Files
ai-sandbox/tests/unit/05_policy.sh
T
ducoterra 144e322391 Add --publish: the one ingress control
Everything else in the file gates egress, which left an everyday request unanswered: the
agent starts a dev server inside the sandbox and a human wants to look at it. This puts a
listener on the host that forwards into the container, so a browser, curl or an API
tester reaches the server the sandboxed process runs.

`--publish [ADDR:]HOST:CONTAINER`, config `publish` and AISB_PUBLISH, repeatable, with the
cost named in the flag: it is ingress, so whatever that server serves is reachable from
the address it binds. The default address is 127.0.0.1 because a bare podman -p binds
every interface (measured) -- a port committed in a repo config must not quietly be a port
on the LAN. publish_addr changes the default machine-wide; a spec with a non-loopback
address warns on every run. The grammar is smaller than podman's on purpose: one port per
entry, no ranges, no /udp, no `*` -- this list is reviewed line by line, and typing
0.0.0.0 is the whole warning. An address means three parts, so `127.0.0.1:8000` is refused
rather than guessed. No -p alias: that flag belongs to the harness (claude -p prints).

Fail closed, as elsewhere: --net none cannot forward a port and podman discards the
mapping while starting the container anyway, so "it ran" would mean "nothing is
listening"; a host port already in use is named before the container starts, not after a
build; pick_port() will not hand the gate a port this run publishes. The container is
labelled with the ports it was given, and doctor reports them.

Inside, publish_rules() accepts tcp on the published ports in the input chain and never
the output one. Measured (docs/networking.md): pasta delivers the connection over
loopback, so that rule counts 0 packets on the reference host; it is there for a host or a
bridge network that delivers on the interface, and so that `nft list table inet aisb`
answers "what can reach this container". The ports are validated again inside the
entrypoint, because a ruleset is not somewhere to splice an unvalidated string. And the
measurement that makes a configured preview look broken: a server bound to 127.0.0.1
inside answers inside and refuses the published port outside, so dev servers must bind
0.0.0.0 -- both skills say so in the change that writes the port.

Tests. Unit: the grammar and every port list that looks right and is not, config/env/flag
precedence and dedup, the canonical spec in --print-policy, the `# ingress:` header, the
flags reaching the invocation before the image, egress enforcement byte-identical with a
port open, which chain the rule lands in and that a non-numeric port never reaches nft as
code. e2e (tests/e2e/13_publish.sh): one real container with enforce=nft where the host
gets its 200 and the same run still refuses a domain outside the allowlist at 403, the
server runs as uid 1000 with no capabilities so it cannot widen its own port, and the host
listener is gone when the container exits.

LLM-Generated: true
2026-10-30 22:53:57 -04:00

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# tests/unit/05_policy.sh -- how allow entries are classified.
source "$TESTS/lib.sh"
PROJ="$WORK/proj"; mkdir -p "$PROJ"; cd "$PROJ" || exit 1
export AISB_CONFIG_DIR="$WORK/cfg-empty"; mkdir -p "$AISB_CONFIG_DIR"
direct_line() { printf '%s' "$1" | grep '^direct=' | cut -d= -f2-; }
t_name "domains go to the gate, not to netfilter"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow api.openai.com
assert_contains "gate_domains=api.openai.com" "domain listed for the gate"
assert_eq "" "$(direct_line "$OUT")" "no netfilter entry for a domain in gate mode"
assert_contains "proxy=100.64.0.1:18081" "gate address is the proxy"
t_name "IP and CIDR entries become direct rules"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow 10.0.0.5:5432
assert_eq "direct=10.0.0.5 5432" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep '^direct=')" "explicit host:port"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow 10.1.0.0/16
assert_eq "direct=10.1.0.0/16 80,443" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep '^direct=')" "CIDR gets the default ports"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow 10.0.0.5:5432 --allow 10.9.9.9
assert_eq "direct=10.0.0.5 5432;10.9.9.9 80,443" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep '^direct=')" "several direct entries"
t_name "ipv6"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow "[::1]:8080"
assert_eq "direct6=::1 8080" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep '^direct6=')" "bracketed [ipv6]:port parses"
assert_eq "direct=" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep '^direct=')" "and stays out of the ipv4 rules"
assert_contains "gate_domains=" "policy printed for an ipv6 entry"
t_name "--no-gate resolves names up front"
sb --print-policy --net allow --no-gate --allow localhost
assert_contains "direct=127.0.0.1 80,443" "localhost resolves to a direct rule"
assert_contains "proxy=none" "--no-gate has no proxy"
sb --print-policy --net allow --no-gate --allow nope.invalid
assert_rc 1 "an unresolvable name is an error, not a silent no-op"
assert_contains "could not resolve" "and it says so"
t_name "ports"
sb --allow api.openai.com:not-a-port --print-policy
assert_rc 1 "non-numeric port rejected"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow api.openai.com:8443
assert_contains "gate_domains=api.openai.com" "domain+port still routed through the gate"
t_name "publish is its own line, because it is a different direction"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow example.com
assert_contains "publish=" "published ports are reported even when there are none"
assert_eq "publish=" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep '^publish=')" " ... and the line is empty, not 'none'"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow example.com --publish 8000 --publish 18080:9000
assert_contains "publish=127.0.0.1:8000:8000 127.0.0.1:18080:9000" "canonical specs: address, host port, container port"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow example.com --publish 0.0.0.0:8000
assert_rc 1 "a two-part spec with an address is not guessed at"
# An allow entry and a published port are answers to different questions; a config that
# reads like one must not quietly become the other.
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow 100.64.0.1:5432 --publish 8000
assert_contains "direct=100.64.0.1 5432" "the allow entry stayed an egress rule"
assert_contains "publish=127.0.0.1:8000:8000" "and the published port stayed ingress"
t_name "mixed list"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow api.openai.com --allow 10.0.0.5:5432 --allow files.pythonhosted.org
assert_contains "api.openai.com" "domain 1"
assert_contains "files.pythonhosted.org" "domain 2"
assert_contains "10.0.0.5 5432" "ip entry"