**Phase 10 final pass — repo green; live criteria blocked off-repo.**
- Verified: `gateway` runs `dashboards-agent` (active/enabled, `10.1.1.27:9120` → `/health` 200, `/snapshot` 401 no-token / 200 bearer on-host, token matches `/etc/dashboards-agent.token`); `driveripper`/`deskwork` inactive, `sudo -n` → "a password is required", `:9120` empty.
- New measurement (transient runtime rule on gateway `firewall-cmd --add-port=9120/tcp`, **reverted** — runtime+permanent port lists verified back to the original set, no rich rules): laptop still gets no SYN through, while `:22`/`:80` on the same address answer in ms ⇒ the block is the lab gateway `10.2.0.1` port filter, not this app/host firewall/agent. No other live change made (no sudoers, no upsd, no UPS command).
- Tests/lint (exact): `bash .agents/validate.sh` → **EXIT 0** — `uv run pytest --cov --cov-fail-under=94` **793 passed, 11 skipped, coverage 98.33 %**; `ruff check src tests agent` clean; `pyright` 0 errors; `node --check` clean; hygiene clean; `uv pip list --outdated` empty (bumped fastapi 0.143.3→0.143.5, `uv.lock` only).
- `uv run pytest -m live --live` (`.env.dev` sourced): **4 passed, 1 skipped, 6 failed** — all six are `:9120`/`:3051` connect timeouts; zero parse/contract failures.
- Dev server restarted on current code: engines `ok`; 3×`host` + 3×`disks` + `nut` `DOWN` with real reasons (designed degradation, stub rows intact, no credential leakage).
- Completion criteria: screenshots ✓ (`data/logs/phase10-{index,system,disks,llm,ups}-live.png`); tunnel-vocabulary grep ✓ outside `.agents/` history (PLAN.md locked line, phase overviews, past reports; fixtures/`uv.lock` hits are digit substrings — `tests/test_deploy_scripts.py` guards operational files); no page-payload change ✓ (contract tests). **Not met, operator-side:** agents on all three hosts, `LIST UPS` from the laptop, `dev-server.sh status` all-ok, live suite green.
- Fixed in this pass: `sources/nut.py` unreachable-upsd message no longer prints a bare `(TimeoutError: )` (now `(timed out after 4s)` / `(ConnectionRefusedError: …)`), pinned by a new test + extended refused-port test.
- Docs: README verified consistent (every env var in `config.py` documented, routes/flags/`--with-llm`/pager sizes checked) — no changes needed. AGENTS.md fixed 4 inconsistencies: per-host sudo reality (gateway grants `NOPASSWD ALL`, which is why it installed without `agent-sudoers`; driveripper scoped; deskwork unrelated), the now-proven firewall finding, `/system` table typo ("agent per host"), gap-4 DB/WAL sizes + test count. `.env.example` `upsd.users` sample now one `instcmds` per line (it contradicted README and the in-app copy). `.env.dev` (gitignored) comment corrected to match the evidence.
- Flagged, untouched (locked): `.agents/PLAN.md` L92–95 still says upsd is "forwarded to `127.0.0.1:3494` in dev" — false after this phase; evidence + exact operator commands appended to `data/logs/NOTES-verify.md` §11.
- Next pending phase: `11_admin_login`.
399 lines
18 KiB
Python
399 lines
18 KiB
Python
"""Contract tests for the deployment scripts in `deploy/`.
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There is no shell test framework here — and adding one would buy nothing a subprocess does
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not — but phase 10 rests on a sentence that lives in **two** files: the sudoers grant in
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`deploy/agent-sudoers`, and the hint `deploy/install-agent.sh` prints when it is run without
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root by the unprivileged `ops` account. Two copies of one instruction is exactly what drifts
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silently, and the failure is an install that cannot happen on a host nobody is sitting at.
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So these tests read the file, run the script the way the operator does (unprivileged, which
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exits before the script can touch anything), and require the two lines to be the same line
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apart from the path the script was invoked through.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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import re
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import shutil
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import stat
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import subprocess
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
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DEPLOY = ROOT / "deploy"
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INSTALLER = DEPLOY / "install-agent.sh"
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SUDOERS = DEPLOY / "agent-sudoers"
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BASH = shutil.which("bash") or "/bin/bash"
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#: The grant as the file documents it. `/home/ops/agent-install` is the canonical staging
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#: path: a monitored host has no repo checkout, so `deploy/` and `agent/` are copied there
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#: (phase 10 task 02) and every host ends up with the same absolute path to grant.
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CANONICAL_GRANT = "ops ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /home/ops/agent-install/deploy/install-agent.sh"
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#: The prefix a correct hint line starts with — user, run-as, and NOPASSWD, everything but
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#: the path, which is the one thing the installer is allowed to substitute.
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GRANT_PREFIX = "ops ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: "
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#: Everything a non-root operator needs to hear, besides the grant line itself.
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HINT_MUST_SAY = (
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"visudo -cf", # check the syntax before installing it
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"install -m 0440 -o root -g root", # and install it the way sudoers files are installed
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"/etc/sudoers.d/dashboards-agent", # the destination both files name
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"deploy/agent-sudoers", # the pointer back to the documented file
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)
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def _run(args: list[str], cwd: Path | None = None) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
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return subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=cwd, check=False)
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def _grant_lines(text: str) -> list[str]:
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"""The sudoers *rules* in a file — comments start with `#`, so this never matches prose."""
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return [line for line in text.splitlines() if line.startswith(GRANT_PREFIX)]
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def _installer_without_root(*flags: str) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
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"""Run the installer the way `ops` does.
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Skipped as root on purpose: root would go past `need_root` and really install a systemd
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unit on the machine running pytest.
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"""
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if hasattr(os, "geteuid") and os.geteuid() == 0:
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pytest.skip("running as root — the installer would install a real unit here")
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return _run([BASH, str(INSTALLER), *flags])
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# --- deploy/agent-sudoers ---------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_agent_sudoers_exists_and_is_a_config_file_not_a_script() -> None:
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assert SUDOERS.is_file(), "deploy/agent-sudoers is missing (phase 10 task 01)"
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assert not os.access(SUDOERS, os.X_OK), "a sudoers file is data; only install-agent.sh runs"
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def test_agent_sudoers_is_exactly_one_grant_line_at_the_canonical_path() -> None:
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"""One rule, the installer, the staging path — nothing else may be granted."""
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lines = _grant_lines(SUDOERS.read_text())
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assert lines == [CANONICAL_GRANT], (
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"deploy/agent-sudoers must grant exactly one command, the staged installer:\n" + "\n".join(lines)
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)
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assert "/home/ops/agent-install" in SUDOERS.read_text()
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def test_agent_sudoers_grants_no_shell_editor_or_second_path() -> None:
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"""The 'deliberately NOT granted' block has to stay a comment, not become a rule."""
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text = SUDOERS.read_text()
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not_granted = text.split("deliberately NOT granted", 1)[-1]
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for never in ("visudo", "sh", "tee", "systemctl", "usermod", "upscmd", "upsrw"):
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assert never in not_granted, f"the file must name {never!r} as deliberately not granted"
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assert not_granted.lstrip().startswith("-"), "the block heading is followed by the list"
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# Every line of that block is a comment: a stray rule there would be a second grant.
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assert _grant_lines(not_granted) == []
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# And it names the token file, because "we did not grant reading it" is the point.
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assert "/etc/dashboards-agent.token" in not_granted
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def test_agent_sudoers_documents_the_why_and_the_two_stage_install() -> None:
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"""House style (deploy/nut-sudoers): why it is needed, then check-first install steps."""
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text = SUDOERS.read_text()
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assert "WHY THIS IS NEEDED" in text
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for step in HINT_MUST_SAY:
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assert step in text, f"deploy/agent-sudoers must document {step!r}"
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# The installed copy is checked too — the file being valid is not the same as the
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# installed file being valid (nut-sudoers' third step, and the reason stays).
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assert text.count("visudo -cf") >= 2
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@pytest.mark.skipif(shutil.which("visudo") is None, reason="visudo is not installed on this box")
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def test_agent_sudoers_passes_the_syntax_check_it_documents() -> None:
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"""The file tells the operator to run `visudo -cf` on it, so it must survive that."""
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result = _run([shutil.which("visudo") or "/usr/sbin/visudo", "-cf", str(SUDOERS)])
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assert result.returncode == 0, f"visudo -cf failed:\n{result.stdout}{result.stderr}"
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# --- deploy/install-agent.sh without root -----------------------------------------------
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def test_installer_without_root_exits_1_and_prints_the_grant_line() -> None:
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result = _installer_without_root("--bind", "127.0.0.1")
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assert result.returncode == 1, "the non-root refusal keeps its exit code (1)"
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assert result.stdout == "", "the refusal is a failure: it goes to stderr, not stdout"
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lines = _grant_lines(result.stderr)
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assert lines == [f"{GRANT_PREFIX}{Path(os.path.realpath(INSTALLER))}"], (
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"the hint must print one grant line naming this script's resolved path:\n" + result.stderr
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)
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def test_hint_and_the_sudoers_file_are_the_same_line_apart_from_the_path() -> None:
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"""The pinned version of the diff in data/logs/NOTES-sudoers.md."""
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printed = _installer_without_root("--bind", "127.0.0.1").stderr
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hint = _grant_lines(printed)[0]
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canonical = _grant_lines(SUDOERS.read_text())[0]
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assert hint.startswith(GRANT_PREFIX) and canonical.startswith(GRANT_PREFIX)
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assert hint.removeprefix(GRANT_PREFIX).endswith("/deploy/install-agent.sh")
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assert hint.removeprefix(GRANT_PREFIX).removeprefix(str(DEPLOY.parent)) == (
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canonical.removeprefix(GRANT_PREFIX).removeprefix("/home/ops/agent-install")
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), "same user, same (root), same NOPASSWD, same script — only the checkout path differs"
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def test_hint_resolves_a_relative_invocation_to_an_absolute_path() -> None:
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"""`bash deploy/install-agent.sh` from the repo root still prints a path sudo can match."""
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result = _run([BASH, "deploy/install-agent.sh", "--bind", "10.0.0.5"], cwd=ROOT)
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assert result.returncode == 1
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assert _grant_lines(result.stderr) == [f"{GRANT_PREFIX}{Path(os.path.realpath(INSTALLER))}"]
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def test_installer_names_the_two_stage_install_and_points_at_the_file() -> None:
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stderr = _installer_without_root("--bind", "127.0.0.1").stderr
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for phrase in HINT_MUST_SAY:
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assert phrase in stderr, f"the non-root hint must say {phrase!r}, not just 'run as root'"
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# The pointer is the file next to *this* script, wherever the checkout lives.
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assert str(Path(os.path.realpath(SUDOERS))) in stderr
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def test_installer_hint_repeats_the_command_that_was_asked_for() -> None:
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"""Copy-pasteable: the hint ends with the same invocation, with the flags it was given."""
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stderr = _installer_without_root("--uninstall").stderr
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assert f"sudo {Path(os.path.realpath(INSTALLER))} --uninstall" in stderr
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def test_installer_help_points_at_the_sudoers_grant() -> None:
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"""The header comment *is* the help text, so the grant is discoverable from --help."""
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result = _run([BASH, str(INSTALLER), "--help"])
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assert result.returncode == 0
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assert "deploy/agent-sudoers" in result.stdout
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# --- the tunnel machinery stays retired (phase 10) ---------------------------------------
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#: Names and ports that only ever existed to serve the ssh-tunnel dev transport, which phase
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#: 10 deleted. Every pattern is written as a character class (`[d]ev-…`) so that **this file
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#: cannot match its own grep**: the phase criterion demands the repo stay free of those
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#: literals, and a guard that reintroduces one to forbid it is the oldest trick there is.
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#: Scope excludes `.agents/` (phase files and run reports are history — rewriting a finished
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#: phase's record to satisfy a grep would falsify it) and `tests/fixtures/` (verbatim
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#: upstream captures: a sector counter or a wheel hash may contain those digits by accident,
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#: and rule 7 forbids editing a capture to please a grep).
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TUNNEL_PATTERNS = ("[d]ev-tunnels", "DEV_[T]UNNELS", "DEV_[F]ORWARDS", r"912[123]\b", r"[3]494\b")
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#: Where those names must not appear: every file that *tells someone what to run*.
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#: `tests/fixtures/` is excluded (verbatim captures, see above) and so is `.agents/` —
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#: phase files and run reports are history, and rewriting a finished phase's record to
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#: satisfy a grep would falsify it.
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TUNNEL_FREE_ROOTS = ("scripts", "deploy", "src", "agent", "web")
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def _tunnel_scope_files() -> list[Path]:
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files: list[Path] = []
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for top in TUNNEL_FREE_ROOTS:
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for path in (ROOT / top).rglob("*"):
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if path.is_file() and path.suffix in (".py", ".sh", ".md", ".css", ".js", ".html"):
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files.append(path)
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files.append(ROOT / "README.md")
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files.append(ROOT / "AGENTS.md")
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files.append(ROOT / ".env.example")
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files.append(ROOT / ".env.dev.example")
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for path in (ROOT / "tests").glob("*.py"):
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files.append(path)
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return files
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def test_dev_tunnel_script_is_deleted() -> None:
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"""The tunnel script is gone, not shelved: git history keeps it if it is ever needed."""
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# Name built at runtime so this file never carries the literal the grep forbids.
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script = ROOT / "scripts" / ("dev-" + "tunnels.sh")
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assert not script.exists(), (
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"the retired ssh-tunnel dev script is back — phase 10 deleted it deliberately"
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)
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def test_no_operational_file_mentions_the_tunnel_machinery() -> None:
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"""A stale tunnel-env instruction is a setup step nobody can complete any more."""
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offenders: list[str] = []
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for path in _tunnel_scope_files():
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text = path.read_text(errors="replace")
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for pattern in TUNNEL_PATTERNS:
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if re.search(pattern, text):
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offenders.append(f"{path.relative_to(ROOT)}: /{pattern}/")
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assert not offenders, "tunnel-era names/ports are back:\n" + "\n".join(offenders)
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# --- shell syntax (the only gate these scripts get) -------------------------------------
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#: Names a shell function must never take. Bash resolves a **function** before an external
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#: command of the same name, so defining `install()` in a script that then calls
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#: `install -d /somewhere` is not a directory creation — it is the function calling itself,
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#: forever. That is not hypothetical: `deploy/install-agent.sh` did exactly this, and the
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#: first real install of phase 10 spun on the SMART block for two minutes and installed
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#: nothing (no unit, no agent file, no token) while looking like a working script to `bash -n`.
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SHADOW_FORBIDDEN = frozenset(
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{
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"install",
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"test",
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"time",
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"date",
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"sort",
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"grep",
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"sed",
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"tee",
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"type",
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"ulimit",
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"wait",
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"kill",
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"cd",
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"pwd",
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}
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)
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_FUNCTION_DEF_RE = r"^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*\(\)"
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def _function_names(script: Path) -> list[str]:
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return re.findall(_FUNCTION_DEF_RE, script.read_text(), flags=re.MULTILINE)
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"script",
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sorted([*DEPLOY.glob("*.sh"), *(ROOT / "scripts").glob("*.sh")]),
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ids=lambda p: str(p.relative_to(ROOT)),
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)
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def test_shell_script_has_valid_syntax(script: Path) -> None:
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result = _run([BASH, "-n", str(script)])
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assert result.returncode == 0, f"bash -n failed for {script}:\n{result.stderr}"
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"script",
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sorted([*DEPLOY.glob("*.sh"), *(ROOT / "scripts").glob("*.sh")]),
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ids=lambda p: str(p.relative_to(ROOT)),
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)
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def test_no_shell_function_is_named_after_a_coreutil_it_could_be_asked_to_run(script: Path) -> None:
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"""`install()` + `install -d` is infinite recursion, and `bash -n` cannot see it."""
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shadowed = SHADOW_FORBIDDEN.intersection(_function_names(script))
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assert not shadowed, (
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f"{script.relative_to(ROOT)} defines function(s) {sorted(shadowed)} that shadow an "
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"external command: bash runs the function, so any call meant for the program recurses"
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)
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# --- the install path, run for real against a sandboxed root boundary --------------------
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#: The commands of `install()` that would touch the machine running pytest. Each one is a
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#: PATH stub that records its arguments and succeeds — the same trick `ScriptedNutClient` is
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#: for the UPS wire: fake the privileged boundary, run the real logic.
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ROOT_BOUNDARY_STUBS = ("id", "getent", "useradd", "usermod", "chown", "systemctl")
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#: The three absolute destinations the installer writes to, rewritten into a temp directory
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#: so the test exercises the body instead of the operator's `/usr` and `/etc`.
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SANDBOX_REWRITES = {
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'AGENT_DIR="/usr/local/lib/dashboards-agent"': 'AGENT_DIR="{root}/lib"',
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'TOKEN_FILE="/etc/dashboards-agent.token"': 'TOKEN_FILE="{root}/token"',
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'UNIT="/etc/systemd/system/$SERVICE.service"': 'UNIT="{root}/dashboards-agent.service"',
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}
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def _sandbox_installer(tmp_path: Path) -> tuple[Path, Path, dict[str, str]]:
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"""A copy of the installer whose writes land in `tmp_path`, plus a stubbed PATH.
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Returns (script, stub call log, env). `agent/host_agent.py` is stubbed next to the copy
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because the script resolves the agent as `../agent/host_agent.py`.
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"""
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text = INSTALLER.read_text()
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target = tmp_path / "target"
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for old, new in SANDBOX_REWRITES.items():
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assert old in text, f"the installer moved {old!r} — update SANDBOX_REWRITES with it"
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text = text.replace(old, new.format(root=target))
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script = tmp_path / "deploy" / "install-agent.sh"
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script.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
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script.write_text(text)
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(tmp_path / "agent").mkdir()
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(tmp_path / "agent" / "host_agent.py").write_text("# stub agent source\n", encoding="utf-8")
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stubs = tmp_path / "stubs"
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stubs.mkdir()
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call_log = tmp_path / "stub-calls.log"
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for name in ROOT_BOUNDARY_STUBS:
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stub = stubs / name
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# `id -u` must answer 0 or need_root() refuses before the body runs; every other call
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# just records itself, which is what the assertions below read.
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body = ['#!/bin/sh', f'printf "%s %s\\n" "{name}" "$*" >> "$STUB_LOG"']
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if name == "id":
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body.append('[ "$1" = "-u" ] && echo 0')
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body.append("exit 0")
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stub.write_text("\n".join(body) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
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stub.chmod(0o755)
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env = {**os.environ, "PATH": f"{stubs}{os.pathsep}{os.environ['PATH']}", "STUB_LOG": str(call_log)}
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return script, call_log, env
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@pytest.mark.skipif(hasattr(os, "geteuid") and os.geteuid() == 0, reason="running as root")
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def test_install_path_installs_into_its_own_paths_and_prints_the_token_once(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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"""The install body end to end: files, unit, token, and no recursion.
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The exit code is the regression test for the `install()` shadow: while the function was
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named after `/usr/bin/install`, this never returned at all.
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"""
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script, call_log, env = _sandbox_installer(tmp_path)
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try:
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result = subprocess.run(
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[BASH, str(script), "--bind", "10.0.0.5", "--port", "9120"],
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capture_output=True,
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text=True,
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env=env,
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timeout=60,
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check=False,
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)
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except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc:
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pytest.fail(f"the installer did not return (recursion? partial output: {exc.stdout!r})")
|
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assert result.returncode == 0, f"install failed:\n{result.stdout}\n{result.stderr}"
|
|
|
|
target = tmp_path / "target"
|
|
assert (target / "lib" / "host_agent.py").is_file(), "install -m never landed the agent"
|
|
unit = (target / "dashboards-agent.service").read_text()
|
|
token_path = target / "token"
|
|
token = token_path.read_text().strip()
|
|
|
|
assert "User=dashboards-agent" in unit
|
|
assert f"--token-file {token_path}" in unit, "the unit must use the file, never --token"
|
|
assert "--host 10.0.0.5 --port 9120" in unit
|
|
# DevicePolicy=strict denies every node not listed, and systemd opens /dev/null for stdin
|
|
# before it execs python: without this line the unit dies at spawn (status 208/STDIN).
|
|
assert "DevicePolicy=strict" in unit
|
|
assert "DeviceAllow=/dev/null" in unit, "strict device policy needs /dev/null or the unit cannot start"
|
|
assert "DeviceAllow=/dev/nvme*" in unit, "SMART reads need the disk nodes back"
|
|
assert token and len(token) >= 32, "a generated token is expected"
|
|
assert token in result.stdout, "first install prints the token, and never again"
|
|
assert f'HOST_TARGETS="hostname=http://{token}@10.0.0.5:9120"' in result.stdout
|
|
|
|
calls = call_log.read_text()
|
|
assert "systemctl daemon-reload" in calls
|
|
assert "systemctl enable --now dashboards-agent" in calls
|
|
assert "chown root:dashboards-agent" in calls, "the token file must become group-readable"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_token_file_is_readable_by_the_service_user_and_nobody_else(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
|
|
"""`--token-file` is a path the *agent* opens, as its own user.
|
|
|
|
systemd does not read the secret for the service, so a 0600 root-owned file makes the
|
|
agent exit before it binds. 0640 root:dashboards-agent is the smallest mode that works,
|
|
and it is still unreadable by `ops` (which is why deploy/agent-sudoers does not grant it).
|
|
"""
|
|
script, _call_log, env = _sandbox_installer(tmp_path)
|
|
result = subprocess.run(
|
|
[BASH, str(script), "--bind", "10.0.0.5"],
|
|
capture_output=True,
|
|
text=True,
|
|
env=env,
|
|
timeout=60,
|
|
check=False,
|
|
)
|
|
assert result.returncode == 0, f"install failed:\n{result.stdout}\n{result.stderr}"
|
|
mode = stat.S_IMODE((tmp_path / "target" / "token").stat().st_mode)
|
|
assert mode == 0o640, f"token file mode is {oct(mode)}, expected 0o640 (group = the agent user)"
|
|
assert not mode & 0o007, "the token file must never be world-readable"
|