dashboards/.agents/phases/complete/15_agent_mtls/02_agent_tls.md

Task 02 — The agent serves a protected TLS web server from one installed bundle

Phase: 15_agent_mtls · Source: TODO.md:3 — "I want all exporters to be protected web servers. The collector should generate and manage a root certificate that needs to be installed with each exporter. Use the certs as auth to each exporter."

Objective

host_agent.py gains a TLS mode that makes the web server protected by certificate: one installed bundle holds the server cert + key, the root CA, a bundle revision, and a revocation list; the agent requires a client cert signed by the root on every path except /health (mirroring the token-mode /health exemption, so an installer probe can reach /health with the CA only), and it reports the bundle revision it loaded so the dashboard can tell a stale bundle from a fresh one. The token mode is byte-identical to today.

Work

1. agent/host_agent.py — stdlib only (an ssl import; no new third-party dependency):
   • a new flag --cert-bundle <file> (env AGENT_CERT_BUNDLE): one PEM text containing the server cert, the server key, the root CA cert, a # BUNDLE-REV <n> line, and # REVOKED <serial> lines. resolve_bundle(path) -> (context, bundle_rev, revoked: frozenset[str], error) is a pure function (the resolve_token idiom): parse the PEM blocks by text, extract the three blocks, write them to a temp dir for load_cert_chain (into /run/dashboards-agent when present and writable — the unit's RuntimeDirectory, task 06 — else tempfile.mkdtemp), and build the context.
   • The TLS context: ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER), load_cert_chain, load_verify_locations(ca), verify_mode = ssl.CERT_OPTIONAL — the handshake is optional and the handler enforces it: on every path except /health, self.connection.getpeercert() must carry a verified certificate (subject present), else 403 {"ok": false, "detail": "client certificate required"}; that cert's serial must not be in the bundle's # REVOKED set, else 403 {"ok": false, "detail": "client certificate revoked"}. The denylist file is re-read on mtime change per request (a small file; a redeployed bundle takes effect without a restart — the reason the # REVOKED lines live in the bundle at all).
   • The startup gate: off-loopback with neither a token nor a bundle → the existing exit-2 refusal (its message now names the bundle too); a bundle present → the off-loopback bind is allowed (the client cert is the protection); a token plus a bundle → the token check is skipped on the TLS path (the handshake is the auth).
   • The snapshot payload gains two additive top-level fields in TLS mode: tls: true and bundle_rev: <n> (absent in token mode — an additive field never changes an existing shape); the serve() start line says tls (client cert required, rev <n>).
   • AGENT_VERSION 1.0.0 → 1.1.0; the docstring's deployment paragraph gains one line for the TLS mode (no flavour text — the AGENTS.md audit rule).
   • ASSUMPTION: CERT_OPTIONAL + the per-path check (not CERT_REQUIRED) is what keeps /health probeable with the CA only — the installer's --status and the systemd probe (task 06) cannot present a client cert the installer does not hold, and a probe that cannot health-check is a dead install.
   • ASSUMPTION: the agent never generates or renews certificates (stdlib cannot mint x509); the bundle is the artifact the dashboard signs and the installer places.
2. tests/test_agent.py — the existing in-process harness (serve() in a thread on 127.0.0.1, urllib/ssl clients), with a test CA + leafs generated by src/dashboards/certs.py over a dict store (no second generator):
   • a client with a matching client cert → /snapshot 200 with tls: true and bundle_rev equal to the bundle's;
   • a client with no cert → the handshake fails or a 403 on a non-/health path; /health still 200 with a CA-only context (the probe path);
   • a client signed by a different CA → refused;
   • a client whose serial is in the bundle's # REVOKED list → 403 "revoked"; rewrite the bundle file without the line (mtime change) → the same client is accepted on the next request (the denylist re-read);
   • a token-mode agent (no bundle): the existing tests unchanged and green (byte-identical behaviour — no tls/bundle_rev fields);
   • resolve_bundle error paths: a missing file, an empty file, a bundle missing the key block, a bundle missing the # BUNDLE-REV line (an error — a revless bundle is not one this app signed; ASSUMPTION: the # BUNDLE-REV line is mandatory).
3. deploy/ is untouched here (task 06); the non-systemd fallback (tempfile.mkdtemp) keeps dev and tests working.

Testing & Quality

• the tests/test_agent.py matrix above; the existing token-mode tests stay green unchanged.
• Coverage: >90% on this task's new/modified code.

Completion Criteria

• a TLS-mode agent on a loopback port answers the full handshake matrix (tests) and reports bundle_rev
• a token-mode agent is byte-identical to today (existing tests green, no new fields present)
• uv run pytest green; uv run ruff check src tests agent + uv run pyright clean