add ai-sandbox: rootless podman sandbox for agentic development

A single bash script that runs a coding harness (pi by default) inside a
rootless Ubuntu 24.04 container with only the current directory mounted at
/project, an explicit egress allowlist and an explicit environment: nothing
is passed in that was not named on the command line or in a config file.

Network enforcement here is empirical rather than assumed
(tests/spike_network.sh, docs/networking.md). The original design -- a sidecar
proxy on an internal network -- does not work rootless on this host, so allow
mode runs pasta with --map-host-loopback, installs an inet aisb ruleset inside
the container that drops every egress path except the gate's, and relays
through a squid gate bound to the host's loopback that resolves names itself
and refuses anything unlisted. The entrypoint checks that the default-drop rule
really exists before setpriv drops to uid 1000 with an empty capability set,
and exits 77/78 rather than run unenforced.

The Containerfile, the entrypoint, the squid config generator and the ruleset
renderer all live in bin/ai-sandbox, and the image is tagged by content hash,
so a policy change can never silently reuse a stale image. Tests are pure
bash: 161 assertions start no container and touch no network, 256 run real
ones, including proof that a raw socket, a stripped proxy env and DNS all stay
blocked while an allowlisted host works over both http and CONNECT.

LLM-Generated: true
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-27 15:11:29 -04:00
commit 03ab9c0cb1
27 changed files with 3426 additions and 0 deletions
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# tests/e2e/10_image.sh -- the image itself: build, cache, contents, fail-closed entrypoint.
source "$TESTS/lib.sh"
PROJ="$WORK/proj"; mkdir -p "$PROJ"; cd "$PROJ" || exit 1
t_name "build"
sb build
assert_rc 0 "ai-sandbox build succeeds"
IMG="$("$AISB" --print-policy --net none 2>/dev/null | grep '^image=' | cut -d= -f2)"
[[ -n "$IMG" ]] && _ok "image ref resolved: $IMG" || _bad "image ref resolved"
podman image exists "$IMG" && _ok "image exists in podman storage" || _bad "image exists"
t_name "build is cached and tagged by content"
START=$SECONDS
sb build
assert_rc 0 "rebuild succeeds"
(( SECONDS - START < 15 )) && _ok "second build reused the cache ($((SECONDS - START))s)" \
|| _bad "second build reused the cache ($((SECONDS - START))s)"
IMG2="$("$AISB" --print-policy --net none 2>/dev/null | grep '^image=' | cut -d= -f2)"
assert_eq "$IMG" "$IMG2" "same inputs, same tag"
sb --print-policy --net none --install hexd > /dev/null
IMG3="$("$AISB" --print-policy --net none --install hexd | grep '^image=' | cut -d= -f2)"
[[ "$IMG3" != "$IMG" ]] && _ok "extra packages produce a different tag" || _bad "extra packages change the tag"
t_name "the entrypoint fails closed without a policy"
podman run --rm --network none --cap-drop=ALL "$IMG" true > "$WORK/fc.out" 2>&1
assert_eq 78 "$?" "no /run/aisb policy -> exit 78, nothing ran"
grep -q 'policy file' "$WORK/fc.out" && _ok "it says why" || _bad "it says why: $(cat "$WORK/fc.out")"
t_name "image contents"
POL="$WORK/pol"; mkdir -p "$POL"
printf 'AISB_NET=none\nAISB_UID=1000\nAISB_GID=1000\nAISB_ALLOW_ICMP=1\nAISB_ALLOW_DNS=0\n' > "$POL/policy.env"
: > "$POL/direct4.list"; : > "$POL/direct6.list"
# podman takes mount options as a comma list: ":ro,:z" not ":ro:z"
SEL="${AISB_SELINUX:-:z}"; SELC="${SEL#:}"
run_in() {
podman run --rm --network none --cap-drop=ALL --cap-add=setuid --cap-add=setgid --cap-add=setpcap \
--userns "keep-id:uid=1000,gid=1000" -u 0:0 \
--security-opt no-new-privileges \
-v "$POL:/run/aisb:ro${SELC:+,$SELC}" -v "$PROJ:/project$SEL" -w /project \
"$IMG" bash -lc "$1" 2>&1
}
OUT="$(run_in 'id -u')"; assert_eq "1000" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | tail -1)" "drops to uid 1000"
OUT="$(run_in 'grep CapEff /proc/self/status | cut -f2')"
assert_eq "0000000000000000" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | tail -1)" "no capabilities left for the command"
OUT="$(run_in 'node --version')"
printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep -qE '^v2[2-9]' && _ok "node $(printf '%s' "$OUT" | tail -1)" || _bad "node 22+: $OUT"
OUT="$(run_in 'command -v pi')"
printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep -q '/pi' && _ok "the pi harness is installed" || _bad "pi installed: $OUT"
OUT="$(run_in 'nft --version && setpriv --version | head -1 && git --version')"
assert_contains "nftables" "nftables present"
assert_contains "git version" "git present"
OUT="$(run_in 'pwd')"
assert_eq "/project" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | tail -1)" "working directory is /project"
t_name "the container cannot see the host filesystem"
SECRET="$WORK/parent-secret.txt"; echo "do not read" > "$SECRET"
OUT="$(run_in "cat '$SECRET' 2>&1 || echo NOT_VISIBLE")"
assert_contains "NOT_VISIBLE" "files outside the mount are unreachable"
OUT="$(run_in 'ls / | tr "\n" " "')"
assert_absent "$(id -un)" "no host home directories in /"
t_name "resource caps are visible from inside"
OUT="$(podman run --rm --network none --cap-drop=ALL --cap-add=setuid --cap-add=setgid --cap-add=setpcap --pids-limit 64 --memory 128m \
--userns "keep-id:uid=1000,gid=1000" -u 0:0 \
-v "$POL:/run/aisb:ro${SELC:+,$SELC}" "$IMG" \
bash -lc 'cat /sys/fs/cgroup/pids.max; cat /sys/fs/cgroup/memory.max' 2>&1)"
assert_contains "64" "pids.max = 64"
assert_contains "134217728" "memory.max = 128m"
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# tests/e2e/11_net.sh -- the promise of the project: only the allowlist is reachable.
#
# Needs outbound internet on the host; skips (rc 0) when there is none.
source "$TESTS/lib.sh"
PROJ="$WORK/proj"; mkdir -p "$PROJ"; cp "$TESTS/fixtures/egress_probe.sh" "$PROJ/"
cd "$PROJ" || exit 1
if ! curl -m8 -sS -o /dev/null http://example.com 2>/dev/null; then
echo " (skipped: no outbound internet on this host, so egress cannot be tested)"
summary; exit 0
fi
GATE="--net allow --allow example.com"
# a service on the host's loopback that the sandbox must not be able to reach
HOSTPORT="$(python3 -c 'import socket;s=socket.socket();s.bind(("127.0.0.1",0));print(s.getsockname()[1]);s.close()')"
python3 -m http.server "$HOSTPORT" --bind 127.0.0.1 --directory "$WORK" >/dev/null 2>&1 &
SRV=$!
trap 'kill '"$SRV"' 2>/dev/null' EXIT
sleep 1
t_name "allow mode: enforcement in one run"
sb $GATE --env AISB_PROBE_HOSTSVC="$HOSTPORT" -- bash /project/egress_probe.sh
assert_contains "ok_allowed_http=200" "allowlisted http works (through the gate)"
assert_contains "ok_allowed_https=200" "allowlisted https works (CONNECT)"
assert_contains "ok_gate_denied_domain=403" "a non-allowlisted domain is refused by the gate"
assert_contains "ok_gate_denied_https=" "https CONNECT to a non-allowlisted host is refused"
assert_contains "ok_direct_egress_blocked=domain" "ignoring the proxy env does not open a direct route"
assert_contains "ok_direct_egress_blocked=rawip" "a literal IP is not routable either"
assert_contains "ok_raw_socket_blocked" "a raw socket cannot connect out"
assert_contains "ok_host_service_blocked" "only the gate's port is reachable on the mapped loopback address"
assert_contains "ok_dns_blocked" "DNS is closed: names cannot be resolved behind the proxy's back"
t_name "the ruleset cannot be lifted from inside"
assert_contains "uid=1000" "the harness runs unprivileged"
assert_contains "capeff=0000000000000000" "no capabilities remain for it"
assert_contains "ok_rules_hidden" "it cannot read the ruleset"
assert_contains "ok_rules_locked" "it cannot delete the ruleset"
assert_contains "ok_netns_locked" "it cannot open its own network namespace"
assert_contains "ok_still_enforced=403" "and enforcement still holds afterwards"
t_name "an IP entry is allowed through the gate as well"
sb --net allow --allow example.com --allow 1.1.1.1:80 -- bash -lc '
echo "ip_entry_code=$(curl -m10 -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code} http://1.1.1.1 2>&1)"
echo "domain_code=$(curl -m10 -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code} http://example.org 2>&1)"'
assert_absent "ip_entry_code=403" "an allowlisted IP is not refused by the gate"
assert_contains "domain_code=403" "while an unlisted domain still is"
t_name "--net none is dark"
sb --net none -- bash -lc '
curl -m5 -sS -o /dev/null http://example.com 2>/dev/null && echo BAD_open || echo ok_dark
ip -4 -o addr show 2>/dev/null | grep -c global | sed "s/^/addrs=/"
echo "capeff=$(grep CapEff /proc/self/status | cut -f2)"'
assert_contains "ok_dark" "no egress at all"
assert_contains "addrs=0" "no global addresses in the namespace"
assert_contains "capeff=0000000000000000" "no capabilities either"
t_name "--no-gate: IPs resolved up front, everything else dropped"
sb --net allow --no-gate --allow example.com -- bash -lc '
echo "allowed=$(curl -m15 -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code} http://example.com 2>&1)"
curl -m8 -sS -o /dev/null http://example.org 2>/dev/null && echo BAD_not_blocked || echo ok_blocked
echo "dns=$(: </dev/tcp/8.8.8.8/53 2>/dev/null && echo open || echo closed)"'
assert_contains "allowed=200" "the resolved address of an allowlisted name works"
assert_contains "ok_blocked" "anything else is dropped by netfilter"
t_name "the gate does not outlive the session"
BEFORE_GATES="$(podman ps -a --filter label=aisb.role=gate -q | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
sb $GATE -- true
AFTER_GATES="$(podman ps -a --filter label=aisb.role=gate -q | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
assert_eq "$BEFORE_GATES" "$AFTER_GATES" "no gate container is left behind by a run"
LEFT="$(ls -A "$AISB_STATE_DIR/sessions" 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
assert_eq "0" "$LEFT" "no session directory is left behind"
t_name "a named gate outlives a session on purpose"
AISB_GATE_NAME=aisb-test-gate "$AISB" gate up --allow example.com > "$WORK/gate.out" 2>&1
OUT="$(cat "$WORK/gate.out")"
assert_rc 0 "gate up succeeds"
assert_contains "port=" "and reports the port"
PORT="$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep '^port=' | cut -d= -f2)"
if [[ -n "$PORT" ]]; then
code="$(curl -sS -m6 -x "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT" -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://example.com/ 2>/dev/null || echo 000)"
assert_eq "200" "$code" "the named gate proxies an allowlisted host"
code="$(curl -sS -m6 -x "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT" -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://example.org/ 2>/dev/null || echo 000)"
assert_eq "403" "$code" "and refuses a non-allowlisted host"
fi
AISB_GATE_NAME=aisb-test-gate "$AISB" gate down > /dev/null 2>&1
assert_eq "0" "$(podman ps -a --filter name=aisb-test-gate -q | wc -l | tr -d ' ')" "gate down removes it"
t_name "a sandbox can use a named gate instead of starting its own"
AISB_GATE_NAME=aisb-test-gate2 "$AISB" gate up --allow example.com > "$WORK/gate2.out" 2>&1
PORT2="$(grep '^port=' "$WORK/gate2.out" | cut -d= -f2)"
sb --net allow --proxy "100.64.0.1:${PORT2}" --allow example.com -- bash -lc '
echo "via_proxy=$(curl -m15 -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code} http://example.com 2>&1)"'
assert_contains "via_proxy=200" "--proxy routes through the named gate"
AISB_GATE_NAME=aisb-test-gate2 "$AISB" gate down > /dev/null 2>&1
t_name "a bad gate config fails closed rather than running wide open"
# point the sandbox at a port where nothing answers: the run must not silently
# proceed with a broken egress path.
sb --net allow --proxy 100.64.0.1:1 -- bash -lc '
code=$(curl -m8 -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code} http://example.com 2>/dev/null); echo "code=$code"
exit 0'
assert_contains "code=000" "with a dead proxy, egress simply fails (no bypass)"
kill "$SRV" 2>/dev/null
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# tests/e2e/12_sandbox.sh -- lifecycle, filesystem and environment behaviour of a real run.
source "$TESTS/lib.sh"
WORK_DIR="$WORK/project"; mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR"; cd "$WORK_DIR" || exit 1
echo "hello from the host" > "$WORK_DIR/host-file.txt"
export AISB_CANARY_IN=canary-value-42
unset AISB_CANARY_OUT
DARK="--net none"
t_name "the command runs and its exit code comes back"
sb $DARK -- bash -c 'echo ran; exit 0'
assert_rc 0 "exit 0 propagates"; assert_contains "ran" "stdout reaches the host"
sb $DARK -- bash -c 'exit 3'
assert_rc 3 "exit 3 propagates"
sb $DARK -- bash -c 'exit 127'
assert_rc 127 "exit 127 propagates"
t_name "default command follows the harness"
sb $DARK --harness none -- true >/dev/null; assert_rc 0 "harness none is accepted"
sb $DARK --harness pi -- bash -lc "command -v pi"
assert_rc 0 "the default pi binary exists in the image"
t_name "the project directory is mounted, writable, and owned by the host user"
sb $DARK -- bash -c 'pwd; touch /project/from-container.txt; echo wrote'
assert_contains "/project" "working directory is /project"
[[ -f "$WORK_DIR/from-container.txt" ]] && _ok "writes land on the host" || _bad "writes land on the host"
if [[ "$(stat -c %u "$WORK_DIR/from-container.txt")" == "$(id -u)" ]]; then
_ok "the file is owned by the host uid, not by root"
else
_bad "the file is owned by the host uid" "owner=$(stat -c %u "$WORK_DIR/from-container.txt") expected=$(id -u)"
fi
sb $DARK -- bash -c 'cat /project/host-file.txt'
assert_contains "hello from the host" "existing project files are readable"
t_name "nothing else on the host is visible"
echo secret > "$WORK/not-shared.txt"
sb $DARK -- bash -c "cat '$WORK/not-shared.txt' 2>&1 || echo NOT_VISIBLE"
assert_contains "NOT_VISIBLE" "the parent directory is not mounted"
sb $DARK -- bash -c 'ls /root 2>&1 | head -1; test -e /etc/shadow && echo has_shadow'
assert_absent "$(hostname)" "the host filesystem layout is gone"
t_name "environment: deny by default, allow on request"
sb $DARK -- bash -c 'echo "canary=[${AISB_CANARY_IN:-unset}]"; echo "home=$HOME"; echo "aisb=$AISB"'
assert_contains "canary=[unset]" "a host variable does not leak in"
assert_contains "home=/home/sandbox" "HOME is the container's own"
assert_contains "aisb=1" "the sandbox marks itself"
sb $DARK --env AISB_CANARY_IN -- bash -c 'echo "canary=[$AISB_CANARY_IN]"'
assert_contains "canary=[canary-value-42]" "--env passes exactly what was asked for"
sb $DARK --env AISB_CANARY_OUT -- bash -c 'true'
assert_rc 1 "an unset --env variable fails the run closed"
t_name "the value never appears in a command line"
( sb $DARK --env AISB_CANARY_IN -- bash -c 'sleep 2' >/dev/null 2>&1 ) &
RUNPID=$!
sleep 1.5
# Every process the value could legitimately have been handed to: the container
# runtime. argv[0] is matched exactly so the test's own shell (whose command line
# contains this very string) can never be the thing that matches.
# (the bracket keeps this grep from matching its own command line)
LEAKY="$(ps -ewwo comm=,args= | awk '{a=$1; sub(".*/","",a)} a ~ /^(podman|crun|conmon|catatonit)$/' \
| grep -c 'canar[y]-value-42' || true)"
assert_eq "0" "$LEAKY" "no podman/crun/conmon argv carries the secret"
wait $RUNPID 2>/dev/null
t_name "the env file is 0600 while running and gone afterwards"
( sb $DARK --env AISB_CANARY_IN -- bash -c 'sleep 2' >/dev/null 2>&1 ) &
RUNPID2=$!
sleep 1.5
ENVF="$(find "$AISB_STATE_DIR/sessions" -name env -print -quit 2>/dev/null)"
if [[ -n "$ENVF" ]]; then
assert_file_mode "$ENVF" 600 "the env file is owner-read/write only"
grep -q 'AISB_CANARY_IN=canary-value-42' "$ENVF" && _ok "and it holds the value we asked for" || _bad "env file content"
else
_bad "the env file is owner-read/write only" "no env file found while the container was running"
fi
wait $RUNPID2 2>/dev/null
sb $DARK --env AISB_CANARY_IN -- true
LEFT="$(find "$AISB_STATE_DIR/sessions" -name env 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
assert_eq "0" "$LEFT" "the env file is deleted when the run ends, even with --keep"
sb $DARK --keep --env AISB_CANARY_IN -- true
LEFT2="$(find "$AISB_STATE_DIR/sessions" -name env 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
assert_eq "0" "$LEFT2" "--keep keeps the container, not the secret"
t_name "extra mounts"
mkdir -p "$WORK/ro-src" "$WORK/rw-src"; echo data > "$WORK/ro-src/file"
sb $DARK --mount "$WORK/ro-src:/ro:ro" --mount "$WORK/rw-src:/rw" -- bash -c '
cat /ro/file
touch /rw/created && echo rw_ok
touch /ro/writable 2>/dev/null && echo "BAD: ro mount is writable" || echo ro_locked=ok
'
assert_contains "data" "read-only mount is readable"
assert_contains "rw_ok" "read-write mount is writable"
assert_contains "ro_locked=ok" "ro really means ro"
t_name "the home directory"
sb $DARK --ephemeral-home -- bash -c 'echo hi > "$HOME/scratch"; ls -A "$HOME" | tr "\n" " "'
assert_contains "scratch" "home is writable with an ephemeral mount"
sb $DARK --home-cache -- bash -c 'echo cached > "$HOME/cached-marker"'
sb $DARK --home-cache -- bash -c 'cat "$HOME/cached-marker"'
assert_contains "cached" "the home cache volume persists across runs"
sb $DARK --ephemeral-home -- bash -c 'test -f "$HOME/cached-marker" && echo LEAK || echo isolated'
assert_contains "isolated" "an ephemeral home does not see it"
t_name "read-only root filesystem"
sb $DARK --read-only -- bash -c 'touch /usr/bin/nope 2>/dev/null && echo "BAD: wrote to rootfs" || echo rootfs_locked=ok; touch /project/rw-still-works && echo project_still_writable'
assert_contains "rootfs_locked=ok" "--read-only blocks writes outside mounts"
assert_contains "project_still_writable" "the project mount stays writable"
t_name "lifecycle"
BEFORE="$(podman ps -a --filter label=ai-sandbox=1 -q | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
sb $DARK -- true
AFTER="$(podman ps -a --filter label=ai-sandbox=1 -q | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
assert_eq "$BEFORE" "$AFTER" "the container is removed when the command exits"
sb $DARK --keep --name aisb-keeptest -- true
podman ps -a --format '{{.Names}}' | grep -qx aisb-keeptest && _ok "--keep leaves the container" || _bad "--keep leaves the container"
SESSIONS_KEPT="$(ls -d "$AISB_STATE_DIR"/sessions/* 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
[[ "$SESSIONS_KEPT" -ge 1 ]] && _ok "--keep leaves the session dir for inspection" || _bad "--keep leaves the session dir"
sb clean --all > /dev/null
GONE="$(podman ps -a --filter name=aisb-keeptest -q | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
assert_eq "0" "$GONE" "clean removes leftovers"
t_name "clean --volumes reclaims the home cache, carefully"
podman volume create not-aisb-decoy > /dev/null 2>&1
podman volume create aisb-other-dangling > /dev/null 2>&1
AISB_HOME_VOLUME=aisb-test-home sb $DARK -- true
if podman volume exists aisb-test-home > /dev/null 2>&1; then _ok "the run created its home cache volume"; else _bad "the run created its home cache volume"; fi
sb clean --volumes=aisb-test-home > /dev/null
if podman volume exists aisb-test-home > /dev/null 2>&1; then _bad "clean --volumes=NAME reclaimed the unused volume"; else _ok "clean --volumes=NAME reclaimed the unused volume"; fi
if podman volume exists aisb-other-dangling > /dev/null 2>&1; then _ok "an unmatched volume was left alone"; else _bad "an unmatched volume was left alone"; fi
# a live sandbox's home is never reclaimed while it runs
AISB_HOME_VOLUME=aisb-test-home2 sb $DARK --name aisb-vollive -- bash -c 'sleep 25' > /dev/null 2>&1 &
for _ in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20; do
podman ps --filter name=aisb-vollive -q | grep -q . && break
sleep 0.5
done
AISB_HOME_VOLUME=aisb-test-home2 sb clean --volumes=aisb-test-home2 > /dev/null
if podman volume exists aisb-test-home2 > /dev/null 2>&1; then _ok "a running sandbox keeps its home volume"; else _bad "a running sandbox keeps its home volume"; fi
podman rm -f aisb-vollive > /dev/null 2>&1
AISB_HOME_VOLUME=aisb-test-home2 sb clean --volumes=aisb-test-home2 > /dev/null
if podman volume exists aisb-test-home2 > /dev/null 2>&1; then _bad "it is reclaimed once nothing references it"; else _ok "it is reclaimed once nothing references it"; fi
podman volume rm not-aisb-decoy aisb-other-dangling > /dev/null 2>&1
t_name "the session log records what ran, without secrets"
LOG="$(cat "$AISB_STATE_DIR/log" 2>/dev/null || true)"
printf '%s' "$LOG" | grep -q 'net=none' && _ok "the log records the run" || _bad "the log records the run"
printf '%s' "$LOG" | grep -q 'canary-value-42' && _bad "secrets must never reach the log" || _ok "no secrets in the log"
t_name "doctor"
sb doctor
assert_rc 0 "doctor reports no problems"
assert_contains "bind mount + uid mapping" "doctor verifies uid mapping"
assert_contains "rootless" "doctor verifies rootless podman"
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# tests/fixtures/egress_probe.sh -- runs *inside* the sandbox and reports, one
# marker per line, what is and is not reachable. Kept as a file so the outer test
# does not have to nest five layers of quoting.
#
# Markers start with ok_/BAD_ so the caller can grep for either.
set -uo pipefail
ALLOW="${AISB_PROBE_ALLOW:-example.com}"
OTHER="${AISB_PROBE_OTHER:-example.org}"
RAWIP="${AISB_PROBE_RAWIP:-1.1.1.1}"
GATE="${AISB_PROBE_GATE:-100.64.0.1}"
HOSTSVC="${AISB_PROBE_HOSTSVC:-18099}"
# 1. allowlisted destination, through the proxy
code="$(curl -m15 -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "http://$ALLOW" 2>/dev/null)"
[[ "$code" == 200 ]] && echo "ok_allowed_http=$code" || echo "BAD_allowed_http=$code"
# 2. allowlisted destination over https (CONNECT)
code="$(curl -m15 -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "https://$ALLOW" 2>/dev/null)"
[[ "$code" == 200 ]] && echo "ok_allowed_https=$code" || echo "BAD_allowed_https=$code"
# 3. non-allowlisted domain: the gate must answer 403
code="$(curl -m10 -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "http://$OTHER" 2>/dev/null)"
[[ "$code" == 403 ]] && echo "ok_gate_denied_domain=$code" || echo "BAD_gate_denied_domain=$code"
# a denied CONNECT is refused by the proxy: curl reports 000/502, never 200
code="$(curl -m10 -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "https://$OTHER" 2>/dev/null)"
[[ "$code" != 200 ]] && echo "ok_gate_denied_https=$code" || echo "BAD_gate_denied_https=$code"
# 4. same, but pretending the caller ignores the proxy env: the netfilter ruleset
# is what stops it. Anything other than a connection failure is a leak.
nop () { env -u http_proxy -u https_proxy -u all_proxy -u HTTP_PROXY -u HTTPS_PROXY -u ALL_PROXY "$@"; }
if nop curl -m8 -sS -o /dev/null "http://$OTHER" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "BAD_direct_egress=domain"
else
echo "ok_direct_egress_blocked=domain"
fi
if nop curl -m8 -sS -o /dev/null "http://$RAWIP" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "BAD_direct_egress=rawip"
else
echo "ok_direct_egress_blocked=rawip"
fi
# 5. a raw socket (no proxy semantics at all) must not connect either
python3 - "$RAWIP" "$GATE" <<'PY'
import socket, sys
rawip, gate = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
for label, host, port in (("rawip", rawip, 80), ("cdnish", "93.184.216.34", 80), ("dns", "8.8.8.8", 53)):
s = socket.socket(); s.settimeout(6)
try:
s.connect((host, port)); print(f"BAD_raw_socket={label}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"ok_raw_socket_blocked={label}:{type(e).__name__}")
finally:
s.close()
PY
# 6. an unrelated service on the host's loopback must be unreachable through the
# mapped address: only the gate's own port is routable there. Tested without
# the proxy, because a proxied request dies at the squid and would exit 0 on a
# 403 -- which proves the proxy works, not that the route is closed.
if nop curl -m6 -sS -o /dev/null "http://$GATE:$HOSTSVC/" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "BAD_host_service_reachable=$HOSTSVC"
else
echo "ok_host_service_blocked=$HOSTSVC"
fi
# 7. DNS: gate mode keeps it shut, so nothing can resolve names behind the proxy
if getent hosts "$OTHER" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "BAD_dns_resolved=$OTHER"
else
echo "ok_dns_blocked=$OTHER"
fi
# 8. who are we, and can we touch the ruleset?
echo "uid=$(id -u)"
echo "capeff=$(grep CapEff /proc/self/status | cut -f2)"
if nft list table inet aisb > /dev/null 2>&1; then echo "BAD_rules_readable"; else echo "ok_rules_hidden"; fi
if nft delete table inet aisb > /dev/null 2>&1; then echo "BAD_rules_deleted"; else echo "ok_rules_locked"; fi
if unshare -n true > /dev/null 2>&1; then echo "BAD_new_netns"; else echo "ok_netns_locked"; fi
# 9. and after all that, enforcement is still in place
code="$(curl -m10 -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "http://$OTHER" 2>/dev/null)"
[[ "$code" == 403 ]] && echo "ok_still_enforced=$code" || echo "BAD_still_enforced=$code"
+75
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@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# tests/lib.sh -- tiny assertion helpers for the ai-sandbox test suite.
#
# Every test file gets: AISB (path to the script), WORK (scratch dir), and uses
# sb() to run the sandbox with fully redirected XDG dirs so nothing touches the
# real machine.
PASS=0
FAIL=0
FAILED_NAMES=()
_current=""
t_name() { _current="$1"; printf '\n\033[1m# %s\033[0m\n' "$1"; }
_ok() { PASS=$((PASS + 1)); printf ' \033[32mok\033[0m %s\n' "$1"; }
_bad() { FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); FAILED_NAMES+=("$_current :: $1"); printf ' \033[31mFAIL\033[0m %s\n' "$1"; shift || true;
[[ -n "${1:-}" ]] && printf ' %s\n' "$1"; return 0; }
# sb [args...] -> sets RC, OUT (stdout+stderr)
sb() {
OUT="$("$AISB" "$@" 2>&1)" && RC=0 || RC=$?
return 0
}
# sb_env VAR=val ... -- args (env prefix, without leaking into the test shell)
sb_env() {
local -a envs=()
while (($#)) && [[ "$1" != -* && "$1" == *=* ]]; do envs+=("$1"); shift; done
OUT="$(env "${envs[@]}" "$AISB" "$@" 2>&1)" && RC=0 || RC=$?
return 0
}
assert_rc() { # assert_rc <expected> <label>
if [[ "$RC" == "$1" ]]; then _ok "$2"
else _bad "$2" "expected rc=$1 got rc=$RC; output: $(printf '%s' "$OUT" | head -3 | tr '\n' ' ')"; fi
}
assert_contains() { # assert_contains <needle> <label>
if printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep -qF -- "$1"; then _ok "$2"
else _bad "$2" "missing: '$1' in: $(printf '%s' "$OUT" | head -5 | tr '\n' ' ')"; fi
}
assert_absent() { # assert_absent <needle> <label>
if printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep -qF -- "$1"; then
_bad "$2" "unexpectedly present: '$1'"
else _ok "$2"; fi
}
assert_eq() { # assert_eq <expected> <actual> <label>
if [[ "$1" == "$2" ]]; then _ok "$3"
else _bad "$3" "expected '$1' got '$2'"; fi
}
assert_count() { # assert_count <expected> <needle> <label>
local n
n="$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep -oF -- "$2" | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
if [[ "$n" == "$1" ]]; then _ok "$3"
else _bad "$3" "expected $1 occurrence(s) of '$2', got $n"; fi
}
assert_file_mode() { # assert_file_mode <path> <mode> <label>
local m; m="$(stat -c '%a' "$1" 2>/dev/null || echo missing)"
if [[ "$m" == "$2" ]]; then _ok "$3"; else _bad "$3" "expected mode $2 got $m"; fi
}
summary() {
printf '\n------------------------------------------------------------\n'
[[ -n "${AISB_TEST_COUNTS:-}" ]] && printf '%s %s\n' "$PASS" "$FAIL" >> "$AISB_TEST_COUNTS"
if (( FAIL )); then
printf '\033[31m%d passed, %d FAILED\033[0m\n' "$PASS" "$FAIL"
local f; for f in "${FAILED_NAMES[@]}"; do printf ' - %s\n' "$f"; done
return 1
fi
printf '\033[32m%d passed, 0 failed\033[0m\n' "$PASS"
}
Executable
+87
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@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# tests/run.sh -- the ai-sandbox test runner.
#
# ./tests/run.sh unit tests (no containers started, no network)
# ./tests/run.sh --e2e everything, including real containers and egress tests
# ./tests/run.sh --only 04 just the files matching 04
# ./tests/run.sh --verbose show each test file's raw output as it runs
#
# Every test file runs with its own XDG state so nothing here touches the real
# machine's config, state or cache directories.
set -uo pipefail
HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT="$(dirname "$HERE")"
AISB="${AISB:-$ROOT/bin/ai-sandbox}"
export AISB
WITH_E2E=0 ONLY="" VERBOSE=0
while (($#)); do
case "$1" in
--e2e|-e) WITH_E2E=1; shift ;;
--only) ONLY="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
--verbose|-v) export VERBOSE=1; shift ;; # lib.sh reads VERBOSE
--help|-h) sed -n '2,12p' "$0"; exit 0 ;;
*) echo "unknown option: $1" >&2; exit 2 ;;
esac
done
command -v podman >/dev/null || { echo "podman is required to run the tests" >&2; exit 2; }
# Syntax-check every shell file in the project before running anything.
SYNTAX_BAD=0
for f in "$AISB" "$HERE"/*.sh "$HERE"/unit/*.sh "$HERE"/e2e/*.sh "$ROOT"/install.sh; do
[[ -f "$f" ]] || continue
if ! syn="$(bash -n "$f" 2>&1)"; then
echo "SYNTAX: $f" >&2; printf '%s\n' "$syn" | sed 's/^/ /' >&2; SYNTAX_BAD=1
fi
done
(( SYNTAX_BAD )) && exit 2
FILES=( "$HERE"/unit/*.sh )
(( WITH_E2E )) && FILES+=( "$HERE"/e2e/*.sh )
if [[ -n "$ONLY" ]]; then
mapfile -t FILES < <(printf '%s\n' "${FILES[@]}" | grep "/[^/]*$ONLY")
fi
BASE="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/ai-sandbox-tests.XXXXXX")"
COUNTS="$BASE/counts"
: > "$COUNTS"
trap 'chmod -R u+rwX "$BASE" 2>/dev/null; rm -rf "$BASE" 2>/dev/null' EXIT
echo "ai-sandbox test suite"
echo " script : $AISB"
echo " mode : $([[ $WITH_E2E == 1 ]] && echo 'unit + e2e (real containers)' || echo 'unit only (add --e2e for containers)')"
echo " files : ${#FILES[@]}"
echo
FAILED_FILES=()
for f in "${FILES[@]}"; do
name="$(basename "$f")"
W="$BASE/$name"; mkdir -p "$W"/{state,cache,cfg}
echo "=================================================================="
echo "== $name"
echo "=================================================================="
# shellcheck disable=SC1090
(
export AISB_STATE_DIR="$W/state" AISB_CACHE_DIR="$W/cache" AISB_CONFIG_DIR="$W/cfg"
export WORK="$W" TESTS="$HERE" AISB_TEST_COUNTS="$COUNTS"
# NOTE: HOME is deliberately not overridden -- podman storage lives there.
unset AISB_ALLOW AISB_ENV AISB_MOUNT AISB_INSTALL AISB_NET AISB_EXTRA_ARGS AISB_SESSION_OVERRIDE
source "$f"
summary
) || FAILED_FILES+=("$name")
echo
done
TOTAL_P=0 TOTAL_F=0
while read -r p fl; do TOTAL_P=$((TOTAL_P + p)); TOTAL_F=$((TOTAL_F + fl)); done < "$COUNTS"
echo "=================================================================="
if ((${#FAILED_FILES[@]})); then
printf '\033[31mFAILED\033[0m %d passed, %d failed across %d file(s)\n' "$TOTAL_P" "$TOTAL_F" "${#FAILED_FILES[@]}"
printf ' failing files: %s\n' "${FAILED_FILES[*]}"
exit 1
fi
printf '\033[32mALL PASS\033[0m %d assertions, %d file(s), %s mode\n' \
"$TOTAL_P" "${#FILES[@]}" "$([[ $WITH_E2E == 1 ]] && echo unit+e2e || echo unit)"
+79
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# tests/spike_network.sh -- empirical verification of the network enforcement primitives.
#
# Run on a machine with rootless podman. Output is captured into docs/networking.md.
# Nothing here is a unit test; it is evidence that the enforcement model holds on the
# host it was run on. Safe: creates and removes its own podman network + containers.
#
# ./tests/spike_network.sh | tee /tmp/spike.txt
set -uo pipefail
NET="${AISB_SPIKE_NET:-aisb-spike}"
IMG="${AISB_SPIKE_IMG:-docker.io/library/ubuntu:24.04}"
CURL_IMG="${AISB_SPIKE_CURL_IMG:-docker.io/curlimages/curl:latest}"
UID_N="$(id -u)"
say() { printf '\n=== %s ===\n' "$*"; }
cleanup() {
podman rm -f aisb-spike-a aisb-spike-b aisb-spike-gate >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
podman network rm "$NET" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
cleanup
# "Connection refused" => L3 reachable (nothing listening). "Could not connect"/timeout => not reachable.
probe() { # probe <ctr> <ip> -> prints REFUSED|UNREACHABLE
local out
out="$(timeout 25 podman run --rm --network="$1" "$CURL_IMG" -m3 -o /dev/null "http://$2:1/" 2>&1 || true)"
case "$out" in
*"Connection refused"*) echo "REFUSED (reachable)" ;;
*) echo "UNREACHABLE :: $(printf '%s' "$out" | tr '\n' ' ' | cut -c1-90)" ;;
esac
}
say "0. host"
printf 'podman : %s\n' "$(podman --version)"
printf 'rootless: %s\n' "$(podman info --format '{{.Host.Security.Rootless}}')"
printf 'uid : %s subuid: %s\n' "$UID_N" "$(grep -c "^$(id -un):" /etc/subuid 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
printf 'helpers : pasta=%s slirp4netns=%s\n' "$(command -v pasta || echo no)" "$(command -v slirp4netns || echo no)"
printf 'state : %s\n' "$(ls "/run/user/$UID_N/netns" 2>/dev/null | tr '\n' ' ')"
printf 'bridges : %s\n' "$(ip -br -o link show type bridge 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}' | tr '\n' ' ')"
say "1. internal network: egress + DNS must fail"
podman network create --internal "$NET" >/dev/null || { echo "SKIP: cannot create network"; exit 0; }
printf 'internal subnet: %s\n' "$(podman network inspect "$NET" --format '{{range .plugins}}{{if .subnet}}{{.subnet}} gw={{.gateway}}{{end}}{{end}}')"
timeout 60 podman run --rm --network="$NET" "$IMG" sh -c '
cat /etc/resolv.conf | sed "s/^/ resolv: /"
getent hosts example.com >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo " DNS: RESOLVED (!!! BAD)" || echo " DNS: blocked"
timeout 4 sh -c "echo > /dev/tcp/93.184.216.34/80" 2>/dev/null && echo " RAW-IP EGRESS: WORKED (!!! BAD)" || echo " RAW-IP EGRESS: blocked"
' 2>&1 | sed 's/^/ /'
say "2. default (podman) network: egress must work"
timeout 60 podman run --rm "$CURL_IMG" -sS -m6 -o /dev/null -w ' http://example.com -> HTTP %{http_code}\n' http://example.com 2>&1 | sed 's/^/ /'
say "3. container placement: where do the veths live?"
timeout 60 podman run -d --name aisb-spike-a --network="$NET" "$IMG" sleep 120 >/dev/null
timeout 60 podman run -d --name aisb-spike-b --network="$NET" "$IMG" sleep 120 >/dev/null
IP_A=$(podman inspect -f '{{range .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{.IPAddress}} {{end}}' aisb-spike-a | awk '{print $1}')
printf ' container A internal ip: %s\n' "$IP_A"
printf ' A -> B : %s\n' "$(probe "$NET" "$(podman inspect -f '{{range .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{.IPAddress}}{{end}}' aisb-spike-b)")"
say "4. gate candidate A: --network=host can it reach the internal subnet?"
timeout 60 podman run --rm --network=host "$CURL_IMG" -m3 -o /dev/null "http://$IP_A:1/" 2>&1 | sed 's/^/ host-net ctr -> internal ip: /'
printf ' host-net ctr has egress : %s\n' "$(timeout 60 podman run --rm --network=host "$CURL_IMG" -sS -m6 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://example.com 2>&1 | tail -1)"
say "5. gate candidate B: multi-attach (internal + internet) egress + DNS"
timeout 60 podman run --rm --network="$NET" --network=podman "$CURL_IMG" -sS -m6 -o /dev/null -w ' HTTP %{http_code}\n' http://example.com 2>&1 | sed 's/^/ /'
say "6. pasta option passthrough (does podman forward args to pasta?)"
timeout 60 podman run --rm --network=pasta:--map-gw "$CURL_IMG" -sS -m6 -o /dev/null -w ' pasta:--map-gw HTTP %{http_code}\n' http://example.com 2>&1 | tail -2 | sed 's/^/ /'
say "7. resource caps observable from inside"
timeout 60 podman run --rm --pids-limit 64 --memory 256m --cpus 0.5 "$IMG" sh -c \
'printf " pids.max=%s mem.max=%s\n" "$(cat /sys/fs/cgroup/pids.max 2>/dev/null)" "$(cat /sys/fs/cgroup/memory.max 2>/dev/null)"; grep -c ^processor /proc/cpuinfo | sed "s/^/ cpuinfo nproc=/"' 2>&1 | sed 's/^//'
say "8. userns keep-id: file ownership written to a host bind"
D="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$D"' EXIT
timeout 60 podman run --rm --userns=keep-id:uid=1000,gid=1000 -u 1000:1000 -v "$D:/project" -w /project "$IMG" \
sh -c 'id -u; id -g; touch /project/owned && echo ok' 2>&1 | sed 's/^/ ctr: /'
printf ' on host: %s\n' "$(stat -c '%u:%g %n' "$D/owned" 2>/dev/null || echo "NOT CREATED")"
cleanup
+42
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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# tests/unit/01_args.sh -- argument handling.
source "$TESTS/lib.sh"
t_name "help / version"
sb --help; assert_rc 0 "--help exits 0"; assert_contains "NETWORK" "--help documents the network section"
sb --version; assert_rc 0 "--version exits 0"
sb version; assert_contains "ai-sandbox" "version subcommand prints the name"
t_name "flag -> harness pass-through"
A="--allow example.com" # allow mode is the default and fails closed without this
sb --dry-run $A --model sonnet; assert_rc 0 "unknown flag is accepted"; assert_contains "pi --model sonnet" "unknown flag and the rest are handed to pi"
sb --dry-run $A file.txt --more; assert_contains "pi file.txt --more" "positional starts the command"
sb --dry-run $A -- echo hi; assert_contains "echo hi" "after -- the command runs exactly as given"
assert_absent "pi echo hi" "after -- the harness is replaced, not prefixed"
assert_contains "--network pasta:--map-host-loopback" "and a --net after -- is not mistaken for a sandbox flag"
sb --dry-run $A --shell; assert_contains "bash -li" "--shell runs bash"
sb --dry-run $A --harness codex; assert_contains "codex" "--harness codex selects the command"
sb --dry-run $A --harness none; assert_contains "bash -li" "--harness none drops to a shell"
sb --dry-run --net none -- echo hi; assert_contains "echo hi" "--net= form before the command still parses"
t_name "strict args"
sb --strict-args --model sonnet; assert_rc 1 "strict mode rejects unknown flags"
assert_contains "unknown option" "strict mode says 'unknown option'"
sb --strict-args --al foo; assert_contains "did you mean --allow" "strict mode suggests a near miss"
t_name "value validation"
sb --net bogus --dry-run; assert_rc 1 "bad --net rejected"; assert_contains "--net must be none, allow or full" "names the valid values"
sb --pids abc --dry-run; assert_rc 1 "bad --pids rejected"
sb --cpus x4 --dry-run; assert_rc 1 "bad --cpus rejected"
sb --memory huge --dry-run; assert_rc 1 "bad --memory rejected"
sb --allow; assert_rc 1 "--allow with no value"
sb --allow-file /nope/missing; assert_rc 1 "--allow-file must exist"
sb --mount /nope/missing --dry-run; assert_rc 1 "--mount path must exist"
t_name "fail-closed network policy"
sb --dry-run; assert_rc 1 "allow mode with no allowlist refuses to start"
assert_contains "Refusing to start wide open" "explains that it refuses to be wide open"
sb --dry-run --net none; assert_rc 0 "--net none needs no allowlist"; assert_contains "--network none" "--net none maps to podman --network none"
sb --dry-run --net full; assert_rc 0 "--net full is allowed (explicit opt-in)"
assert_contains "unrestricted internet" "--net full warns"
sb --dry-run --allow example.com; assert_rc 0 "one allow entry is enough"
+78
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@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# tests/unit/02_config.sh -- config files, allowlists and precedence.
source "$TESTS/lib.sh"
CFG="$WORK/cfg"
REPO="$WORK/repo"
mkdir -p "$CFG" "$REPO/.ai-sandbox"
export AISB_CONFIG_DIR="$CFG"
cd "$REPO" || exit 1
t_name "allow files are merged"
cat > "$CFG/allow" <<'EOF'
# user-wide allowlist
api.openai.com
registry.npmjs.org # trailing comment
EOF
cat > "$REPO/.ai-sandbox/allow" <<'EOF'
pypi.org
EOF
sb --print-policy --net allow
assert_rc 0 "print-policy runs"
assert_contains "api.openai.com" "user allowlist entry present"
assert_contains "registry.npmjs.org" "user entry with trailing comment present"
assert_contains "pypi.org" "repo allowlist entry present"
t_name "dedup"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow pypi.org --allow pypi.org
ALLOW_LINE="$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep '^allow=')"
N="$(printf '%s' "$ALLOW_LINE" | grep -o 'pypi.org' | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
assert_eq "1" "$N" "duplicate allow entries collapse into one"
t_name "key = value config"
cat > "$CFG/config" <<'EOF'
net = none
harness = none
cpus = 7
memory = 1536m
pids = 77
selinux = :Z
EOF
sb --print-policy
assert_contains "net=none" "config file sets net"
assert_contains "harness=none" "config file sets harness"
assert_contains "cpus:7" "config file sets cpus"
assert_contains "memory:1536m" "config file sets memory"
assert_contains "pids:77" "config file sets pids"
assert_contains "selinux=:Z" "config file sets selinux"
t_name "precedence: flag > env > config file"
sb --print-policy --net allow
assert_contains "net=allow" "flag beats config file"
sb_env AISB_NET=full --print-policy
assert_contains "net=full" "AISB_* env beats config file"
sb_env AISB_NET=full --print-policy --net none
assert_contains "net=none" "flag beats AISB_* env"
t_name "AISB_ALLOW / AISB_ENV lists"
sb_env AISB_ALLOW=a.example.com,b.example.com:8443 --print-policy --net none
assert_contains "a.example.com" "AISB_ALLOW entry 1"
assert_contains "b.example.com:8443" "AISB_ALLOW entry 2 with port"
sb_env AISB_ENV=HOME_X,TMPDIR --print-policy --net none
assert_contains "env_names=HOME_X TMPDIR" "AISB_ENV populates env names"
assert_contains "env_missing=HOME_X" "unset names are reported by --print-policy"
t_name "repo config wins per-directory"
cat > "$REPO/.ai-sandbox/config" <<'EOF'
pids = 42
EOF
sb --print-policy --net none
assert_contains "pids:42" "repo config overrides user config"
t_name "unknown keys warn but do not break"
echo 'bogus_key = 1' >> "$CFG/config"
sb --print-policy --net none
assert_contains "unknown key: bogus_key" "unknown key warns"
assert_rc 0 "unknown key is not fatal"
+86
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# tests/unit/03_argv.sh -- the policy actually reaches the podman invocation.
source "$TESTS/lib.sh"
PROJ="$WORK/proj"; mkdir -p "$PROJ"; cd "$PROJ" || exit 1
export AISB_CONFIG_DIR="$WORK/cfg-empty"; mkdir -p "$AISB_CONFIG_DIR"
A="--allow example.com"
t_name "isolation flags are always on"
sb --dry-run $A
assert_contains "--cap-drop=ALL" "all capabilities dropped"
assert_contains "no-new-privileges" "no new privileges"
assert_contains "--userns keep-id" "uid mapped back to the host user"
assert_contains "--pids-limit 512" "pid limit"
assert_contains "--memory 4g" "memory limit"
assert_contains "--cpus 4" "cpu limit"
assert_contains "/tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev" "/tmp is a nosuid tmpfs"
assert_contains "--hostname aisb" "hostname"
assert_contains "--rm" "container is removed on exit"
assert_contains "--stop-signal SIGTERM" "clean shutdown signal"
t_name "network modes"
sb --dry-run --net none
assert_contains "--network none" "none"
sb --dry-run --net full
assert_contains "--network pasta" "full uses pasta with no filter"
assert_absent "--cap-add=NET_ADMIN" "full mode needs no NET_ADMIN"
sb --dry-run $A
assert_contains "--network pasta:--map-host-loopback,100.64.0.1" "allow mode maps a host-loopback door for the gate"
assert_contains "--cap-add=NET_ADMIN" "allow mode grants NET_ADMIN to the entrypoint only"
assert_contains "HTTP_PROXY=http://100.64.0.1:18081" "proxy env points at the gate"
assert_contains "NO_PROXY=localhost" "localhost is never proxied"
sb --dry-run $A --proxy 10.9.8.7:3128
assert_contains "HTTP_PROXY=http://10.9.8.7:3128" "--proxy overrides the gate"
sb --dry-run $A --no-gate
assert_absent "HTTP_PROXY=" "--no-gate sets no proxy"
t_name "filesystem"
sb --dry-run $A
assert_contains "$PROJ:/project" "cwd is mounted at /project"
assert_contains "--workdir /project" "cwd is the working directory"
assert_contains "/run/aisb:ro" "policy dir is mounted read-only"
sb --dry-run $A --no-cwd
assert_absent "$PROJ:/project" "--no-cwd mounts nothing"
sb --dry-run $A --workdir /src
assert_contains "$PROJ:/src" "--workdir changes the mount point"
mkdir -p "$WORK/extra"
sb --dry-run $A --mount "$WORK/extra"
assert_contains "$WORK/extra:/mnt/extra" "--mount defaults to /mnt/<name>"
sb --dry-run $A --mount "$WORK/extra:/ex:ro"
assert_contains "$WORK/extra:/ex" "--mount with explicit destination"
assert_contains "ro" " ... and ro option present"
sb --dry-run $A --read-only
assert_contains "--read-only" "--read-only"
sb --dry-run $A
assert_contains "type=volume,source=aisb-home,target=/home/sandbox" "home cache volume by default"
sb --dry-run $A --ephemeral-home
assert_contains "/home/sandbox:rw,nosuid,nodev" "--ephemeral-home uses a tmpfs home"
assert_absent "type=volume,source=aisb-home" "--ephemeral-home drops the volume"
t_name "labels, limits, extra args"
sb --dry-run $A --label team=x
assert_contains "--label team=x" "--label"
assert_contains "aisb.net=allow" "session label"
sb --dry-run $A --cpus 12 --memory 8g --pids 99
assert_contains "--cpus 12" "custom cpus"
assert_contains "--memory 8g" "custom memory"
assert_contains "--pids-limit 99" "custom pids"
sb_env "AISB_EXTRA_ARGS=--label from=extra" --dry-run $A
assert_contains "--label from=extra" "AISB_EXTRA_ARGS is appended"
t_name "everything lands before the image; the command comes last"
sb --dry-run $A --label zzz=1 -- echo hello
line="$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | tail -1)"
pos_img="$(printf '%s' "$line" | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -n -m1 'localhost/ai-sandbox' | cut -d: -f1)"
pos_lbl="$(printf '%s' "$line" | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -n -m1 'zzz=1' | cut -d: -f1)"
pos_cmd="$(printf '%s' "$line" | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -n -m1 '^hello$' | cut -d: -f1)"
if [[ -n "$pos_img" && -n "$pos_lbl" && $pos_lbl -lt $pos_img ]]; then _ok "extra flags precede the image"; else _bad "extra flags precede the image" "img=$pos_img label=$pos_lbl"; fi
if [[ -n "$pos_cmd" && -n "$pos_img" && $pos_img -lt $pos_cmd ]]; then _ok "the command follows the image"; else _bad "the command follows the image" "img=$pos_img cmd=$pos_cmd"; fi
t_name "dry run is side-effect free"
sb --dry-run $A
RUNNING="$(podman ps --format '{{.Names}}' | grep -c 'aisb' || true)"
DIRS="$(ls -A "$AISB_STATE_DIR/sessions" 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
assert_eq "$RUNNING" 0 "dry run started no container"
assert_eq "$DIRS" 0 "dry run left no session directory behind"
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# tests/unit/04_env.sh -- environment passing and secret hygiene.
source "$TESTS/lib.sh"
PROJ="$WORK/proj"; mkdir -p "$PROJ"; cd "$PROJ" || exit 1
export AISB_CONFIG_DIR="$WORK/cfg-empty"; mkdir -p "$AISB_CONFIG_DIR"
export AISB_CANARY=hunter2-secret-value
export AISB_EMPTY_VAR=""
unset AISB_NOT_SET
t_name "deny by default"
sb --print-policy --net none
assert_eq "env_names=" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep '^env_names=')" "nothing is passed by default"
assert_absent "CANARY" "a host variable is not passed unless asked for"
t_name "explicit passing"
sb --print-policy --net none --env AISB_CANARY
assert_contains "env_names=AISB_CANARY" "named variable is queued"
assert_absent "hunter2" "the value never appears in --print-policy output"
sb --dry-run --net none --env AISB_CANARY
assert_absent "hunter2" "the value never appears in the printed podman invocation"
assert_contains "<env-file:0600>" "values travel through a 0600 env file, not the command line"
t_name "set-but-empty passes, unset fails closed"
sb --print-policy --net none --env AISB_EMPTY_VAR
assert_contains "env_names=AISB_EMPTY_VAR" "empty value still passes"
assert_absent "env_missing=AISB_EMPTY_VAR" "empty value is not 'missing'"
sb --print-policy --net none --env AISB_NOT_SET
assert_rc 0 "--print-policy warns instead of dying"
assert_contains "not set in the host environment" "the warning names the problem"
assert_contains "env_missing=AISB_NOT_SET" "env_missing reports it"
t_name "literal values"
sb --dry-run --net none --env FOO=bar
assert_contains "<env-file:0600>" "literal values also go through the env file"
assert_absent "bar" "literal values are not echoed into the invocation"
t_name "env files"
cat > "$WORK/envfile" <<'EOF'
# comment
AISENV_ONE=1
AISENV_TWO=with spaces
AISENV_THREE=has=equals
EOF
chmod 600 "$WORK/envfile"
sb --print-policy --net none --env-file "$WORK/envfile"
assert_contains "env_names=AISENV_ONE AISENV_TWO AISENV_THREE" "all three names queued"
sb_env AISENV_ONE=1 --print-policy --net none --env AISB_CANARY --env-file "$WORK/envfile"
assert_contains "AISENV_THREE" "env file entries pass"
assert_contains "AISB_CANARY" "and combine with --env"
t_name "loose env-file permissions warn"
chmod 644 "$WORK/envfile"
sb --print-policy --net none --env-file "$WORK/envfile"
assert_contains "chmod 600 recommended" "world-readable env file warns"
chmod 600 "$WORK/envfile"
t_name "invalid names and values"
sb --print-policy --net none --env 9BAD
assert_rc 1 "invalid variable name rejected"
sb --print-policy --net none --env-file "$WORK/does-not-exist"
assert_rc 1 "missing env file rejected"
export AISB_MULTILINE=$'one\ntwo'
sb --print-policy --net none --env AISB_MULTILINE
assert_rc 1 "multi-line values are rejected rather than silently truncated"
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# tests/unit/05_policy.sh -- how allow entries are classified.
source "$TESTS/lib.sh"
PROJ="$WORK/proj"; mkdir -p "$PROJ"; cd "$PROJ" || exit 1
export AISB_CONFIG_DIR="$WORK/cfg-empty"; mkdir -p "$AISB_CONFIG_DIR"
direct_line() { printf '%s' "$1" | grep '^direct=' | cut -d= -f2-; }
t_name "domains go to the gate, not to netfilter"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow api.openai.com
assert_contains "gate_domains=api.openai.com" "domain listed for the gate"
assert_eq "" "$(direct_line "$OUT")" "no netfilter entry for a domain in gate mode"
assert_contains "proxy=100.64.0.1:18081" "gate address is the proxy"
t_name "IP and CIDR entries become direct rules"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow 10.0.0.5:5432
assert_eq "direct=10.0.0.5 5432" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep '^direct=')" "explicit host:port"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow 10.1.0.0/16
assert_eq "direct=10.1.0.0/16 80,443" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep '^direct=')" "CIDR gets the default ports"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow 10.0.0.5:5432 --allow 10.9.9.9
assert_eq "direct=10.0.0.5 5432;10.9.9.9 80,443" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep '^direct=')" "several direct entries"
t_name "ipv6"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow "[::1]:8080"
assert_eq "direct6=::1 8080" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep '^direct6=')" "bracketed [ipv6]:port parses"
assert_eq "direct=" "$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep '^direct=')" "and stays out of the ipv4 rules"
assert_contains "gate_domains=" "policy printed for an ipv6 entry"
t_name "--no-gate resolves names up front"
sb --print-policy --net allow --no-gate --allow localhost
assert_contains "direct=127.0.0.1 80,443" "localhost resolves to a direct rule"
assert_contains "proxy=none" "--no-gate has no proxy"
sb --print-policy --net allow --no-gate --allow nope.invalid
assert_rc 1 "an unresolvable name is an error, not a silent no-op"
assert_contains "could not resolve" "and it says so"
t_name "ports"
sb --allow api.openai.com:not-a-port --print-policy
assert_rc 1 "non-numeric port rejected"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow api.openai.com:8443
assert_contains "gate_domains=api.openai.com" "domain+port still routed through the gate"
t_name "mixed list"
sb --print-policy --net allow --allow api.openai.com --allow 10.0.0.5:5432 --allow files.pythonhosted.org
assert_contains "api.openai.com" "domain 1"
assert_contains "files.pythonhosted.org" "domain 2"
assert_contains "10.0.0.5 5432" "ip entry"
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# tests/unit/06_entrypoint.sh -- the container-side enforcement script.
source "$TESTS/lib.sh"
PROJ="$WORK/proj"; mkdir -p "$PROJ"; cd "$PROJ" || exit 1
export AISB_CONFIG_DIR="$WORK/cfg-empty"; mkdir -p "$AISB_CONFIG_DIR"
# Extract the entrypoint exactly as it is baked into the image.
EP="$WORK/entrypoint.sh"
"$AISB" --print-entrypoint > "$EP" 2>"$WORK/ep.err"; RC=$?
assert_eq 0 "$RC" "the embedded entrypoint can be printed"
bash -n "$EP" && _ok "entrypoint is syntactically valid bash" || _bad "entrypoint is syntactically valid bash"
grep -q 'set -Eeuo pipefail' "$EP" && _ok "entrypoint is strict" || _bad "entrypoint is strict"
t_name "the image is described by the script itself"
sb --print-containerfile
assert_contains "FROM docker.io/library/ubuntu:24.04" "ubuntu 24.04 base"
assert_contains "nftables" "image ships nftables"
assert_contains "util-linux" "image ships setpriv (util-linux)"
assert_contains "sha256sum -c" "node tarball is checksum verified"
assert_contains "useradd" "image creates the sandbox user"
assert_contains 'ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/lib/aisb/entrypoint.sh"]' "entrypoint is baked in"
assert_contains "WORKDIR /project" "project is the default workdir"
t_name "generated ruleset shape"
# Run the rule generator outside a container (nft is not needed to render it).
POL="$WORK/mnt"; mkdir -p "$POL"
cat > "$POL/policy.env" <<EOF
AISB_NET=allow
AISB_UID=1000
AISB_GID=1000
AISB_UNENFORCED=0
AISB_KEEP_ROOT=0
AISB_ALLOW_ICMP=1
AISB_ALLOW_DNS=0
AISB_PROXY_IPS=100.64.0.1
AISB_PROXY_PORTS=18081
EOF
printf '10.0.0.5 5432\n10.1.0.0/16 80,443\n' > "$POL/direct4.list"
printf '::1 8080\n' > "$POL/direct6.list"
RULES="$AISB_STATE_DIR/rules.f"
# Render the ruleset by extracting the generator and feeding it the policy above.
GEN="$WORK/gen.sh"
awk '/^gen_rules\(\) \{/{f=1} f{print} f&&/^\}$/{exit}' "$EP" > "$GEN"
{ printf 'POLICY_DIR=%q\nAISB_PROXY_IPS="100.64.0.1"\nAISB_PROXY_PORTS="18081"\nAISB_ALLOW_ICMP=1\nAISB_ALLOW_DNS=0\n' "$POL"
printf 'gen_rules\n'; } >> "$GEN"
bash "$GEN" > "$RULES" 2>"$WORK/gen.err" && _ok "rules render" || _bad "rules render" "$(tail -3 "$WORK/gen.err")"
grep -q 'table inet aisb' "$RULES" && _ok "inet table (covers v4 and v6)" || _bad "inet table"
grep -q 'policy drop' "$RULES" && _ok "default policy is drop" || _bad "default policy drop"
grep -q 'aisb-default-drop' "$RULES" && _ok "explicit default-drop rule exists" || _bad "default-drop rule"
grep -q 'oifname "lo" accept' "$RULES" && _ok "loopback stays usable" || _bad "loopback accept"
grep -q 'ip daddr 10.0.0.5 tcp dport { 5432 }' "$RULES" && _ok "per-entry host:port rule" || _bad "host:port rule: $(grep -c . "$RULES") lines"
grep -q 'ip daddr 10.1.0.0/16 tcp dport { 80,443 }' "$RULES" && _ok "CIDR rule with default ports" || _bad "CIDR rule"
grep -q 'ip6 daddr ::1 tcp dport { 8080 }' "$RULES" && _ok "ipv6 rule" || _bad "ipv6 rule"
grep -q 'ip daddr 100.64.0.1 tcp dport 18081' "$RULES" && _ok "gate endpoint is allowed" || _bad "gate rule"
grep -q 'aisb-est' "$RULES" && _ok "established traffic accepted" || _bad "established rule"
grep -c 'accept comment "aisb-direct"' "$RULES" | grep -qx 3 && _ok "exactly 3 direct rules" || _bad "direct rule count: $(grep -c 'aisb-direct' "$RULES")"
t_name "no DNS hole when the gate is in front"
grep -E 'th dport 53' "$RULES" >/dev/null && _bad "DNS is closed in gate mode" || _ok "DNS is closed in gate mode"
t_name "privilege drop is the last thing that happens"
tail -5 "$EP" | grep -q 'setpriv' && _ok "exec setpriv at the end" || _bad "setpriv last: $(tail -3 "$EP" | tr '\n' ' ')"
grep -q -- '--bounding-set=-all' "$EP" && _ok "bounding set cleared" || _bad "bounding set cleared"
grep -q -- '--inh-caps=-all' "$EP" && _ok "inheritable caps cleared" || _bad "inheritable caps cleared"
grep -q -- '--no-new-privs' "$EP" && _ok "no new privileges" || _bad "no-new-privs"
grep -q -- '--reuid=' "$EP" && _ok "uid switched" || _bad "reuid"
grep -q 'fail "policy file' "$EP" && _ok "missing policy = refuse to start" || _bad "fail closed on missing policy"
grep -q 'refusing to start\|Refusing to run unenforced' "$EP" && _ok "missing NET_ADMIN = refuse to start" || _bad "fail closed without NET_ADMIN"