/* Brain of Reese — the in-app token gate (phase 79, task 05). * * The owner's sentence (TODO.md L5): "The web ui should ask for a * token before letting a user through and should cache that token in * browser storage so they don't have to keep entering it." * * One reusable mount point for the two gated surfaces: * * • the shell (index.html) — app.js's boot IIFE awaits * mountGate(#main, onAuthed) BEFORE its initSharedHeader; * • the document viewer (document.html) — document.js wires * mountGate(#main, onAuthed) around the existing boot sequence * (whoami → load content). * * Both carry the same gate markup (class .auth-gate; the ids differ — * #auth-gate / #doc-auth-gate — so the gate is found by CLASS: the * ONE .auth-gate section on the page). * * The contract (pinned at source level in * tests/unit/test_token_gate.py): * * • the gate SHIPS hidden + inert (the phase-16 ship-hidden pattern): * an authenticated boot never shows it for a frame. * • (1) at mount, a CACHED token (localStorage["bor.token"]) is * re-sent to POST /api/token-auth SILENTLY — BEFORE the whoami * check. On ANY failure the key is removed (the token may have * been revoked) and the mount falls through to the role check. * • (2) the role check is header.js's fetchWhoami() — the SAME * cached promise the page's own header boot uses (exactly one * /api/whoami per page load in dev): role "user" or "admin" → * onAuthed() (the gate NEVER shows); "anonymous" → the gate is * revealed (hidden AND inert dropped), the lock root is locked * (lockRoot.inert = true — WCAG: the locked app must not receive * focus or keyboard traversal, the inert-pair contract) and the * token input is focused. * • form submit → POST /api/token-auth: 204 → the token is cached * (localStorage, try/catch — private mode: caching is a no-op, * the gate still works), the whoami cache is invalidated and * re-fetched (the choice below), role "user" → the gate is hidden * again (hidden + inert re-added), the lock root unlocks, * onAuthed() runs, and the shared header re-boots * (initSharedHeader — a mid-page login must not leave the * anonymous header state: Sign in hidden, Sign out visible). * 401 (or any failure) → the #auth-gate-error (role=alert) line * is revealed, the input cleared and re-focused — the entered * token never lingers in the field. * • the whoami-cache choice: CLEAR THE MODULE CACHE (header.js's * resetWhoami) rather than a direct re-fetch — a direct fetch * would verify the role for the gate but leave header.js's cache * stale (the boot fired it pre-auth, when the page was still * anonymous), so the header re-boot and every later fetchWhoami() * would still read anonymous. Resetting makes the NEXT * fetchWhoami() the single fresh post-auth request for the whole * page (gate + header + view gates all reuse it). * • ALL localStorage access is try/catch (the fail-silence storage * contract — private mode or a storage error degrades to * "re-enter the token each visit", never to a broken gate). * * The module has NO import-time side effects: pages call mountGate at * boot (the shell from app.js's boot IIFE, the viewer from * document.js). On the shell the call is AWAITED before app.js's * initSharedHeader, so a silent re-auth lands before the FIRST whoami * fires — the header sees the post-auth role deterministically (no * stale "Sign in" for a returning token user). No CDN, no framework. */ import { fetchWhoami, initSharedHeader, resetWhoami } from "./header.js"; /* The cached-token key (the owner's sentence: "cache that token in browser storage"). The server stores only the SHA-256 digest of the full token (app/core/tokens.py) — the plaintext lives here, in the browser, and is re-sent verbatim to /api/token-auth (the server hashes it for the unique-index lookup). */ const TOKEN_KEY = "bor.token"; /* ---------- the fail-silence storage contract ---------- * Every localStorage access is try/catch: private mode or a storage * error degrades to "re-enter the token each visit" — the gate itself * still works either way. */ const readCachedToken = () => { try { const t = localStorage.getItem(TOKEN_KEY); return typeof t === "string" && t.trim() !== "" ? t : null; } catch { return null; // private mode / storage error — nothing cached } }; const storeToken = (token) => { try { localStorage.setItem(TOKEN_KEY, token); } catch { /* private mode: the gate still works, caching is a no-op */ } }; const removeToken = () => { try { localStorage.removeItem(TOKEN_KEY); } catch { /* nothing was stored */ } }; /* POST /api/token-auth — every failure shape (malformed / unknown / revoked / empty) is ONE generic 401 "invalid token" server-side (the phase-16 no-enumeration contract), so the client only needs the status: 204 = the session cookie is (re)set. */ async function tryTokenAuth(token) { const r = await fetch("/api/token-auth", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify({ token }), }); return r.status === 204; } /* The in-app token gate. `lockRoot` is the element the gate locks while visible (#main on both pages — the locked app must not receive focus or keyboard traversal: the inert-pair contract); `onAuthed` runs ONLY once the visitor is signed in (role "user" or "admin") — the shell passes a no-op (the lazy views mount on first show exactly as today), the viewer passes its existing boot sequence (the shared header + the content load). */ export async function mountGate(lockRoot, onAuthed) { const gate = document.querySelector(".auth-gate"); const form = gate ? gate.querySelector("form") : null; const input = gate ? gate.querySelector('input[name="token"]') : null; const error = gate ? gate.querySelector(".auth-gate-error") : null; const submit = form ? form.querySelector('button[type="submit"]') : null; const hideGate = () => { if (gate) { gate.hidden = true; gate.inert = true; } }; const showError = () => { if (error) error.hidden = false; if (input) { input.value = ""; // the entered token never lingers in the field input.focus(); } }; /* (1) SILENT RE-AUTH — before the whoami check. A cached token is re-sent to /api/token-auth first: on success the session cookie is (re)set NOW, before any whoami on this page settles — the cache is invalidated (resetWhoami) so the role check below is a FRESH request (a boot-fired pre-auth whoami would still say anonymous). On ANY failure the key is DROPPED — the token may have been revoked — and the mount falls through to the role check (the page may already be signed in as the admin, and the anonymous visitor simply gets the gate). */ const cached = readCachedToken(); if (cached) { const ok = await tryTokenAuth(cached).catch(() => false); if (ok) { resetWhoami(); // the cached whoami (boot-fired, pre-auth) is stale const who = await fetchWhoami(); if (who.authenticated) { // role "user" (the re-auth landed) or "admin" (the browser // also holds an admin session — admin wins, whoami's // contract): unlock and run onAuthed — the gate NEVER shows // for a cached valid token (no flash). if (lockRoot) lockRoot.inert = false; hideGate(); // defensive: it ships hidden — the boot never // reveals it for an authenticated role, so this is a no-op. onAuthed(); return; } // token-auth said 204 but whoami still says no (the cookie did // not land): treat it as a dead cached token. removeToken(); } else { removeToken(); // a failed silent re-auth drops the key } } /* (2) ROLE CHECK — header.js's fetchWhoami(): the SAME cached promise the page's own header boot awaits (app.js on the shell, the viewer's onAuthed on document.html) — exactly one /api/whoami per page load. */ const who = await fetchWhoami(); if (who.authenticated) { // role "user" or "admin" — the gate NEVER shows. if (lockRoot) lockRoot.inert = false; onAuthed(); return; } /* Anonymous: reveal the gate (drop hidden AND inert — the inert-pair contract), lock the app, focus the token input. The gate is the only interactive surface while visible: the lock root is inert, so Tab never reaches the locked app (the composer on the shell, the content on the viewer). */ if (gate) { gate.hidden = false; gate.inert = false; } if (lockRoot) lockRoot.inert = true; if (input) input.focus(); if (!form) return; // no gate markup — nothing to bind /* Form submit: preventDefault → POST /api/token-auth → 204: cache the token, invalidate + re-fetch the whoami cache (the documented choice: clear the module cache — a direct re-fetch would leave header.js's boot-fired anonymous cache stale for the header re-boot), role "user" → hide the gate, unlock, onAuthed(), and re-boot the shared header for the new role. 401 / failure: the role=alert error line, the input cleared + re-focused, the button re-enabled (never stale, PLAN §7.4). */ form.addEventListener("submit", (e) => { e.preventDefault(); void (async () => { const token = (input && input.value ? input.value : "").trim(); if (!token || (submit && submit.disabled)) return; if (error) error.hidden = true; if (submit) submit.disabled = true; // one auth at a time const ok = await tryTokenAuth(token).catch(() => false); if (!ok) { showError(); if (submit) submit.disabled = false; return; } storeToken(token); // try/catch — private mode: caching is a no-op resetWhoami(); // the boot-fired whoami says anonymous — stale const after = await fetchWhoami(); // the single fresh post-auth request if (!after.authenticated) { // token-auth said 204 but whoami still says anonymous (the // session cookie did not land): drop the cache just written // and let the user retry. (role "admin" here — an admin // signed in from another tab in the meantime — is // authenticated: the gate's job is to let them through.) removeToken(); showError(); if (submit) submit.disabled = false; return; } hideGate(); if (lockRoot) lockRoot.inert = false; onAuthed(); // A mid-page login must not leave the anonymous header state // (Sign in visible / Sign out hidden): re-boot the shared // header on the fresh post-auth whoami (idempotent — it just // re-toggles the same controls). void initSharedHeader(); })(); }); }