge`/`console`/`rollback` **SUCCESS**; `page bytes: 51626`; `README/AGENTS claims: OK`; `repo hygiene: OK (71 tracked files)`. - Footprint: bridge **RAM 30.4 % (99 616 B) / Flash 39.6 % (1 246 145 B)** vs baseline 26.7 %/87 592 & 36.1 %/1 135 293 → **+12 024 B RAM / +110 852 B flash**; TLS alone +6 160 B / +100 008 B (rollback image byte-identical); session heap 187 936 → ~145.5 k (1 session) → ~107.9 k (2). - `ruff check --select F,E9 tools/ tests/` → All checks passed; `bash -n` clean (gate, runner, probe); `-Wall -Wextra` warning-free. **Completion criteria**: 1 ✓ (gate green + RAM/Flash + session heap quoted); 2 ✓ as recorded (boot prints no fingerprint on the NVS-load path, `cert` prints on demand, identity survived reflashes, nothing about the key is printed anywhere — `nvs erase`→first-boot leg **not re-run**); 3 ✓ re-measured (51 626 == gate; `:80` → 301, no page bytes); 4 partial — 426/401/404 + pinning handshake measured, but arming/typing needs the operator's passphrase (`dflt:0`) and the target is this machine, so no input was sent; 5 ✓ (no `.pem/.key/.crt` tracked or on disk; hygiene block ran); 6 ✓ (`[env:rollback]` built every run + README section); 7 ✓. **Documentation**: README — check count 4793→4826 (intro + Quick start), `test_tls_pem` 829→862 with new pins, footprint/TLS-cost rows re-measured, "Ten bugs"→"Eleven bugs" + new entry + both anchors, `cert` row, Troubleshooting names-warning row, `tls_pem.h` architecture entry, nine/ten pure-module wording. AGENTS.md (staleness only): "Ten bugs"→"Eleven bugs" ×2, 4826, and the certificate-names row extended with the DER-OID rule. `.agents/HW_VERIFICATION.md` — 426 body/headers re-measured, fingerprint row correction + `-ext` rule, new SAN row (`failed → fixed in tree, device leg needs nvs erase`) with closing commands; phase report written to `.agents/reports/02_tls_control_channel/02_tls_control_channel__00_phase.a1.md`. **Deviations / live-infra**: made **no** reflash and **no** `nvs erase` (erase also destroys the token and Wi-Fi credentials; flashing puts a live HID keyboard into ROM download mode on this machine). Live steps were read-only `curl`/`openssl` plus one capped `console.py cert` (opening the CDC resets the board — permitted, recorded). No phase/PLAN files touched; everything left in the working tree for the harness to commit. **Next pending phase**: `03_session_takeover` — `01_pending_claim_socket.md`. |
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ducoterra
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121491bab4 |
phase: 01_verification_gate
All green. Report: **Implemented / verified (phase 01 final pass)** - `.agents/validate.sh` re-verified as the gate: ①`tests/run_tests.sh` ②`SANITIZE=1` run ③`uv … platformio run -e bridge -e console` ④page byte count ⑤hygiene, then the informational `tools/hw_probe.sh`. Added an explicit `== repo hygiene ==` header + `repo hygiene: OK (57 tracked files…)` verdict line so every check prints one (previously hygiene passed in silence). - `.agents/HW_VERIFICATION.md`: baseline (bridge 26.7 %/87 592 B, 36.1 %/1 135 293 B; console 16.8 %/33.6 %; 3406 checks; page 48 598 B) re-confirmed; served-page row extended with this pass's one-attempt measurements. **Tests / gate (100 % green)** - `bash .agents/validate.sh` → **exit 0** (also from `/tmp`): `RESULT: all suites passed` twice (3406 = 3162 C++ + 160 relayctl + 84 page), `2 succeeded`, `page bytes: 48598`, `repo hygiene: OK`, `validation OK`. - Faults re-demonstrated then reverted: (a) inverted `test_keystate` assert → cold-copy gate `RESULT: FAILED`, **GATE_EXIT=1**; (b) markup id `pArmed`→`pArmedZ` → page suite rc 1; (c) type error in `src/main.cpp` → `bridge FAILED / console FAILED`, rc 1; (d) hygiene regex matches `certs/test.pem` (git index commands are forbidden in this pass — task 01's report holds the original live `git add` demo). - Lint: no linter is configured for this repo; compiler is the linter — `-Wall -Wextra` host suites + both firmware builds: **0 warnings**; `bash -n` clean; `py_compile` clean. `ruff check` (this machine's broad ruleset) reports 21 pre-existing *preview-rule* style nits in untouched `tools/*.py` + `tests/test_relayctl.py` (SIM/UP/ISC/EXE/RUF/FURB), zero correctness findings — not churned: `watch_target.py`/`relayctl.py` are hardware-verified artifacts outside this phase. `shellcheck` is absent here and not in the local container image (fetching it would violate the gate's no-network rule). Coverage: n/a (shell + docs; no new Python). **Completion criteria** — all met: exit 0 with per-check output ✓; SANITIZE in-gate ✓; no `-t upload`/device curl/network fetch (grep: only in comments; `run_tests.sh` checks `podman image exists` first, so never pulls) ✓; faults bite ✓; HW_VERIFICATION.md names command+expected observation for every 02–05 device claim + one-attempt rule ✓; full suite green, `git status` = phase artifacts + mandated doc edits, nothing stray ✓. **Documentation** — README inconsistencies found & fixed: `test_proto` 193→**2327** (table now sums to the headline 3406); duplicate stale `test_page 47` row deleted (element-id clause merged into the 84 row); "last six checks"/"fails 3 checks" claims replaced by measurement (5 fail-safe source pins; `linked()` gate → 2, accept-stamp → 1, both → 3); console line formats corrected to what the code prints (`mouse interface=present target=report protocol buttons=0x00 …`, `queue 0 keys pending…`, `target=BOOT protocol (refused)`); status-JSON sample gained `typed/typing/mouse/mbtn/mframes`; footprint 87 400/35.5 %→87 592/36.1 %; page delivery `Content-Length: 35164`→**48 598** (re-measured live, one capped curl: 200/48 598, 404 on `/nope`, 401 on `/status`); stale Backlog item "Mouse." removed and renumbered; "~35 KB"→"~48 KB"; page-button names matched to the real markup; `validate.sh`/`HW_VERIFICATION.md`/`hw_probe.sh` added to Architecture, Tests and End-to-end. AGENTS.md: only stale statements fixed — "one commit, `Initial import`… predates the mouse and `output.h`" and the pure-module list missing `mouse.h`/`output.h`; not expanded. **Deviations** — Did not run the keystroke/mouse device rows: the board's target is this very machine, so injecting input during an unattended pass is the side effect the README's "hazard nobody warns you about" forbids; those rows stay blank per the contract (read-only GETs only). No live infra changed. **Next pending phase:** `02_tls_control_channel` (tasks `01_tls_identity_module` … `06_tls_docs_rollback`). |
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ducoterra
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ece0313d02 |
feat: relative mouse on the HID interface, and the verifier to prove it
The board now enumerates as a boot keyboard plus a relative mouse on the same HID interface. The pointer is captured, never grabbed: Pointer Lock in the page, so Esc (the browser's own, never forwarded) always frees it, and every frame restates the whole button byte so a frame lost in the WiFi cannot leave a button held. Losing the lock, the tab or the link runs the same release funnel as a stuck key, and boot protocol or `mouse off` refuses mouse frames with E11 rather than sending bytes a boot interface would misparse as keys. src/mouse.h owns the report, src/output.h the queues and the funnel; the page, relayctl.py and watch_target.py carry the button bits and the evdev decoding. The verifier's own tables are pinned now — REL_WHEEL is 8, not 2, and the first version guessed from the report's field order, so a working wheel looked dead while the summary said no scroll happened. LLM-Generated: true |
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ducoterra
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9bc8d5213c |
Initial import: keyrelay, a WiFi-controlled USB HID keyboard
Browser or terminal controller drives an ESP32-S3 that acts as a Logitech G815 into a target machine running no software. Disarmed by default; arming requires the passphrase, the board button, or the serial console, and every fail-safe path cancels in-flight work. - src/: firmware with pure, host-testable modules (keystate, proto, text, ws_codec, sha1), the WebSocket control server, and the served page - tests/: host suites for the pure modules, relayctl parity, and page JS - tools/: relayctl terminal controller, serial console, bootloader helper, and an evdev target watcher - platformio.ini: bridge (USB HID) and console (no-HID) environments - README.md: single source of truth for behaviour, protocol and safety LLM-Generated: true |