main
4
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 ducoterra
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144e322391 |
Add --publish: the one ingress control
Everything else in the file gates egress, which left an everyday request unanswered: the agent starts a dev server inside the sandbox and a human wants to look at it. This puts a listener on the host that forwards into the container, so a browser, curl or an API tester reaches the server the sandboxed process runs. `--publish [ADDR:]HOST:CONTAINER`, config `publish` and AISB_PUBLISH, repeatable, with the cost named in the flag: it is ingress, so whatever that server serves is reachable from the address it binds. The default address is 127.0.0.1 because a bare podman -p binds every interface (measured) -- a port committed in a repo config must not quietly be a port on the LAN. publish_addr changes the default machine-wide; a spec with a non-loopback address warns on every run. The grammar is smaller than podman's on purpose: one port per entry, no ranges, no /udp, no `*` -- this list is reviewed line by line, and typing 0.0.0.0 is the whole warning. An address means three parts, so `127.0.0.1:8000` is refused rather than guessed. No -p alias: that flag belongs to the harness (claude -p prints). Fail closed, as elsewhere: --net none cannot forward a port and podman discards the mapping while starting the container anyway, so "it ran" would mean "nothing is listening"; a host port already in use is named before the container starts, not after a build; pick_port() will not hand the gate a port this run publishes. The container is labelled with the ports it was given, and doctor reports them. Inside, publish_rules() accepts tcp on the published ports in the input chain and never the output one. Measured (docs/networking.md): pasta delivers the connection over loopback, so that rule counts 0 packets on the reference host; it is there for a host or a bridge network that delivers on the interface, and so that `nft list table inet aisb` answers "what can reach this container". The ports are validated again inside the entrypoint, because a ruleset is not somewhere to splice an unvalidated string. And the measurement that makes a configured preview look broken: a server bound to 127.0.0.1 inside answers inside and refuses the published port outside, so dev servers must bind 0.0.0.0 -- both skills say so in the change that writes the port. Tests. Unit: the grammar and every port list that looks right and is not, config/env/flag precedence and dedup, the canonical spec in --print-policy, the `# ingress:` header, the flags reaching the invocation before the image, egress enforcement byte-identical with a port open, which chain the rule lands in and that a non-numeric port never reaches nft as code. e2e (tests/e2e/13_publish.sh): one real container with enforce=nft where the host gets its 200 and the same run still refuses a domain outside the allowlist at 403, the server runs as uid 1000 with no capabilities so it cannot widen its own port, and the host listener is gone when the container exits. LLM-Generated: true |
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ducoterra
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90d98dcc9e |
Keep the sandbox's own chatter off the stream the command owns
stdout inside the container belongs to the command that ran. Two readers take it as data: ai-sandbox-autophase's preflight reads its answer from that stream, and progress.mjs reads the child pi's JSON event stream from it. Five notices in the pi-seeding block went there instead of stderr, and the steady state (host file unchanged, so cur = prev) prints one on *every* pi-bridged run -- the driver refused a working sandbox on every project. They all go to stderr now, like log() and fail(). The preflight takes the aisb-ok marker from wherever it appears instead of insisting it come first: a banner from an older image or from the user's own launcher is warned about and quoted back, because that stream is parsed as data in every unit. It still refuses on a non-zero exit, on silence, and on a launcher that runs no command -- the failures that would repeat in every unit -- and quotes the foreign stdout instead of a bare exit code. The same block, second contract: the thinking level is policy, so a home the sandbox creates gets it on the *first* seed, not one run later via the merge. tests/unit/06_entrypoint.sh runs the seeding block with the two streams split and asserts stdout empty in every state (cold, steady, edited inside, unparseable, level changed), and greps the entrypoint for any [aisb] line without >&2. tests/unit/10_autophase.sh adds the noisy and the yapping launcher fixtures. LLM-Generated: true |
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ducoterra
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a08a69f143 |
make xhigh the sandbox's thinking, and stop settings.json freezing
Two changes, one bug found through the other.
Thinking is policy now: defaultThinkingLevel is xhigh unless you say otherwise
(thinking / --thinking / AISB_THINKING, with pi's levels plus 'host' to decline
and 'off' meaning pi's own no-reasoning level). It is written into the bridged
settings and re-applied by the entrypoint on every run, so a run cannot set its
own reasoning down for the runs after it. Unknown levels are refused with the
list to pick from. Nothing is written for codex, claude or a command after --,
and --no-pi-config declines it along with the bridge, because pi's own defaults
are what that flag asks for.
The reason xhigh had never reached a sandbox is worse than a missing default:
settings.json was managed as one whole file, and pi rewrites its own settings
(a theme change, "seen the changelog"), so the first such write matched nothing
and froze every host preference out permanently -- provider, model, thinking
budgets and level included, a real session left holding just
{"lastChangelogVersion": "1.4.0"}. It is merged per key instead, against a copy
of what we last wrote: a key edited in the sandbox stays edited, a key never
touched follows the host again, an untouched key the host dropped is dropped, a
key pi invented survives, and a file with no base copy takes the host values --
which repairs the volumes already frozen. Unparseable JSON is re-seeded with a
warning since pi cannot use it either; a file the container cannot read is
reported with the fix, because nothing inside the sandbox can repair one.
One trap worth remembering: the seeding script is passed to bash -c in single
quotes, so a single quote inside it closes the argument early and the rest runs
in the outer shell -- valid bash, wrong program, clean bash -n and clean
shellcheck. tests/unit/06_entrypoint.sh extracts the seeding script and asserts
it is quote-free, and extracts the merge program to test its semantics without
a container; tests/e2e/12_sandbox.sh does the same in a real run, including
forcing the level back after the sandbox sets it to off.
LLM-Generated: true
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ducoterra
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03ab9c0cb1 |
add ai-sandbox: rootless podman sandbox for agentic development
A single bash script that runs a coding harness (pi by default) inside a rootless Ubuntu 24.04 container with only the current directory mounted at /project, an explicit egress allowlist and an explicit environment: nothing is passed in that was not named on the command line or in a config file. Network enforcement here is empirical rather than assumed (tests/spike_network.sh, docs/networking.md). The original design -- a sidecar proxy on an internal network -- does not work rootless on this host, so allow mode runs pasta with --map-host-loopback, installs an inet aisb ruleset inside the container that drops every egress path except the gate's, and relays through a squid gate bound to the host's loopback that resolves names itself and refuses anything unlisted. The entrypoint checks that the default-drop rule really exists before setpriv drops to uid 1000 with an empty capability set, and exits 77/78 rather than run unenforced. The Containerfile, the entrypoint, the squid config generator and the ruleset renderer all live in bin/ai-sandbox, and the image is tagged by content hash, so a policy change can never silently reuse a stale image. Tests are pure bash: 161 assertions start no container and touch no network, 256 run real ones, including proof that a raw socket, a stripped proxy env and DNS all stay blocked while an allowlisted host works over both http and CONNECT. LLM-Generated: true |