Typing `ai-sandbox --` gave nothing, and a policy surface this wide
(egress modes, mounts, the agents share, the pi bridge, per-subcommand
flags) is not something to retype from memory. Nothing in the script or
install.sh emitted completions, so this adds one as a standalone file
rather than growing the script.
It mirrors parse_args() plus the per-subcommand parsers, and follows the
same rules the script does: a non-flag word that is not a subcommand ends
sandbox parsing, so after it the completer offers nothing rather than
flags that would silently become harness arguments; build, update, doctor
and clean only offer the flags they actually accept, since each dies on
an unknown one; inspect takes the full policy set, so it gets the full
list. Values complete from local state only -- --net and --harness from
their fixed modes, --env from exported host variables, --mount and
--workdir from directories, --allow from the two documented allow files.
Nothing here resolves a name or touches the network. Aliases that point
at the script (alias pi=ai-sandbox) register too, which is why the source
line belongs after the alias in ~/.bashrc.
Verified by driving COMP_WORDS for each case above and diffing the flag
list against parse_args(); bash -n is clean. Note the Makefile lint list
does not yet include contrib/, so shellcheck has not seen this file.
LLM-Generated: true
A sandboxed harness found none of your skills, prompt templates or
standing AGENTS.md, because those live in ~/.agents and only the project
was mounted. It is now bind-mounted at /home/sandbox/.agents by default
-- bound, never copied -- with --no-agents to opt out and --agents-dir
for a curated set, reported by --print-policy and by doctor.
Read-only is the load-bearing part and has no escape hatch: a skill is an
instruction the model follows later, on the host, so a sandbox that could
write ~/.agents had a persistence path out of itself, planted as a
helpful-looking SKILL.md. It holds even under --insecure-keep-root, the
mount lands after /home/sandbox itself so it cannot be shadowed by the
home volume or tmpfs, and an explicit --mount on the same destination
wins because podman refuses duplicates. A missing or unreadable directory
is a silent skip like the pi bridge's; an explicit --agents-dir that
resolves to nothing is a hard error.
The exposure is stated in docs/threat-model.md: the tree, its .git history
and anything pasted into a skill are readable by whatever runs in there.
tests/unit/09_agents.sh covers resolution, precedence and the
bind-never-copy canary; tests/e2e/12_sandbox.sh mounts it in a real
container, checks the host tree survives a run byte for byte and that
even root inside the sandbox cannot write it.
LLM-Generated: true
The image ships pi with no provider and no preferences, so a sandboxed run
meant configuring the model twice. ai-sandbox now reads the host
~/.pi/agent/{models,settings}.json and rewrites them instead of copying them:
every provider apiKey becomes "$AI_API_TOKEN" (pi resolves an env reference
itself, so no value is written to disk), '!command' header values are dropped
rather than executed, settings that point into $HOME are dropped because that
path is not mounted, and auth.json / models-store.json / sessions / extensions
are never read.
The rewritten pair is seeded into /home/sandbox/.pi/agent at container start,
owned by uid 1000 and mode 600, and is treated as managed: a host change is
re-seeded, an edit made inside the sandbox is kept and reported, a deletion
takes the host version again.
The token follows the existing environment rules -- one variable, passed by
name through the 0600 env file, announced when auto-passed. A bridged run
whose token variable is unset or empty is refused instead of starting a pi
that cannot reach its model, and the bridge never widens the allowlist: it
warns with the exact --allow to add.
Docs and examples now use a self-hosted gateway (https://aipi.reeseapps.com)
instead of vendor API endpoints, since that is the only thing this tool is
used against. 391 assertions pass (make lint, ./tests/run.sh --e2e).
LLM-Generated: true
A tag is a moving pointer, and three things conspired to make the base
immutable-in-practice while mutable-in-theory: image_hash() hashed the
string "ubuntu:24.04" rather than what it resolves to, ensure_image()
returns early when the tag exists, and podman build's pull policy is
"missing" -- so even 'build --rebuild' rebuilt on the cached base. A
Canonical patch simply never arrived, and nothing said so.
Now the tag is resolved to a registry digest (skopeo, falling back to a
pull unless AISB_BASE_PULL_FALLBACK=0), recorded per-ref under
$AISB_CACHE_DIR/base/ at 0600, and used in FROM *and* in image_hash():
refreshing the base produces a new image instead of mutating one a
sandbox may be running. Freshness is a TTL (AISB_BASE_TTL_DAYS=7, 0 every
build, -1 never) plus an explicit 'update' / 'update --check'.
Two rules keep it usable rather than merely strict. A stale pin beats a
mutable tag: offline or with AISB_BASE_AUTO_UPDATE=0 the recorded digest
is still used, and only a build with no digest at all is allowed --
announced as UNPINNED, labelled that way, warned about by doctor. And
preview modes stay deterministic: --print-* never reach the network,
inspect is the surface that asks the machine now.
Both images carry aisb.base-digest / .node / .pi-package / .pi-version
labels plus /etc/aisb/manifest.txt of resolved apt versions, which answers
"which squid was enforcing this?" after the build log is gone. Tags are
named after the base instead of the hardcoded u24- prefix.
Bug found on the way: POL[base_digest]="$(base_pin ...)" silently produced
unpinned labels, because an assignment inside a command substitution is
discarded with the subshell. Helpers return text; callers assign. Also
fixed: the manifest step used jq on npm's dependency objects as if they
were strings, and a missing Node checksum used to skip verification
quietly -- it now warns.
311 assertions pass (unit + e2e), shellcheck clean.
LLM-Generated: true
A single bash script that runs a coding harness (pi by default) inside a
rootless Ubuntu 24.04 container with only the current directory mounted at
/project, an explicit egress allowlist and an explicit environment: nothing
is passed in that was not named on the command line or in a config file.
Network enforcement here is empirical rather than assumed
(tests/spike_network.sh, docs/networking.md). The original design -- a sidecar
proxy on an internal network -- does not work rootless on this host, so allow
mode runs pasta with --map-host-loopback, installs an inet aisb ruleset inside
the container that drops every egress path except the gate's, and relays
through a squid gate bound to the host's loopback that resolves names itself
and refuses anything unlisted. The entrypoint checks that the default-drop rule
really exists before setpriv drops to uid 1000 with an empty capability set,
and exits 77/78 rather than run unenforced.
The Containerfile, the entrypoint, the squid config generator and the ruleset
renderer all live in bin/ai-sandbox, and the image is tagged by content hash,
so a policy change can never silently reuse a stale image. Tests are pure
bash: 161 assertions start no container and touch no network, 256 run real
ones, including proof that a raw socket, a stripped proxy env and DNS all stay
blocked while an allowlisted host works over both http and CONNECT.
LLM-Generated: true
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