Add --publish: the one ingress control

Everything else in the file gates egress, which left an everyday request unanswered: the
agent starts a dev server inside the sandbox and a human wants to look at it. This puts a
listener on the host that forwards into the container, so a browser, curl or an API
tester reaches the server the sandboxed process runs.

`--publish [ADDR:]HOST:CONTAINER`, config `publish` and AISB_PUBLISH, repeatable, with the
cost named in the flag: it is ingress, so whatever that server serves is reachable from
the address it binds. The default address is 127.0.0.1 because a bare podman -p binds
every interface (measured) -- a port committed in a repo config must not quietly be a port
on the LAN. publish_addr changes the default machine-wide; a spec with a non-loopback
address warns on every run. The grammar is smaller than podman's on purpose: one port per
entry, no ranges, no /udp, no `*` -- this list is reviewed line by line, and typing
0.0.0.0 is the whole warning. An address means three parts, so `127.0.0.1:8000` is refused
rather than guessed. No -p alias: that flag belongs to the harness (claude -p prints).

Fail closed, as elsewhere: --net none cannot forward a port and podman discards the
mapping while starting the container anyway, so "it ran" would mean "nothing is
listening"; a host port already in use is named before the container starts, not after a
build; pick_port() will not hand the gate a port this run publishes. The container is
labelled with the ports it was given, and doctor reports them.

Inside, publish_rules() accepts tcp on the published ports in the input chain and never
the output one. Measured (docs/networking.md): pasta delivers the connection over
loopback, so that rule counts 0 packets on the reference host; it is there for a host or a
bridge network that delivers on the interface, and so that `nft list table inet aisb`
answers "what can reach this container". The ports are validated again inside the
entrypoint, because a ruleset is not somewhere to splice an unvalidated string. And the
measurement that makes a configured preview look broken: a server bound to 127.0.0.1
inside answers inside and refuses the published port outside, so dev servers must bind
0.0.0.0 -- both skills say so in the change that writes the port.

Tests. Unit: the grammar and every port list that looks right and is not, config/env/flag
precedence and dedup, the canonical spec in --print-policy, the `# ingress:` header, the
flags reaching the invocation before the image, egress enforcement byte-identical with a
port open, which chain the rule lands in and that a non-numeric port never reaches nft as
code. e2e (tests/e2e/13_publish.sh): one real container with enforce=nft where the host
gets its 200 and the same run still refuses a domain outside the allowlist at 403, the
server runs as uid 1000 with no capabilities so it cannot widen its own port, and the host
listener is gone when the container exits.

LLM-Generated: true

.agents/skills/right-sandbox/references/settings-map.md

@@ -11,9 +11,10 @@ built-in default  <  ~/.config/ai-sandbox/{config,allow}  <  ./.ai-sandbox/{conf
                   <  AISB_* environment  <  command-line flag
 ```
 
-`allow`, `env`, `mount`, `install`, `label` **accumulate** from every source (deduped); every other
-key replaces. So a repo file cannot revoke a user-wide `allow` line — say so if the user expects a
-repo config to tighten their own machine.
+`allow`, `env`, `mount`, `install`, `label`, `publish` **accumulate** from every source (deduped);
+every other key replaces. So a repo file cannot revoke a user-wide `allow` line — say so if the user
+expects a repo config to tighten their own machine. It also cannot *un*publish a port the user's
+own config opens.
 
 ## The container, for orientation
 
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ directories — the host one is bind-mounted read-only onto the container one at
 | `home_cache` | `1` | `0` = throwaway tmpfs home (also `--ephemeral-home`) |
 | `gate_addr` | `100.64.0.1` | the address that *means* the host's loopback inside the container |
 | `gate_port` | `18081` | preferred first port; next free is used |
+| `publish_addr` | `127.0.0.1` | the host address a bare `publish = 8000` binds. Machine-wide setting: put it in the user config, never in a repo file, and do not widen it for the user's convenience |
 | `extra_args` | empty | appended verbatim to `podman run`, word-split. Escape hatch: do not commit it |
 | `pi_config` | `1` | bridge `~/.pi/agent/{models,settings}.json` with the credential as `$VAR` |
 | `pi_token_env` | `AI_API_TOKEN` | the variable the bridged config reads |
@@ -57,6 +59,7 @@ directories — the host one is bind-mounted read-only onto the container one at
 | `mount` | — | repeatable; `SRC[:DEST][:ro\|rw]`, default `DEST=/mnt/<basename>` |
 | `install` | — | repeatable; apt packages, each distinct set is its own image tag |
 | `label` | — | repeatable; `K=V` on the container |
+| `publish` | — | repeatable; **ingress**: `[ADDR:]HOST:CONTAINER` forwarded into the container. One port per entry, no ranges, no `/udp`; an address needs three parts. `8000`, `18080:3000`, `0.0.0.0:18080:3000` (LAN-visible: warned, do not commit) |
 
 Anything else warns (`unknown key`) and is ignored.
 
@@ -64,6 +67,7 @@ Anything else warns (`unknown key`) and is ignored.
 
 ```
 egress    --net none|allow|full  --allow HOST[:PORT]  --allow-file F  --proxy HOST:PORT  --no-gate
+ingress   --publish [ADDR:]HOST:CONTAINER        (no `-p`: that flag belongs to the harness)
 files     --mount SRC[:DEST][:ro]  --no-cwd  --workdir DIR|auto  --read-only
           --home-cache  --ephemeral-home  --agents | --no-agents  --agents-dir PATH
 env       --env NAME  --env NAME=VALUE  --env-file F          (F should be 0600)
@@ -128,6 +132,10 @@ fails loudly, which is the feature.
   that with `--workdir /tmp/...`; the tmpfs covers it.
 * The host path may not contain `:` at all — podman cannot parse such a mount spec, and
   ai-sandbox refuses rather than passing the error along.
+* `publish` is the only **ingress** setting there is, and it is not an allowlist entry. `allow =
+  100.64.0.1:5432` lets the sandbox reach a service on your machine; `publish = 5432:5432` lets your
+  machine reach a port inside the container. Confusing the two is how a database ends up exposed.
+  Read `references/port-and-loopback.md` before writing either.
 * Nothing is inherited but `TERM LANG LC_ALL LC_CTYPE TZ` (plus `HOME`, set to the container home,
   `AISB=1`, `AISB_SESSION`). A tool that needs `PATH`, a dotfile or anything else from your real home
   needs an explicit grant.