ai-sandbox/PLAN.md

PLAN

Execution plan for ai-sandbox, with the state each phase leaves behind. Every phase ends with a gate that must pass before the next one starts. Status as of this writing: phases 1-9 complete, follow-ups listed at the end.

#	Phase	Gate	Status
0	Measure the host before designing	tests/spike_network.sh results recorded in docs/networking.md	✅ done — killed the sidecar-on-internal-network design, found pasta --map-host-loopback + in-container nftables
1	Skeleton: CLI, config, preview modes	make test (args, config, precedence)	✅ done
2	Image build	build, cache, content-hash tag, contents asserted	✅ done (tests/e2e/10_image.sh)
3	Enforcement in the container	generated ruleset shape + real-container capability checks	✅ done (tests/unit/06_entrypoint.sh, tests/e2e/11_net.sh)
4	Egress gate	allowlisted host reachable, everything else refused, gate lifecycle	✅ done (tests/e2e/11_net.sh)
5	Environment passing	deny-by-default, 0600 delivery, redaction, fail-closed on unset	✅ done (tests/unit/04_env.sh, tests/e2e/12_sandbox.sh)
6	Limits, lifecycle, observability	exit codes, cleanup, caps, session log, --keep	✅ done (tests/e2e/12_sandbox.sh)
7	Harness defaults, docs, portability sweep	alias UX, README/threat model, shellcheck clean, no personal paths	✅ done
8	Supply chain: pinned base, TTL refresh, audit trail	digest in FROM and in the content hash; update/--check; labels + in-image package manifest	✅ done (tests/unit/07_base.sh, tests/e2e/10_image.sh)
9	Pi config bridge: same provider inside, credential by env	host models.json/settings.json rewritten not copied; canary secret nowhere in state; seeding, refresh and edit-presence asserted in a real container	✅ done (tests/unit/08_pi_config.sh, tests/e2e/12_sandbox.sh)

Phase detail

0 — Measure first (this is why the design looks unusual)

Ran tests/spike_network.sh. Three results decided the architecture: containers on one user-defined network cannot talk to each other rootless here (so no sidecar proxy on an internal network); --network=host works rootless and has internet (so a host-loopback gate is possible); pasta:--map-host-loopback,<addr> makes a container's connection to <addr> land on the host's loopback; and --cap-add=NET_ADMIN lets root inside the container install nftables that genuinely gate the pasta path. Also learned bind mounts need :z under SELinux.

1 — Skeleton

parse_args with the alias-friendly rule (sandbox flags until the first positional/unknown flag; those become arguments to the harness; -- replaces the command), config files at two levels, AISB_* overrides, --dry-run / --print-policy / --print-entrypoint / --print-containerfile. Precedence is built-in < config file < env < flag, and the built-in defaults live only in resolve_opts() — materialising them at the top of the script silently made the environment beat config files, which is a bug worth remembering.

2 — Image

Generated Containerfile, tag = content hash of base image + versions + install list + entrypoint + Containerfile itself, so a policy change never reuses a stale image and variants coexist. Node tarballs are checksum-verified against nodejs.org. pi is baked in so the pi alias works after one build.

3 — Enforcement

entrypoint_script(): read policy → render inet aisb with policy drop → nft -f → verify the default-drop rule exists → setpriv drop to uid 1000 with --inh-caps=-all --bounding-set=-all --no-new-privs. Refuses to start (77/78) rather than run unenforced.

4 — Gate

Per-session squid container on --network=host, bound to 127.0.0.1:<free port>, config generated and bind-mounted read-only, http_access deny all last. Sandbox gets proxy env + a ruleset that allows nothing else out. Torn down with the session unless gate up created a named one.

5-7 — Environment, lifecycle, polish

0600 env file delivery and redaction everywhere; limits and caps asserted from inside; --keep leaves the container and the session dir for forensics; clean reaps (--all for running ones, --volumes[=GLOB] for unused home caches, never a volume a container still references); doctor verifies the host including a real bind/uid round-trip; docs; shellcheck-clean in a container.

/home/sandbox is a named volume so npm and tool caches survive between runs. It outlives the image, which is the one kind of staleness this design cannot hash away: change the image's home layout and existing volumes keep the old files, so ensure_home_volume() creates it labelled and clean --volumes is the documented way to drop it.

8 — Supply chain

The hash made our changes traceable but said nothing about the base: FROM ubuntu:24.04 is a moving pointer, podman build's pull policy is missing, and ensure_image() returns early when the tag exists — so even build --rebuild reused the cached base. Now the tag is resolved to a digest (skopeo, falling back to podman pull unless AISB_BASE_PULL_FALLBACK=0), recorded per-ref under $AISB_CACHE_DIR/base/, and used in FROM and in image_hash(): a refreshed base yields a new image rather than mutating one that may be running.

Two rules make it survivable rather than merely strict. A stale pin beats a mutable tag — offline, or with AISB_BASE_AUTO_UPDATE=0, the recorded digest is used, and only a build with no digest at all is allowed, loudly marked UNPINNED in the output, in the image labels and in doctor. Freshness is a TTL (AISB_BASE_TTL_DAYS=7, 0 every build, -1 never) rather than a background job, so nothing surprises you mid-session and update stays an explicit, dated event. Both images carry aisb.base-digest/aisb.node/aisb.pi-version labels and /etc/aisb/manifest.txt with resolved apt versions, which is how you answer "which squid was enforcing this?" a month later. --print-* stays cache-only and deterministic; inspect is the surface that asks the machine now.

One bug worth remembering: POL[base_digest]="$(base_pin …)" looked right and silently produced unpinned labels, because the subshell's assignment was discarded. Helpers return text; callers assign.

9 — Pi configuration bridge

The image ships pi with no provider and no preferences, so the first run asked you to configure the model twice. It now reads ~/.pi/agent/{models,settings}.json and rewrites them: every provider apiKey becomes "$AI_API_TOKEN" (pi resolves an env reference itself, so no value is ever written to disk), !command header values are dropped rather than executed, settings pointing into $HOME are dropped because that path is not mounted, and auth.json/models-store.json/sessions/extensions are never read. The pair lands in /home/sandbox/.pi/agent at container start, owned by uid 1000, mode 600, and is a managed file: a host change is re-seeded, a sandbox edit is kept and reported, a deletion takes the host version again.

Two decisions worth keeping. The token follows the existing env rules — one variable, passed by name through the 0600 file, announced when auto-passed — and a bridged run where that variable is unset or empty is refused instead of starting a pi that cannot reach its model, because "sandbox is broken" is a worse bug report than an explicit refusal. And the bridge never widens the allowlist; it warns with the exact --allow to add, since an agent silently unable to answer looks like a network failure.

Follow-ups (not yet done)

• --net unix mode: --network=none plus a unix-socket proxy and an in-container TCP→socket forwarder. Structurally stronger (no IP stack at all); needs a story for tools that resolve names themselves.
• Re-resolve --no-gate domains on a timer, or resolve through the gate and pin the returned answers, so long-running sessions do not go stale against CDNs.
• Idle gate reaping beyond clean: a --gate-ttl label check on start.
• --allow-from-lockfile: derive a first-cut allowlist from package.json/requirements.txt registries so the first run is not a blank page.
• Quarantine mode for untrusted repos: --net none + read-only mount + --ephemeral-home as a single flag, plus a warning if .git hooks exist.
• --record: optional pcap/CONNECT-log capture of a session for review.
• --mount for agent skills/plugins: first-class flag instead of a generic mount.
• Packaging: a quadlet/systemd unit for a long-lived named gate.
• Signature verification for the base where the registry signs it (cosign/sigstore), so a pin is authenticated rather than merely immutable; and an optional local mirror/AISB_SKOPEO-compatible offline source for air-gapped hosts.
• update --auto as a timer unit, if TTL-on-next-run turns out to be too lazy for security response — deliberately not done yet, since a background rebuild that surprises a running session is its own hazard.
• Scoped sandbox tokens: if the gateway can mint a short-lived, per-sandbox key, --pi-token-env should ask for one rather than forwarding the long-lived host credential. The bridge deliberately does not guess a minting endpoint.
• Bridging extensions/skills on request: --pi-mount-ext or similar for the extension paths named in enabledExtensionPaths, which are host paths and therefore currently dropped; needs the same explicit-grant shape as --mount.
• models.json review surface: inspect could print the exact diff between host config and bridged config, so a change is reviewable before a run rather than after.