A single bash script that runs a coding harness (pi by default) inside a rootless Ubuntu 24.04 container with only the current directory mounted at /project, an explicit egress allowlist and an explicit environment: nothing is passed in that was not named on the command line or in a config file. Network enforcement here is empirical rather than assumed (tests/spike_network.sh, docs/networking.md). The original design -- a sidecar proxy on an internal network -- does not work rootless on this host, so allow mode runs pasta with --map-host-loopback, installs an inet aisb ruleset inside the container that drops every egress path except the gate's, and relays through a squid gate bound to the host's loopback that resolves names itself and refuses anything unlisted. The entrypoint checks that the default-drop rule really exists before setpriv drops to uid 1000 with an empty capability set, and exits 77/78 rather than run unenforced. The Containerfile, the entrypoint, the squid config generator and the ruleset renderer all live in bin/ai-sandbox, and the image is tagged by content hash, so a policy change can never silently reuse a stale image. Tests are pure bash: 161 assertions start no container and touch no network, 256 run real ones, including proof that a raw socket, a stripped proxy env and DNS all stay blocked while an allowlisted host works over both http and CONNECT. LLM-Generated: true
21 lines
279 B
INI
21 lines
279 B
INI
root = true
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[*]
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charset = utf-8
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end_of_line = lf
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insert_final_newline = true
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trim_trailing_whitespace = true
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indent_style = space
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indent_size = 2
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[*.sh]
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indent_style = space
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indent_size = 2
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shell_variant = bash
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[*.{md,yml,yaml}]
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indent_size = 2
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[Makefile]
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indent_style = tab
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