diff --git a/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/00_phase.md b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/00_phase.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b522472
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/00_phase.md
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+# Phase 11 — One admin, one password: the dashboards stop being public
+
+**Source:** operator request in chat, 2026-10-17 — "password protect this dashboard for a single admin user… changeable once logged in, configured initially with an env var, not required to change… for local testing the default admin password should be `testpass`."
+**Story:** n/a
+**Context:** `src/dashboards/app.py` (route table, middleware, `PAGES`), `src/dashboards/api.py` (`AppContext`, `/api/config`, the one `POST /api/ups/command`), `src/dashboards/config.py` (env-only settings), `src/dashboards/store.py` (the existing `meta` table), `src/dashboards/web/static/app.js` (`fetchJSON`, `initChrome`), `.env.example` / `.env.dev.example`, `README.md` → *Configuration*, `AGENTS.md` → *Non-negotiable rules*
+
+## Objective
+
+Every page and every `/api` route except a small, explicit public list requires a signed-in
+admin session; the admin password is seeded from `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD` on first start, is
+changeable from a new `/settings` page, and does **not** have to be changed. The server refuses
+to start when it has neither a stored password nor the env var — there is no way to run this
+thing open by accident.
+
+## Derived scope (from the operator, in chat)
+
+- **Fail closed.** `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD` unset **and** no stored verifier → the process exits
+  with an operator-readable reason. `testpass` is the local-testing password (dev config +
+  the hermetic suite), never a production fallback.
+- **`/api/health` stays public** on purpose — the Containerfile `HEALTHCHECK` and
+  `./scripts/dev-server.sh status` depend on it. Its shape must not change, and nothing new
+  may be added to it without treating it as a public endpoint.
+- **Most secure, least likely to break** was the instruction for sessions/CSRF → stdlib
+  `hashlib`/`hmac` only: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 verifier, HMAC-signed stateless session cookie,
+  a session-bound CSRF token on every write, and a default-deny gate. **No new dependency**,
+  so no `PLAN.md` anchor moves (`itsdangerous` + Starlette `SessionMiddleware` was the
+  alternative the operator declined by asking for "least likely to break").
+
+## Dependencies
+
+- `01_severity_language` … `05_ups_hero_battery_glyph` (complete) — the pages, the shared
+  `.masthead` chrome and `Dash.fetchJSON` that this phase wraps; nothing here may change what
+  they render once a session exists.
+- `06_system_page_gpu_verdicts`, `07_llm_monitor_style_pages`, `08_events_paging_and_copy`,
+  `09_disks_smartctl` (todo) — **no** dependency in either direction. This phase touches
+  `app.py`, `config.py`, `store.py`, `app.js` and new files; those phases touch
+  `severity.py`, `sources/*`, page scripts. If they run first, re-read the `create_app(` call
+  sites in `tests/` before task 03 — that is the only overlap that can conflict.
+- `10_dev_direct_dial` (todo) — **no functional dependency, four shared files**: it rewrites
+  `.env.dev.example`, edits `.env.example`'s NUT section, rewrites the local `.env.dev`, and
+  rewrites the dev sections of `README.md`/`AGENTS.md`. Run either order, with two rules: apply
+  this phase's `.env*` additions by **appending to whatever the file says at the time** (never
+  restore a `DEV_TUNNELS`/`DEV_FORWARDS` line that 10 deleted), and never delete a
+  `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD` line 10 touches. Whichever phase runs second re-checks the diff of the
+  other's doc edits rather than overwriting them.
+
+## Tasks
+
+1. `01_auth_primitives.md` — `src/dashboards/auth.py`: password hash/verify (self-describing PBKDF2), session mint/read, CSRF token, login throttle, origin check. Pure logic, no HTTP.
+2. `02_verifier_config_fail_closed.md` — `store.get_meta`/`set_meta`/`delete_meta`, the four `DASH_*` auth settings, and `ensure_admin_verifier()` wired into the lifespan so a dashboard with no password anywhere refuses to start.
+3. `03_session_gate_and_public_surface.md` — the default-deny middleware, `/login` route, `/api/auth/login|logout|status`, CSRF enforcement on every write, `fetchJSON` attaching the token and bouncing to `/login` on 401, plus the test that enumerates **every** route and demands a session.
+4. `04_change_password.md` — `POST /api/auth/password`: current-password check, verifier replace, session-secret rotation (every other browser is out), event row, throttle reset.
+5. `05_login_page.md` — `pages/login.html` + `static/page-login.js`: password field, inline accessible errors, lockout message, no CDN, theme parity with the other pages.
+6. `06_settings_page.md` — `/settings`: change-password form, sign-out, session age; a `⚙` link in the masthead of all four dashboards.
+7. `07_dev_config_docs_browser_verification.md` — env templates, the operator's gitignored `.env.dev`, README + AGENTS.md, then live browser proof with screenshots and the leak checks (`/api/summary` 401 anonymous, `/system` 303, `/api/health` 200).
+
+## Testing & Quality
+
+- Unit: `tests/test_auth.py` for every primitive — wrong password, tampered cookie, expired
+  cookie, cookie signed with a rotated secret, CSRF token from another session, throttle
+  backoff and reset, `needs_rehash` when the configured cost rises.
+- Integration: `tests/test_auth_api.py` — anonymous 401 on every `/api/*` data route, 303 →
+  `/login?next=…` for HTML, login success/malfailure/lockout over HTTP, logout kills the
+  cookie, change-password invalidates the *old* session and the *other* browser's,
+  `POST /api/ups/command` refuses without the CSRF header even **with** a valid session.
+- The default-deny guard: `test_every_route_that_is_not_public_requires_a_session` walks
+  `create_app().routes` and asserts nothing outside the public list answers anonymously. A
+  route added by a future phase that forgets the gate fails here, not in production.
+- `tests/test_api.py` keeps passing unmodified in intent: `build_client()` logs in once with
+  `testpass`, so the ~200 existing HTTP assertions still assert what they assert. The nine
+  direct `create_app(Settings(...))` call sites in `tests/` get the same password.
+- Coverage: **>90%** on new/modified code (`auth.py` should be near 100%); the overall gate
+  (94%, currently ~98%) must hold.
+- The phase is "Complete" only when the **entire** project test suite passes 100% (every test
+  in the project, not just this phase's), including `uv run pytest -m live --live`.
+
+## Documentation & Consistency
+
+- The final pass reviews `README.md` and `AGENTS.md` in full against the project as it stands
+  after this phase — fixing every inconsistency found, **including pre-existing ones not
+  caused by this phase**.
+- Tasks update `README.md`/`AGENTS.md` immediately when their own changes are user-visible
+  (setup, commands, configuration, features, conventions). This phase is user-visible in the
+  strongest sense: the first thing an operator meets is a login prompt.
+
+## Completion Criteria
+
+- [ ] `curl -si http://127.0.0.1:8090/system` → `303` to `/login?next=/system`; `curl -s
+      http://127.0.0.1:8090/api/summary` → `401 {"ok": false, …}`; `curl -s
+      http://127.0.0.1:8090/api/config` → `401`; `curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8090/api/health` →
+      `200` (the one deliberate public data route)
+- [ ] login with `testpass` in a browser reaches `/`; a wrong password shows an inline error
+      and, after 5 failures, the lockout message with `Retry-After` honoured
+- [ ] `/settings` changes the password; the same browser is signed out and gets back in with
+      the new one; a second browser (or a saved cookie) is rejected with 401
+- [ ] with `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD` unset **and** no `auth.verifier` row, `uv run dashboards`
+      exits non-zero with a message naming the variable and the reset command
+- [ ] `./scripts/dev-server.sh status` and the Containerfile `HEALTHCHECK` still work
+      unauthenticated (`/api/health` unchanged)
+- [ ] `uv run pytest` green, `uv run pytest --cov --cov-fail-under=94` green,
+      `uv run ruff check src tests agent && uv run pyright` clean, `bash .agents/validate.sh`
+      green
+- [ ] screenshots in `data/logs/`: `auth-login.png`, `auth-login-rejected.png`,
+      `auth-locked-out.png`, `auth-signed-in-overview.png`, `auth-settings.png` (AGENTS.md
+      invariant 10 — a UI change is screenshotted, not claimed)
+- [ ] `README.md` documents the four new `DASH_*` variables, the reset procedure, and the fact
+      that a UI change wins over the env var; `AGENTS.md` carries the new invariant naming the
+      public surface; both are accurate and consistent with the whole project (final pass)
+- [ ] no behavior change in completed phases: every payload, hero card, chart and gate the
+      five completed phases shipped still renders identically **once signed in**
diff --git a/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/01_auth_primitives.md b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/01_auth_primitives.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6596372
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/01_auth_primitives.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+# Task 01 — Auth primitives: hashes, session tokens, CSRF tokens, throttle
+
+**Phase:** `11_admin_login` · **Source:** operator request 2026-10-17 — "password protect this dashboard for a single admin user"
+**Story:** n/a
+
+## Objective
+
+`src/dashboards/auth.py`: every authentication decision as a pure, unit-testable function with
+no HTTP and no I/O — password hash/verify, session token mint/read, CSRF token mint/verify,
+login throttle, origin check. Nothing here knows about FastAPI; task 03 wires it.
+
+## Work
+
+1. New `src/dashboards/auth.py`, module docstring stating the design and **why** it is
+   hand-rolled (stdlib only — the same reasoning as `prom.py` and the NUT wire client; no
+   `itsdangerous`, no `bcrypt`, no session store to operate). Constants at the top:
+
+   ```python
+   ADMIN_USER = "admin"            # single admin; there is no user table and none is coming
+   SESSION_COOKIE = "dash_session"
+   CSRF_HEADER = "X-CSRF-Token"
+   SAFE_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"})
+   PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 600_000     # OWASP's PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 figure; DASH_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS overrides
+   PBKDF2_ALGO = "pbkdf2_sha256"
+   ```
+
+2. Password verifier — self-describing so the cost can rise later without a migration:
+   - `hash_password(password: str, *, iterations: int = PBKDF2_ITERATIONS) -> str` →
+     `pbkdf2_sha256$<iterations>$<salt_hex>$<hash_hex>`, salt `secrets.token_bytes(16)`,
+     `hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac("sha256", password.encode(), salt, iterations)`.
+   - `verify_password(password: str, encoded: str) -> bool` — parses defensively and returns
+     `False` for `""`, a wrong field count, a non-numeric iteration count, an unknown algo
+     name, odd-length hex, or a length mismatch. **It must never raise**: a corrupt `meta`
+     row has to read as "wrong password", not a 500 on the login page. Compare with
+     `hmac.compare_digest`.
+   - `needs_rehash(encoded: str, *, iterations: int) -> bool` — true when the stored cost (or
+     algo) is below the configured one, so a login can transparently upgrade the hash.
+   - No password, hash, salt or session token may ever appear in a log line, an exception
+     message, or a return value used for display. Name this in the docstring: AGENTS.md
+     invariant 6 now covers the admin's own credential.
+
+3. Sessions — stateless and signed, so there is no session table and no cleanup job:
+   - `new_secret() -> str` → `secrets.token_hex(32)`. Stored by task 02 under the meta key
+     `auth.session_secret`; rotating it invalidates every issued cookie, which is how changing
+     the password signs everyone else out.
+   - `@dataclass(frozen=True) Session: username: str; expires_at: float; token: str`
+   - `mint_session(secret: str, *, username: str = ADMIN_USER, hours: float = 720.0,
+     now: float | None = None) -> str` → `b64url(f"{username}|{expires_at:.0f}")` + `"."` +
+     `b64url(hmac_sha256(secret, payload))`. Use `base64.urlsafe_b64encode` and strip padding;
+     `hmac.new(secret.encode(), payload.encode(), hashlib.sha256)`.
+   - `read_session(secret: str, token: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> Session | None` —
+     signature first (constant-time), then `expires_at > now`. Returns `None` for: `""`,
+     no dot, non-base64 payload, payload without `|`, non-numeric expiry, an expired session,
+     a token signed by a rotated secret, and a payload whose *username* was tampered with.
+   - `mint_csrf(secret: str, session_token: str) -> str` →
+     `hmac_sha256(secret, "csrf|" + session_token).hexdigest()` — bound to the session, so a
+     token stolen from one session cannot authorise another's write, and it needs no expiry
+     of its own because the session has one.
+   - `verify_csrf(secret: str, session_token: str, provided: str | None) -> bool` —
+     `compare_digest`, `False` on `None`/empty.
+
+4. Login throttle — in-process memory, because there is one admin and one uvicorn process:
+   - `class LoginThrottle: def __init__(self, *, max_attempts: int = 5, base_seconds: float =
+     60.0, max_seconds: float = 3600.0)`
+   - `retry_after(key: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> float` → seconds still blocked,
+     `0.0` when allowed.
+   - `failure(key: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> float` → the backoff just applied.
+     Exponential from `base_seconds` per key, capped at `max_seconds`; a key that gets a
+     successful login is cleared.
+   - `success(key: str) -> None`, and `prune(now)` (or an inline length guard) so a spoofed
+     swarm of source addresses cannot grow the dict without bound.
+   - Take `now` as an injectable seconds value on every method (`time.monotonic` at the call
+     site in task 03) — a test must not sleep 60 s to prove the backoff works.
+   - ASSUMPTION: the key is the socket peer address. Behind nginx every login shares one
+     bucket, so a determined attacker can lock the operator out of the dashboard (not of the
+     UPS, not of the data) for at most `max_seconds`. Accepted for a single-admin box; it goes
+     in `AGENTS.md` → Known gaps rather than becoming an `X-Forwarded-For` knob that is
+     trivially spoofed when someone forgets to trust the proxy.
+
+5. Origin / Sec-Fetch gate as pure string functions (unit-testable without a `Request`):
+   - `origin_matches(origin: str, own_origin: str, allowed: Sequence[str] = ()) -> bool`
+   - `sec_fetch_site_allowed(value: str | None) -> bool` — allow `None`, `"same-origin"`,
+     `"none"`; reject `"cross-site"`, `"cross-origin"`, `"same-site"`(unknown → reject).
+     Anything unrecognised is rejected: a browser that invents a new value is a browser doing
+     something we did not reason about.
+
+## Testing & Quality
+
+- `tests/test_auth.py` (new) — the exhaustive negative table above. Minimum:
+  round-trip hash/verify, wrong password, unicode password (`"pässwörd"` — proves the utf-8
+  encode), five malformed encodings all `False` with no exception, `needs_rehash` on a
+  1_000-iteration hash against the default cost, session round-trip, tampered username,
+  flipped signature byte, truncated token, expired session (via `now`), cookie from a rotated
+  secret, CSRF ok/wrong-session/missing, throttle allows 5, blocks the 6th with
+  `retry_after > 0`, backoff doubles and caps at `max_seconds`, `success()` clears,
+  `origin_matches` accepts its own origin and the allow-list and rejects
+  `http://evil.example`, `sec_fetch_site_allowed("cross-site") is False`.
+- Cover `auth.py` to ~100% — every branch here is a security decision, and a branch no test
+  reaches is a decision nobody checked.
+- Coverage: **>90%** on this task's new code; overall gate (94%) maintained.
+
+## Completion Criteria
+
+- [ ] `uv run pytest tests/test_auth.py -v` green
+- [ ] `python -c "from dashboards import auth; h=auth.hash_password('testpass'); print(h)"`
+      prints a `pbkdf2_sha256$600000$…` string and `auth.verify_password('testpass', h)` is
+      `True` while `verify_password('wrong', h)` and `verify_password('testpass', 'junk')` are
+      `False`
+- [ ] `grep -n "print(\|logger\|logging" src/dashboards/auth.py` shows nothing that could
+      echo a credential
+- [ ] no new dependency in `pyproject.toml` / `uv.lock` (`uv pip list --outdated` stays empty)
+- [ ] `uv run pytest` green; `uv run ruff check src tests agent && uv run pyright` clean
diff --git a/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/02_verifier_config_fail_closed.md b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/02_verifier_config_fail_closed.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f478d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/02_verifier_config_fail_closed.md
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+# Task 02 — Where the password lives: `meta`, the four settings, and failing closed
+
+**Phase:** `11_admin_login` · **Source:** operator request 2026-10-17 — "configured initially with an env var (but should not be required to change)"
+**Story:** n/a
+
+## Objective
+
+Make the credential durable and the startup honest: the verifier and the signing secret live in
+the SQLite `meta` table, the environment seeds them once, and a server with neither a stored
+verifier nor `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD` **refuses to start** instead of serving the fleet open.
+
+## Work
+
+1. `src/dashboards/store.py` — three small public helpers over the `meta` table that already
+   exists (`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS meta (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT)`), each under
+   `self._lock`:
+   - `get_meta(key: str) -> str | None`
+   - `set_meta(key: str, value: str) -> None` (`INSERT OR REPLACE`)
+   - `delete_meta(key: str) -> int` (returns rowcount; the reset procedure needs it and a
+     test should prove it removes only the named key)
+   Route `stats()`'s `last_maintain` read through `get_meta()` so there is one path to the
+   table. Leave `maintain()`'s write inline — it is inside that method's transaction.
+2. `src/dashboards/config.py` — four new `Settings` fields beside the server block, using the
+   existing `_env` / `_num` / `_flag` / `_int` helpers (field defaults are read once at import;
+   that is the established pattern, see the module docstring):
+   - `admin_password: str = _env("DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD")` — the **seed**. `_env()` strips, so
+     `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD=` means *unset*, never "the password is empty".
+   - `session_hours: float = _num("DASH_SESSION_HOURS", 720)` — 30 days; a homelab dashboard
+     that logs the operator out every shift change gets bypassed, which is worse.
+   - `cookie_secure: bool = _flag("DASH_COOKIE_SECURE")` — off by default because dev is
+     `http://127.0.0.1`; task 03 also marks the cookie `Secure` when the request arrived over
+     `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`.
+   - `pbkdf2_iterations: int = _int("DASH_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS", PBKDF2_ITERATIONS)` — import the
+     constant from `.auth` (`auth.py` imports nothing from this package, so there is no cycle).
+     The knob exists so the hermetic suite can hash in microseconds instead of 0.3 s; the
+     comment must say that, and must not suggest lowering it in production.
+3. `src/dashboards/auth.py` — the loader that turns settings + `meta` into request-time state.
+   Declare a `MetaStore` `Protocol` (`get_meta` / `set_meta` / `delete_meta`) so this module
+   still imports nothing from `config`/`store`:
+
+   ```python
+   @dataclass(frozen=True)
+   class AuthState:
+       verifier: str          # encoded PBKDF2, never the password
+       secret: str            # session-signing key
+       session_hours: float
+       iterations: int
+       seeded: bool           # True when this start wrote the verifier row
+       env_ignored: bool      # True when a stored verifier beat DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD
+   ```
+
+   - `load_auth_state(store: MetaStore, *, admin_password: str, iterations: int =
+     PBKDF2_ITERATIONS, session_hours: float = 720.0, now: float | None = None) -> AuthState`
+     - `verifier = store.get_meta("auth.verifier")`.
+     - If absent and `admin_password` → `hash_password(...)`, `set_meta("auth.verifier", …)`,
+       `seeded=True`.
+     - If absent and no `admin_password` → raise `RuntimeError` with the exact operator text:
+       name `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD`, name the meta key, and give the reset command
+       (`sqlite3 <db> "DELETE FROM meta WHERE key IN ('auth.verifier','auth.session_secret')"`).
+       Fail closed here — not "start open with a warning": the domain is public and the fleet's
+       hostnames and UPS controls are behind it.
+     - `secret = store.get_meta("auth.session_secret")` or generate with `new_secret()` and
+       persist it. Persisting it is what makes a restart not invalidate every browser.
+     - `env_ignored = bool(admin_password) and not seeded`. When true,
+       `logging.getLogger("dashboards.auth").warning()` **once**, at startup, with the words:
+       `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD is ignored — the password set in /settings wins; delete the
+       'auth.verifier' row to reset from the environment`. Never log the value, the hash, or
+       any prefix of either.
+   - `update_verifier(store: MetaStore, state: AuthState, new_password: str) -> AuthState` —
+     hashes, writes both `auth.verifier` and a **fresh** `auth.session_secret`, returns the new
+     state (task 04 uses it; the rotation is what signs out every other browser). Empty /
+     whitespace-only `new_password` raises `ValueError` — an empty password must never be
+     storable.
+4. `src/dashboards/app.py` — build the state during lifespan startup, before `start()`, for
+   both the owned-store and injected-store branches, and hang it off the context:
+   `ctx.auth = load_auth_state(store, admin_password=settings.admin_password,
+   iterations=settings.pbkdf2_iterations, session_hours=settings.session_hours)`.
+   `AppContext` (in `api.py`) gains `auth: Any = None` (typed as `AuthState | None`; import the
+   dataclass — that is how it stays honest under pyright). Task 03 is what *enforces* it; this
+   task only guarantees it exists or the process does not come up.
+   Startup failure must be loud and non-zero: a `RuntimeError` raised in the lifespan does that
+   for `uvicorn dashboards.app:app` and `uv run dashboards` alike. Do **not** swallow it.
+5. Tests:
+   - `tests/test_store.py` — `get_meta` `None` for a missing key, round-trip, `set_meta`
+     replaces, `delete_meta` returns 1 for an existing key / 0 for a missing one and leaves the
+     other keys alone.
+   - `tests/test_config.py` — the four new fields pick up their env vars and their defaults;
+     `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD=` is `""`.
+   - `tests/test_auth.py` (or a new `tests/test_auth_bootstrap.py` if 01's file is getting
+     long) — seeds on first call and writes both rows; second call with `admin_password=""`
+     reuses the stored verifier (so a deployment can drop the env var after first boot);
+     `admin_password=""` **and** no row raises `RuntimeError` naming both the variable and the
+     key; a stored verifier makes a conflicting env password `env_ignored=True` and does **not**
+     overwrite the row; a corrupt `auth.session_secret`… (state the behaviour you choose:
+     regenerate and persist is fine, since the effect is "everyone signs in again", which is a
+     login prompt, not a lockout); `update_verifier` changes both rows and the new state's
+     secret, and refuses an empty password.
+   - `tests/test_api.py` — one test that `create_app(Settings(db_path=db), store)` (no
+     password anywhere) fails to start, and that with `admin_password="testpass"` it starts.
+
+## Testing & Quality
+
+- Coverage **>90%** on `auth.py`, `config.py`, `store.py`, `app.py` changes; overall gate
+  (94%) maintained.
+- Prove the fail-closed branch and the seeded branch each run — a security default that no test
+  exercises is a rumour.
+
+## Completion Criteria
+
+- [ ] `uv run pytest tests/test_store.py tests/test_config.py tests/test_auth.py -v` green
+- [ ] starting the real dev server with `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD` unset and a scratch
+      `DASH_DB=/tmp/auth-probe.sqlite3` exits non-zero and prints the message naming the
+      variable and the reset command (paste the line into the commit message)
+- [ ] the same command with `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD=testpass` starts, and
+      `sqlite3 /tmp/auth-probe.sqlite3 "SELECT key FROM meta"` lists `auth.verifier` and
+      `auth.session_secret`
+- [ ] the stored hash in `meta` is a `pbkdf2_sha256$…` string; `grep -c testpass` in that DB
+      is 0
+- [ ] `uv run pytest` green; `uv run ruff check src tests agent && uv run pyright` clean
diff --git a/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/03_session_gate_and_public_surface.md b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/03_session_gate_and_public_surface.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c21a80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/03_session_gate_and_public_surface.md
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+# Task 03 — The gate: default-deny middleware, `/login` route, `/api/auth/*`
+
+**Phase:** `11_admin_login` · **Source:** operator request 2026-10-17 — "password protect this dashboard"
+**Story:** n/a
+
+## Objective
+
+Put every route behind the session except four deliberately public ones, with the login,
+logout and status endpoints that create and end it, and make the browser scripts carry the
+credentials so no page has to think about auth.
+
+## Work
+
+1. `src/dashboards/app.py` — state the public surface **next to the route table** it guards:
+
+   ```python
+   # Everything else requires a signed-in admin. This list is the whole attack surface, so
+   # adding a path here is a security decision, not a convenience: /api/health is here
+   # because the Containerfile HEALTHCHECK and ./scripts/dev-server.sh status poll it
+   # unauthenticated, and it is the only data route that stays public.
+   PUBLIC_PATHS = frozenset({"/login", "/api/auth/login", "/api/health"})
+   PUBLIC_PREFIXES = ("/static/",)
+   ```
+
+   Add `"/login": "login.html"` to `PAGES`. Task 05 supplies the file; until then serve the
+   existing shape it will get (a minimal page is fine to create here and flesh out in 05 — do
+   **not** leave `/login` 404, or the gate redirects to a dead end).
+2. Add the gate as an `@app.middleware("http")` in `create_app()`, beside the existing
+   `no_store_for_api`:
+   - `ctx = getattr(request.app.state, "ctx", None)`; no `ctx` → `503 {"ok": false, "detail":
+     "startup did not complete"}` for non-public paths (the app that failed to build its
+     context must not serve pages with `ctx.auth = None`).
+   - public path → straight through.
+   - session: `request.cookies.get(auth.SESSION_COOKIE)`, or `Authorization: Bearer <token>`
+     (so `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer …"` can script the API — document it in README).
+     Read with `auth.read_session(ctx.auth.secret, token)`.
+   - no/invalid session →
+     - `GET`/`HEAD` with `text/html` in `Accept` and a path not starting with `/api` →
+       `303` to `/login?next=<safe next>`;
+     - everything else → `401 {"ok": false, "detail": "sign in required", "login": "/login"}`.
+   - `safe_next(raw)` — keep it only if it starts with `/`, does not start with `//`, and
+     contains no `://`; else drop it. That is the open-redirect check; a `?next=` that sends
+     the operator to someone else's site would be a phishing kit with a homelab theme.
+   - `GET`/`HEAD` with a valid session → set `request.state.session = session` and continue.
+   - non-`GET`/`HEAD` (everything that can write, `POST` included) additionally:
+     - origin check with `auth.origin_matches(origin, own_origin, allowed)` where `own_origin`
+       is `f"{request.url.scheme}://{request.url.netloc}"` and `allowed` comes from
+       `DASH_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` — **no such setting is added**: same-origin is the only policy
+       this app needs, so pass `()`. Reject when `Origin` is present and mismatched, or when
+       `Sec-Fetch-Site` is present and `auth.sec_fetch_site_allowed()` rejects it;
+     - CSRF: required when the caller authenticated with the **cookie** (a bearer caller
+       cannot be forged by another site — that is what the header buys), validated with
+       `auth.verify_csrf(ctx.auth.secret, session.token, request.headers.get(auth.CSRF_HEADER))`;
+     - failures → `403 {"ok": false, "detail": "cross-origin request refused"}` /
+       `403 {"ok": false, "detail": "missing or invalid CSRF token"}`.
+   - **every response the gate produces carries `NO_STORE`** (the gate may short-circuit
+     before `no_store_for_api` runs, depending on middleware order — do not depend on the
+     order, pin the header in a test).
+3. `POST /api/auth/login` (public; put it in a new `auth_router()` in
+   `src/dashboards/api.py`, included in `app.py` alongside the other routers, prefix `/api/auth`):
+   - body `{"password": "<string>"}` — there is no username field (single admin;
+     `auth.ADMIN_USER`). An absent/empty password is `422`, not a hash comparison.
+   - throttle first: `key = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"`;
+     `retry_after = ctx.login_throttle.retry_after(key)`; blocked → `429` with
+     `Retry-After: <ceil>` and `detail` naming the lockout seconds — no "wrong password"
+     lie, and no hint about which account.
+   - `auth.verify_password(password, ctx.auth.verifier)`:
+     - no → `throttle.failure(key)`, log an event
+       (`Event(now, "auth", "admin", "login-denied", "warn", "sign-in refused (attempt N)")`)
+       and `401 {"ok": false, "detail": "wrong password"}` — one message for every failure
+       kind, because there is one account and the response must not rank failures.
+       `alerts.py` only turns `kind == "unreachable"` events into overview rows and the page
+       feeds filter by `source`, so an `auth` event cannot blink the overview — say so in the
+       code comment so nobody "fixes" it by hiding the event.
+     - yes → `throttle.success(key)`, `auth.mint_session(...)`, set the cookie
+       (`httponly=True`, `samesite="lax"`, `path="/"`, `max_age=int(hours*3600)`,
+       `secure=True` when `settings.cookie_secure` **or** the request's first
+       `X-Forwarded-Proto` value is `https` — marking it `Secure` for an https visit is safe
+       even if the header lies, because it only ever tightens), and answer
+       `{"ok": true, "username": "admin", "expires_at": ts, "csrf": <token>, "next": "/safe"}`.
+       Never echo the password, the verifier, or the session token in any other field.
+   - `GET /login` while already holding a valid session → `303` to `/` (or to a safe `next`).
+4. Protected auth routes on the same router:
+   - `GET /api/auth/status` → `{"ok": true, "authenticated": true, "username": "admin",
+     "expires_at": ts, "seconds_left": n, "csrf": auth.mint_csrf(secret, session.token),
+     "session_hours": …}`. This is the only place the CSRF token is published; it is inside
+     the session for a reason.
+   - `POST /api/auth/logout` (session + CSRF required — a plain link would be a CSRF that
+     signs the operator out) → clears the cookie (`delete_cookie(path="/")`) and answers
+     `{"ok": true}`.
+5. `src/dashboards/api.py` — `AppContext` gains `login_throttle: Any = None` next to the
+   `auth` field from task 02; `app.py` constructs one `auth.LoginThrottle()` per app (per
+   process, which is the documented model). Do not create it per request: a new throttle per
+   request is a throttle that never trips.
+6. `src/dashboards/web/static/app.js` — one place learns the token, every request uses it:
+   - module-level `authState = null` + `async function ensureAuth()` that fetches
+     `/api/auth/status` once (memoise the promise, not just the result, or 4 page scripts race
+     four status calls), caching `{csrf}`;
+   - `fetchJSON(url, options)` attaches `X-CSRF-Token` for every method outside
+     `GET`/`HEAD`, awaiting `ensureAuth()` first;
+   - on `401`, `window.location.assign('/login?next=' + encodeURIComponent(location.pathname))`
+     and throw once — guard with a module flag so a 2 s poll loop whose session expired does
+     not spam the login page with redirects;
+   - keep the exported surface additive (`app.js`'s `return { … }` list): export `authStatus`
+     (the cached object) because task 06's `/settings` page prints the session expiry.
+7. Tests — `tests/test_auth_api.py` (new) plus the plumbing this task forces on the suite:
+   - `tests/auth_client.py` (new helper module, imported the way `tests/card_contract.py`
+     is): `ADMIN_PASSWORD = "testpass"`, `sign_in(client, password=ADMIN_PASSWORD)` that posts
+     the login, asserts 200, and stashes the token on the client
+     (`client.headers[auth.CSRF_HEADER] = body["csrf"]`). Setting it on the TestClient is what
+     keeps the 12 existing `client.post(` assertions in `tests/test_api.py` unedited — they get
+     cookies *and* the CSRF header for free.
+   - `tests/test_api.py::build_client` logs in through that helper. The seven other
+     `create_app(` sites in `tests/test_api.py` (search `grep -n "create_app(" tests/`; there
+     are also two in `tests/test_system_contract.py` and `tests/test_ups_contract.py`) each get
+     `admin_password=ADMIN_PASSWORD` **and** a `sign_in()`, or their assertions read 401s.
+   - gate behaviour: every `/api/*` data route (at least `/api/config`, `/api/summary`,
+     `/api/events`, `/api/metrics`, `/api/system/snapshot`, `/api/system/history`,
+     `/api/llm/snapshot`, `/api/ups/snapshot`, `/api/ups/commands`) answers `401` with that
+     exact body shape anonymously; `GET /`, `/system`, `/llm`, `/ups` with `Accept:
+     text/html` → `303` with `Location` starting `/login?next=`; `/api/health`, `/login`,
+     `/static/dash.css` stay reachable anonymously; every gate response has
+     `cache-control: no-store`.
+   - `test_every_route_that_is_not_public_requires_a_session` — build the app, walk
+     `app.routes`, derive each path (`getattr(r, "path", "")`; a `Mount` counts as its prefix),
+     and assert: anything outside `PUBLIC_PATHS`/`PUBLIC_PREFIXES` is `401`/`303` for anonymous
+     `GET` **and** `POST`. This is the test that protects the next phase that adds a route.
+   - `?next=` handling: `/nope` passes through, `//evil.example` and
+     `http://evil.example` are dropped to `/` (assert the `Location` has no `evil` in it).
+   - login: wrong password 401 `wrong password`; empty 422; success sets a `Set-Cookie`
+     containing `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=lax` and `Max-Age`, and returns a usable `csrf`;
+     `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` adds `Secure`; `DASH_COOKIE_SECURE=1` adds it without the
+     header; 6th bad attempt from the same client → 429 with `Retry-After` and the event row
+     exists in `/api/events?source=auth` once signed in.
+   - CSRF: `POST /api/ups/command` with a valid session and **no** `X-CSRF-Token` → 403, and
+     prove it never reached the wire (the scripted `ScriptedNutClient` in `tests/test_api.py`
+     records nothing); with the header it behaves exactly as it did before this phase
+     (`DANGER` still required for `driver.killpower`); `Origin: http://evil.example` → 403 on
+     login and on a write; `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site` → 403; a bearer-token caller can write
+     without the CSRF header but not without the token.
+   - logout kills the cookie (subsequent `/api/summary` → 401).
+   - the served-pages tests in `tests/test_api.py` that scrape page scripts still pass — the
+     orphan-`id` test and the two-panel/hero pins must stay green without weakening them.
+
+## Testing & Quality
+
+- Coverage **>90%** on `app.py`, `api.py`, `auth.py` changes; every branch of the gate
+  (public, sessionless HTML, sessionless JSON, bad-session write, CSRF-missing,
+  origin-mismatch, no-ctx) needs a test — this module is the entire perimeter.
+- `node --check src/dashboards/web/static/app.js` is part of `.agents/validate.sh`; run it.
+
+## Completion Criteria
+
+- [ ] `uv run pytest tests/test_auth_api.py -v` green, including the route-enumeration test
+- [ ] `curl -si http://127.0.0.1:8090/system | head -5` shows `303` + `Location: /login?next=/system`
+- [ ] `curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8090/api/summary` → the 401 JSON; `curl -s
+      http://127.0.0.1:8090/api/health` → 200; `curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}'
+      http://127.0.0.1:8090/static/dash.css` → 200
+- [ ] `curl -s -X POST -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"password":"testpass"}'
+      http://127.0.0.1:8090/api/auth/login` returns `ok: true` with a `csrf`, and the returned
+      token used as `X-CSRF-Token` + the cookie makes `POST /api/ups/command` behave as before
+- [ ] `uv run pytest` fully green (all ~550 tests, not just the auth ones); `ruff` + `pyright`
+      clean; `bash .agents/validate.sh` green
diff --git a/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/04_change_password.md b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/04_change_password.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7cea43d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/04_change_password.md
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# Task 04 — Change the password from the API, and mean it for every session
+
+**Phase:** `11_admin_login` · **Source:** operator request 2026-10-17 — "the password should be changeable once logged in"
+**Story:** n/a
+
+## Objective
+
+`POST /api/auth/password`: prove the current password, replace the verifier, rotate the signing
+secret so the change takes effect everywhere at once. Optional in every sense — nothing forces
+a change, no expiry, no first-login interstitial.
+
+## Work
+
+1. `src/dashboards/api.py` — add to `auth_router()`:
+
+   `POST /api/auth/password`, body `{"current": str, "new": str}` (session **and**
+   `X-CSRF-Token` required by task 03's gate):
+   - Validate `new` before touching anything: non-empty after `.strip()`, at least
+     `MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 8`, and different from `current` → otherwise `422` with a `detail`
+     that says which. No composition rules (symbols/digits requirements produce sticky notes,
+     not passwords); length is the part that does work.
+   - Throttle the *current* password guesses on a **separate key** —
+     `f"password:{request.client.host}"` on the same `LoginThrottle` instance — so the
+     change-password form is not an unthrottled oracle for the old password once a cookie is
+     stolen. Blocked → `429` with `Retry-After`, same as login.
+   - `auth.verify_password(current, ctx.auth.verifier)`; wrong → `throttle.failure(that key)`
+     and `403 {"ok": false, "detail": "current password is wrong"}`. Nothing else changes and
+     an event is logged (`source="auth"`, `kind="password-denied"`, `severity="warn"`).
+   - Right → `auth.update_verifier(store, ctx.auth, new)` (task 02: writes `auth.verifier` and
+     a fresh `auth.session_secret`), assign `ctx.auth = new_state` (`AppContext` is a plain
+     mutable dataclass), `throttle.success()`, log
+     `Event(now, "auth", "admin", "password-changed", "warn", "admin password changed")`, and
+     respond with a **fresh cookie minted from the new secret** plus
+     `{"ok": true, "changed": true, "expires_at": ts, "csrf": <new token>,
+     "hint": "other browsers are now signed out"}`.
+     Cookie attributes identical to login (including the `X-Forwarded-Proto` / 
+     `DASH_COOKIE_SECURE` rule).
+   - Rotating the secret is the whole point: sessions are stateless, so without it a stolen
+     cookie would outlive the password that "revoked" it. Say that in a comment — the next
+     reader will wonder why a password change touches the signing key.
+2. Also in `auth_router()`: make login upgrade a cheap hash transparently. After a successful
+   `verify_password`, if `auth.needs_rehash(ctx.auth.verifier,
+   iterations=settings.pbkdf2_iterations)` → re-hash with the configured cost and write it
+   (keep the secret — this is not a logout). Without this, an operator who raises
+   `DASH_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS` never actually gets the new cost.
+3. Order-of-operations guard: the response must be built from `new_state`, never from the old
+   `ctx.auth`. A response signed with the old secret is a browser that dies on its next
+   request — the exact bug this task can introduce.
+4. Tests (extend `tests/test_auth_api.py`):
+   - wrong `current` → 403, and the `auth.verifier` string in the DB is byte-identical to
+     before; five wrong tries then a **correct** one is still `429` (proves the separate
+     throttle key actually throttles);
+   - `new` empty / whitespace / 7 chars / equal to `current` → 422 and both `meta` rows
+     unchanged;
+   - success → `auth.verifier` and `auth.session_secret` both changed; `verify_password`
+     confirms new-yes/old-no against the stored string; the **old** cookie now gets `401` from
+     `/api/summary`; the cookie in the response works and its returned `csrf` authorises
+     `POST /api/ups/command`; a second browser's cookie (captured earlier in the test) gets
+     `401`;
+   - restart semantics: after a change, rebuild the app from the same DB with
+     `admin_password="testpass"` in settings → login with the **new** password works and
+     `testpass` does not (the env var is a seed, not an override);
+   - rehash: seed a verifier at `iterations=1000`, start with `pbkdf2_iterations=2000`, log in
+     → 200 and the stored string now says `pbkdf2_sha256$2000$…`, and the same password still
+     works afterwards;
+   - the `auth` events exist and are visible via `/api/events?source=auth`, and `alerts.build`
+     does **not** turn them into overview alerts (assert the summary's `alerts` list is
+     unchanged by them — invariant: a login failure is a fact for the feed, not a red panel).
+5. `/api/config` and `/api/health` must not gain any auth detail: `/api/health` is public, and
+   "the admin password was changed at T" is not something to serve to an anonymous probe. The
+   fact lives in the event feed (authenticated) and in `/settings`.
+
+## Testing & Quality
+
+- Coverage **>90%** on the new route and `auth.update_verifier`; every rejection path above is
+  a test, not a comment.
+- The suite's existing `/api/ups/command` tests (the `ScriptedNutClient` ones) must stay green
+  unchanged in behaviour.
+
+## Completion Criteria
+
+- [ ] `uv run pytest tests/test_auth_api.py -v` green for the eight scenarios above
+- [ ] by hand on the dev server: sign in with `testpass`, change it to something else with
+      `curl`, and confirm the old cookie now gets `401` while the returned one works
+- [ ] `sqlite3 data/dashboards.sqlite3 "SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key='auth.verifier'"`
+      still prints only an encoded PBKDF2 string — no plaintext, anywhere
+- [ ] `uv run pytest` green; `ruff` + `pyright` clean; `bash .agents/validate.sh` green
diff --git a/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/05_login_page.md b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/05_login_page.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab04f1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/05_login_page.md
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+# Task 05 — The login page
+
+**Phase:** `11_admin_login` · **Source:** operator request 2026-10-17 — "password protect this dashboard"
+**Story:** n/a
+
+## Objective
+
+A single-purpose page at `/login` that asks for the admin password, says honestly why it
+refused, and lands the operator on `/` (or the page they were heading to). Hand-rolled HTML +
+one small script, no CDN, dark/light parity with the dashboards.
+
+## Work
+
+1. `src/dashboards/web/pages/login.html` — modelled on the other four pages' `<head>`
+   (`/static/dash.css`, the same inline SVG favicon, `data-theme="dark"` so `app.js` can flip
+   it from `localStorage` before paint):
+   - title `Homelab · sign in`; the `.masthead` brand link, but **no** `.tabs` nav — the tabs
+     lead to pages that would bounce straight back here, and a nav of links that all redirect
+     is a lie about what is available.
+   - one `.card` in `main`: `<h1>Sign in</h1>`, a `.sub` line naming what this protects ("the
+     fleet's system, engine and battery dashboards — including the UPS controls"), then a form:
+     `<label for="admin-password">Admin password</label>` +
+     `<input id="admin-password" type="password" autocomplete="current-password" required>` +
+     `<button class="action" id="sign-in" type="submit">Sign in</button>`.
+   - a `<p id="login-error" class="login-error" role="alert" hidden>` for refusals and
+     `<p id="login-note" class="faint mono" hidden>` for the lockout countdown.
+   - scripts: `/static/app.js` then `/static/page-login.js`, `defer`.
+   - **no** username field: one admin, and a field that is always the same word teaches the
+     operator that half the form is theatre (`auth.ADMIN_USER` is the server's business).
+2. `src/dashboards/web/static/page-login.js` — IIFE in the house style (see
+   `page-index.js`), no framework:
+   - `submit` handler → `POST /api/auth/login` with
+     `Dash.fetchJSON` (it adds the JSON accept header and turns a non-2xx into a thrown
+     `Error` with `status`/`body`); body `{password}`;
+   - on success `location.assign(body.next || '/')`;
+   - on `401` show `Wrong password.` and select the field's contents (fixing a typo without
+     retyping is the whole UX of a login form);
+   - on `429` show the `detail` plus the `Retry-After` seconds ticking down, and disable the
+     button until it reaches 0 — a submit that will be refused should not look pressable;
+   - on any other failure print the server's `detail` verbatim through the escape path the app
+     already uses for text (`textContent`, never `innerHTML`);
+   - honour `?next=` **only** if it starts with `/` and not `//` (the same rule the server
+     enforces; a client-side copy is defence in depth, and the server's check is the one that
+     counts);
+   - if the browser already holds a valid session, `GET /api/auth/status` succeeds → redirect
+     to `/` immediately (task 03 also does this server-side; this is what stops a flash of the
+     form).
+3. `src/dashboards/web/static/dash.css`:
+   - extend the existing `input[type="text"]` rule (line ~642) to
+     `input[type="text"], input[type="password"]` — do not duplicate it;
+   - add `.login-card { max-width: 26rem; margin: 3rem auto; }` and `.login-error { color:
+     var(--fail); }`, `.login-card form { display: grid; gap: .6rem; }`, plus
+     `.login-card label { font-size: 10.5px; text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: .06em;
+     color: var(--text-faint); }` (the same caption vocabulary as `.hero .label`);
+   - only existing `:root` tokens (`--fail`, `--text-faint`, `--accent`, …) —
+     `tests/test_api.py` fails if a rule reaches for a token `:root` does not declare, and if a
+     `.sev-*` family appears.
+4. Keep the invariant: nothing external. `tests/test_api.py` already asserts the pages load no
+   foreign asset — extend that assertion to `/login` (same test, one more path).
+
+## Testing & Quality
+
+- `tests/test_api.py` (the served-HTML section) — `/login` is served anonymously with
+  `HTTP/1.1 200`, contains `id="admin-password"`, `type="password"`,
+  `autocomplete="current-password"`, `role="alert"`, and **no** `/system`-style `.tabs`; no
+  `http://` or `https://` asset reference in the served bytes.
+- Orphan-`id` pin: every new `id` (`admin-password`, `sign-in`, `login-error`, `login-note`)
+  must be referenced by `page-login.js` (or the CSS) — that test fails on a dead `id`, so name
+  what you use and use what you name.
+- `node --check src/dashboards/web/static/page-login.js` (part of `validate.sh`).
+- Coverage: no new Python; the served-bytes assertions are the tests. Do not add a JS test
+  runner (a locked anchor).
+
+## Completion Criteria
+
+- [ ] anonymous `GET /login` → 200 with the form; anonymous `GET /` → 303 to `/login?next=/`
+- [ ] in the dev server: wrong password shows `Wrong password.` inline with no page reload;
+      `testpass` lands on `/` and the header status dots go green
+- [ ] five wrong passwords then a correct one shows the lockout with a counting-down
+      `Retry-After` and a disabled button; it clears and the next attempt works
+- [ ] `/login?next=/ups` after a successful sign-in lands on `/ups`
+- [ ] dark and light both readable (screenshot both, or one plus a note in `NOTES-*.md`)
+- [ ] `uv run pytest` green; `ruff` + `pyright` clean; `bash .agents/validate.sh` green
diff --git a/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/06_settings_page.md b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/06_settings_page.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..defebb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/06_settings_page.md
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+# Task 06 — `/settings`: change the password, sign out, see when the session ends
+
+**Phase:** `11_admin_login` · **Source:** operator request 2026-10-17 — "the password should be changeable once logged in"
+**Story:** n/a
+
+## Objective
+
+A fifth page the operator reaches from the masthead: the session facts, a working
+change-password form, and a sign-out. It has to survive the secret rotation from task 04
+without leaving the browser holding a stale CSRF token.
+
+## Work
+
+1. `src/dashboards/app.py` — add `"/settings": "settings.html"` to `PAGES`. It lands behind the
+   gate with no extra code (task 03's route-enumeration test proves it); do not add it to the
+   public list.
+2. `src/dashboards/web/pages/settings.html` — same `<head>`/masthead as the other pages, `.tabs`
+   nav **without** `aria-current` (Settings is not one of the four dashboards), and in `main`:
+   - **Session** panel: `<dl>` with the signed-in name, the expiry as a local timestamp *and*
+     "in 29d 14h" via `Dash.duration(seconds_left)`, and `<button class="action"
+     id="sign-out" type="button">Sign out</button>`.
+   - **Change password** panel: three fields — current (`autocomplete="current-password"`),
+     new (`autocomplete="new-password"`, `id="new-password"`), confirm
+     (`autocomplete="new-password"`, `id="confirm-password"`) — each with a real `<label
+     for=…>` and an `aria-describedby` hint naming the 8-character floor, a `<button
+     class="action" id="change-password">Change password</button>`, and one
+     `<p id="settings-result" role="status" aria-live="polite">` for the outcome.
+   - A static `.sub` paragraph stating the precedence rule in the app's own voice: the password
+     was seeded from `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD` at first start, changing it here takes precedence,
+     the env var never overwrites a password set here, and resetting from the environment means
+     deleting the `auth.verifier` row and restarting. (This is the sentence that stops the
+     "I edited the env file and nothing happened" support call.)
+   - No `#nav-status` — `Dash.initChrome()` already guards its absence.
+3. `src/dashboards/web/static/app.js`:
+   - `resetAuth()` — clears the memoised `authState`/promise added in task 03, exported in the
+     `return { … }` list. Needed twice: after a password change (the secret rotated, so the
+     cached `csrf` is now invalid) and after logout. Forgetting this is the bug where the
+     operator changes the password and then every UPS button 403s until they reload.
+   - also call it when a `401` bounces to `/login` (the flag from task 03 already stops the
+     redirect storm).
+4. `src/dashboards/web/static/page-settings.js`:
+   - on load `Dash.fetchJSON('/api/auth/status')` → fill the session panel;
+   - sign-out → `POST /api/auth/logout` → `Dash.resetAuth()` → `location.assign('/login')`;
+   - change password → local checks first (new ≥ 8 chars, `new === confirm`, current non-empty),
+     reported inline without a round-trip; then
+     `POST /api/auth/password` with `{current, new}`; on success write
+     "Password changed. Other browsers are signed out." into `#settings-result`,
+     `Dash.resetAuth()` (so the next write re-reads the fresh `csrf`), clear all three fields
+     (`form.reset()` plus explicit blanking — password managers autofill them), and keep the
+     session cookie the response set; on `403` print "current password is wrong", on `422`
+     print the server's `detail`, on `429` the lockout text — every message via `textContent`;
+   - after a successful change, verify once by calling `/api/auth/status` again so the panel
+     cannot show a session the server no longer honours.
+5. Masthead on all four dashboard pages (`index.html`, `system.html`, `llm.html`, `ups.html`) —
+   one link in `.masthead-right`, before the theme toggle:
+   `<a class="ghost account" href="/settings" title="Session and password">⚙ Account</a>`.
+   **No `id`** (the orphan-`id` test in `tests/test_api.py` flags ids nothing references — an
+   `<a href>` needs none), and it must sit outside `.tabs` so the pinned tab structure of the
+   four dashboards is untouched. Add `.ghost` styling for `a` alongside the existing
+   `button.ghost` rule (extend its selector to `a.ghost` rather than duplicating; existing
+   tokens only).
+6. `src/dashboards/web/static/page-login.js` — a sign-in that carries `?next=/settings` is a
+   normal path once the session dies on the settings page; task 05's `next` handling covers it,
+   just verify it in the browser.
+
+## Testing & Quality
+
+- `tests/test_api.py` (served-bytes section, signed-in client) —
+  `GET /settings` is `200` and contains `id="new-password"`, `autocomplete="new-password"`,
+  `id="sign-out"`, `role="status"`; anonymous `GET /settings` is `401`/`303` (already covered by
+  the enumeration test — do not duplicate it there, but assert it once here for the page);
+  `test_every_dashboard_page_links_to_settings` over the four page paths; `/settings` carries no
+  external asset; the orphan-`id` test still passes with the four new ids.
+- `node --check` for `page-settings.js` and `app.js` (in `validate.sh`).
+- No new Python except the one `PAGES` line, so coverage moves only through `app.py`'s existing
+  route tests; keep the overall gate (94%) where it is.
+
+## Completion Criteria
+
+- [ ] in a browser: the `⚙ Account` link appears on all four dashboards and opens `/settings`
+- [ ] signing out from `/settings` returns to `/login`, and `/system` afterwards bounces to
+      `/login` rather than rendering an empty page of `n/a`s
+- [ ] changing the password on `/settings` shows the success line, keeps the operator signed
+      in, and a UPS button on `/ups` (e.g. beeper disable → confirm) still works **without a
+      page reload** — that is `resetAuth()` doing its job
+- [ ] the same change in a second browser tab signed in earlier shows the 401 → `/login` path
+- [ ] `/settings` renders correctly in dark and light; screenshots
+      `data/logs/auth-settings.png` and `data/logs/auth-account-link.png`
+- [ ] `uv run pytest` green; `ruff` + `pyright` clean; `bash .agents/validate.sh` green
diff --git a/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/07_dev_config_docs_browser_verification.md b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/07_dev_config_docs_browser_verification.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f09e4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.agents/phases/todo/11_admin_login/07_dev_config_docs_browser_verification.md
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+# Task 07 — Dev config, the two docs, and proof in a browser against live data
+
+**Phase:** `11_admin_login` · **Source:** operator request 2026-10-17 — "for local testing the default admin password should be `testpass`"
+**Story:** n/a
+
+## Objective
+
+Make `testpass` the password a developer types locally without ever putting it in a tracked
+template, document the whole thing for the operator, and prove the gate in a real browser on
+live fleet data (AGENTS.md invariant 10).
+
+## Work
+
+1. `.env.example` — new `Server` block lines, production-shaped and placeholder-only:
+   ```
+   # Admin password. Seeds the SQLite verifier on first start; after that the password set
+   # in /settings wins and this line is ignored (delete the 'auth.verifier' row to reset).
+   # With neither this variable nor a stored verifier the app REFUSES to start.
+   DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD=change-me
+   DASH_SESSION_HOURS=720
+   # 1 marks the session cookie Secure. Set it in deployment (TLS/nginx); the app also sets
+   # it automatically for requests that arrive with X-Forwarded-Proto: https.
+   DASH_COOKIE_SECURE=0
+   # Cost of the PBKDF2 hash. Lowering it weakens the one thing standing between the network
+   # and your fleet; it exists so the test suite can hash fast.
+   DASH_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS=600000
+   ```
+2. `.env.dev.example` — `export DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD=change-me`, and the local-testing value in
+   prose **on a comment line**, e.g. `# Local throwaway value: the hermetic suite and every
+   dev box here use the word the tests sign in with (see tests/auth_client.py).`
+   - **The trap to avoid:** `.agents/validate.sh` scans every tracked env *template* and fails
+     the phase if a `*_PASSWORD=` / `*_TOKEN=` / `*_SECRET=` / `*_KEY=` line carries anything
+     but an allow-listed placeholder (`changeme`, `change-me`, `replace-me*`, `secret`,
+     `placeholder`, `dummy`, `example`, `x+`, empty). **`testpass` is not on that list**, so
+     `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD=testpass` in a tracked template fails the gate — correctly. Do not
+     edit `validate.sh` to let it through; the fix is a placeholder in the template and the
+     real word in the gitignored file. Comment lines are not matched (the pattern is anchored
+     at `^` and cannot start at `#`), which is why prose is safe and an assignment is not.
+3. The developer's own `.env.dev` (gitignored, mode `0600`) — append
+   `export DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD=testpass` if no `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD` line exists. Append with
+   `printf '…\n' >> .env.dev` (`tee` truncates in place; the mode is 0600 for a reason) and do
+   not reorder or reformat the rest of that file — it carries real upsd credentials.
+   Never print its contents into a log, a commit message, or a screenshot.
+4. Optional one-line ergonomics in `scripts/dev-server.sh`'s `start()` — after the success
+   `echo`, add `echo "  sign in with DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD from .env.dev"`. `start`'s readiness
+   probe and `status` both use `/api/health`, which stayed public, so **no auth logic belongs in
+   this script** and no password belongs in it either.
+5. `README.md`:
+   - **Quickstart** — after `cp .env.dev.example .env.dev`, one line: local dev signs in with
+     the dev file's password; the app refuses to start without one.
+   - New **Signing in** section (before *Configuration*): one admin; the four public paths and
+     why `/api/health` is one of them (container `HEALTHCHECK`, `dev-server.sh status`);
+     password seeded from `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD`, changed in `/settings`, never forced;
+     sessions are HMAC-signed cookies (`DASH_SESSION_HOURS`, default 30 days) invalidated
+     together by a password change; the reset procedure, verbatim:
+     `sqlite3 data/dashboards.sqlite3 "DELETE FROM meta WHERE key IN ('auth.verifier','auth.session_secret')"`;
+     scripting the API with `Authorization: Bearer <session token>`;
+     deployment note — set the password in the container env file (the deployment repo's quadlet
+     env template), set `DASH_COOKIE_SECURE=1` behind the TLS/nginx front, and note that nginx
+     config/HSTS live in the deployment repo like every other service here.
+   - **Configuration table** — the four new variables with their defaults, in the same
+     two-column style as the existing rows.
+6. `AGENTS.md`:
+   - a new numbered rule in **Non-negotiable rules** — *"One admin, one password, four public
+     paths."* Everything else is behind the session; the public list is
+     `/login`, `/api/auth/login`, `/api/health`, `/static/*`; the verifier is PBKDF2 in the
+     SQLite `meta` table and the env var is a **seed, never an override**; no stored verifier
+     and no env var means the process refuses to start; a password change rotates the signing
+     secret so every browser is out; the login POST and every write are origin/CSRF-checked;
+     and `/api/health` is public by decision, which means nothing sensitive may be added to it
+     without re-deciding.
+   - `auth.py` in the one-line-per-responsibility architecture list (pure primitives: PBKDF2
+     verifier, signed sessions, CSRF tokens, login throttle — stdlib only, no new dependency).
+   - Architecture/API prose: the four dashboards and `/settings` now require a session.
+   - **Known gaps** — three entries: the login throttle keys the socket peer address, so behind
+     nginx a lockout is global (at worst `max_seconds`; accepted for a single admin);
+     no second factor and no per-user accounts by design; the throttle is per-process, so
+     running more than one uvicorn worker multiplies the buckets (and the session/CSRF design
+     itself is worker-safe because it is stateless).
+   - `PLAN.md`'s Architectural Anchors table has no auth row. This phase adds no dependency, so
+     it stays inside the existing anchors — but note in the phase `NOTES-*.md` that the operator
+     may want to ratify "in-house stdlib auth (PBKDF2 + HMAC cookie)" as an anchor; this skill
+     and this phase must not edit `PLAN.md`.
+7. Live browser verification (dev server on `http://127.0.0.1:8090`, tunnels up, live data):
+   - `./scripts/dev-server.sh restart`, then confirm `./scripts/dev-server.sh status` still
+     prints per-source `ok`/`DOWN` **without** credentials;
+   - screenshots into `data/logs/`: `auth-login.png`, `auth-login-rejected.png`,
+     `auth-locked-out.png`, `auth-signed-in-overview.png`, `auth-settings.png`,
+     `auth-account-link.png` (the last two from task 06 — retake if a pixel moved);
+   - leak checks, recorded in `NOTES-verify.md` with the actual status codes:
+     `curl -si localhost:8090/system` (303 → `/login?next=/system`),
+     `curl -s localhost:8090/api/summary` (401), `/api/config` (401), `/api/events` (401),
+     `/api/system/history?...` (401), `/api/health` (200),
+     `curl -s localhost:8090/login | grep -c 'http'` (0 external refs);
+   - once signed in, walk all five pages and confirm the five completed phases look exactly as
+     they did before: the `/system` hero rows, the `/llm` sparklines and latency feet, the `/ups`
+     glyph and heroes, the overview's two panels, the `Δ<window>` footnotes;
+   - `uv run pytest -m live --live` — the live suite talks to the agents, engines and upsd
+     directly rather than to the dashboard, so it must be unaffected; run it and say so.
+8. `NOTES-auth.md` in the phase directory — what was verified how (which screenshot shows
+   which behaviour), the `curl` outputs, the exact `meta` keys written, and anything the operator
+   must do in the deployment repo (set `DASH_ADMIN_PASSWORD`, set `DASH_COOKIE_SECURE=1`).
+
+## Testing & Quality
+
+- `bash .agents/validate.sh` green — this is the task where the tracked-template secret gate
+  bites, so run it before declaring the docs done.
+- `git status --porcelain` must show no `.env` / `.env.dev` change staged (both are ignored) and
+  no screenshot except the `data/logs/` drops the repo already ignores.
+- Coverage: no code change expected; the gate (94%) must not move.
+
+## Completion Criteria
+
+- [ ] `.env.example` and `.env.dev.example` are placeholder-clean and `bash .agents/validate.sh`
+      passes the template scan (quote the passing line in the commit message)
+- [ ] `.env.dev` has the dev password, still mode `0600`, still containing its real NUT
+      credentials untouched
+- [ ] `./scripts/dev-server.sh restart && ./scripts/dev-server.sh status` works unauthenticated
+- [ ] all six screenshots exist in `data/logs/` and show live data, not the simulator
+- [ ] the leak-check list above returns exactly the codes listed, recorded in `NOTES-auth.md`
+- [ ] README's *Signing in* section and four config rows exist; `AGENTS.md` has the new
+      invariant, the `auth.py` line, and the three known gaps
+- [ ] `uv run pytest` and `uv run pytest -m live --live` both green;
+      `uv run ruff check src tests agent && uv run pyright` clean; `bash .agents/validate.sh`
+      green