2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
ducoterra	144e322391	Add --publish: the one ingress control ... Everything else in the file gates egress, which left an everyday request unanswered: the agent starts a dev server inside the sandbox and a human wants to look at it. This puts a listener on the host that forwards into the container, so a browser, curl or an API tester reaches the server the sandboxed process runs. `--publish [ADDR:]HOST:CONTAINER`, config `publish` and AISB_PUBLISH, repeatable, with the cost named in the flag: it is ingress, so whatever that server serves is reachable from the address it binds. The default address is 127.0.0.1 because a bare podman -p binds every interface (measured) -- a port committed in a repo config must not quietly be a port on the LAN. publish_addr changes the default machine-wide; a spec with a non-loopback address warns on every run. The grammar is smaller than podman's on purpose: one port per entry, no ranges, no /udp, no `*` -- this list is reviewed line by line, and typing 0.0.0.0 is the whole warning. An address means three parts, so `127.0.0.1:8000` is refused rather than guessed. No -p alias: that flag belongs to the harness (claude -p prints). Fail closed, as elsewhere: --net none cannot forward a port and podman discards the mapping while starting the container anyway, so "it ran" would mean "nothing is listening"; a host port already in use is named before the container starts, not after a build; pick_port() will not hand the gate a port this run publishes. The container is labelled with the ports it was given, and doctor reports them. Inside, publish_rules() accepts tcp on the published ports in the input chain and never the output one. Measured (docs/networking.md): pasta delivers the connection over loopback, so that rule counts 0 packets on the reference host; it is there for a host or a bridge network that delivers on the interface, and so that `nft list table inet aisb` answers "what can reach this container". The ports are validated again inside the entrypoint, because a ruleset is not somewhere to splice an unvalidated string. And the measurement that makes a configured preview look broken: a server bound to 127.0.0.1 inside answers inside and refuses the published port outside, so dev servers must bind 0.0.0.0 -- both skills say so in the change that writes the port. Tests. Unit: the grammar and every port list that looks right and is not, config/env/flag precedence and dedup, the canonical spec in --print-policy, the `# ingress:` header, the flags reaching the invocation before the image, egress enforcement byte-identical with a port open, which chain the rule lands in and that a non-numeric port never reaches nft as code. e2e (tests/e2e/13_publish.sh): one real container with enforce=nft where the host gets its 200 and the same run still refuses a domain outside the allowlist at 403, the server runs as uid 1000 with no capabilities so it cannot widen its own port, and the host listener is gone when the container exits. LLM-Generated: true	2026-10-30 22:53:57 -04:00
ducoterra	209f167e43	add doc-sandbox: answer from the installed program, not memory ... The explainer for questions about a flag, a config key, a refusal, a mechanism or a security boundary. ai-sandbox generates its own Containerfile, entrypoint, squid config and netfilter rules from one script, so the text of the program is the documentation of the version the user will run: the skill sets a strict ground-truth order -- the installed script and --help, then the repo docs, then the tests as the executable spec -- and its own fact sheet last, overridden by all of them. scripts/locate.sh resolves that order on an arbitrary machine: the installed script and its version, the source tree behind it (via $AISB_REPO, the script's own parent, $PWD, the git root), the docs with their line counts, and the config/state/cache locations. references/source-map.md maps a question topic to the function, doc and test that hold the answer, plus the vocabulary (split_target, classify_allows, gate vs --no-gate vs --proxy, POL[]/P_*/OPT_*) and the FAQ. The skill names which safe surface answers what: the --dry-run, --print-entrypoint, --print-containerfile and --print-policy previews build nothing and reach no registry, while inspect, doctor --deep, build, update and gate up do change the machine and are not for an explanation. It records the two honest exceptions rather than overclaiming -- --print-policy ensures the home volume, and --no-gate hits DNS. Read-only by construction: no build, no container, no network call, and it reads pi_config_bridge() rather than a models.json holding a live key. Its worst failure mode is an invented flag, so the answer format requires the real spelling, the source it came from, what the thing does not do, and a plain "no" plus the closest real thing when the answer is no. LLM-Generated: true	2026-10-29 08:37:51 -04:00