Everything else in the file gates egress, which left an everyday request unanswered: the
agent starts a dev server inside the sandbox and a human wants to look at it. This puts a
listener on the host that forwards into the container, so a browser, curl or an API
tester reaches the server the sandboxed process runs.
`--publish [ADDR:]HOST:CONTAINER`, config `publish` and AISB_PUBLISH, repeatable, with the
cost named in the flag: it is ingress, so whatever that server serves is reachable from
the address it binds. The default address is 127.0.0.1 because a bare podman -p binds
every interface (measured) -- a port committed in a repo config must not quietly be a port
on the LAN. publish_addr changes the default machine-wide; a spec with a non-loopback
address warns on every run. The grammar is smaller than podman's on purpose: one port per
entry, no ranges, no /udp, no `*` -- this list is reviewed line by line, and typing
0.0.0.0 is the whole warning. An address means three parts, so `127.0.0.1:8000` is refused
rather than guessed. No -p alias: that flag belongs to the harness (claude -p prints).
Fail closed, as elsewhere: --net none cannot forward a port and podman discards the
mapping while starting the container anyway, so "it ran" would mean "nothing is
listening"; a host port already in use is named before the container starts, not after a
build; pick_port() will not hand the gate a port this run publishes. The container is
labelled with the ports it was given, and doctor reports them.
Inside, publish_rules() accepts tcp on the published ports in the input chain and never
the output one. Measured (docs/networking.md): pasta delivers the connection over
loopback, so that rule counts 0 packets on the reference host; it is there for a host or a
bridge network that delivers on the interface, and so that `nft list table inet aisb`
answers "what can reach this container". The ports are validated again inside the
entrypoint, because a ruleset is not somewhere to splice an unvalidated string. And the
measurement that makes a configured preview look broken: a server bound to 127.0.0.1
inside answers inside and refuses the published port outside, so dev servers must bind
0.0.0.0 -- both skills say so in the change that writes the port.
Tests. Unit: the grammar and every port list that looks right and is not, config/env/flag
precedence and dedup, the canonical spec in --print-policy, the `# ingress:` header, the
flags reaching the invocation before the image, egress enforcement byte-identical with a
port open, which chain the rule lands in and that a non-numeric port never reaches nft as
code. e2e (tests/e2e/13_publish.sh): one real container with enforce=nft where the host
gets its 200 and the same run still refuses a domain outside the allowlist at 403, the
server runs as uid 1000 with no capabilities so it cannot widen its own port, and the host
listener is gone when the container exits.
LLM-Generated: true
Turns a project directory into that project's policy, so a plain
`ai-sandbox` in the directory is the correct, reviewable invocation. It
writes the two files load_config() actually reads -- .ai-sandbox/allow
and .ai-sandbox/config -- and nothing else: no sandbox.yaml, no local
override, no invented schema, because a file nobody reads is a policy
nobody has.
scripts/survey.sh gathers the evidence read-only and prints no values:
variable NAMES, remote and registry HOSTS, service PORTS, with URL
credentials stripped before anything is printed -- the same rule
--dry-run, --print-policy and the session log hold themselves to. The
agent decides from that evidence, then verifies with --dry-run and
--print-policy rather than assuming an allowlist entry means a working
toolchain.
references/settings-map.md maps every accepted key and flag to its
default, plus per-ecosystem allowlists and the survey-to-policy cheat
sheet. references/port-and-loopback.md is the honest answer on ports:
outbound to a service on the machine via the mapped loopback address
100.64.0.1 (needs an allow entry and a client that does not hand the
request to the egress proxy), and why a port the sandbox listens on is
not reachable from the host in --net allow -- with probes, because that
half is a reading of gen_rules(), not a measurement.
Policy files only. Never builds, never starts a container, and never
writes a real credential: it writes .ai-sandbox/env.example and tells
the user what to put in the gitignored 0600 file.
LLM-Generated: true
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